Following the Venezuela-Russia-Cuba-China-Iran examination from Jaime Suchlicki last month, the Inter-American Dialogue's Michael Shifter drills down to the Iran-Venezuela aspect of this in the latest issue of Poder 360. This excerpt should give a decent idea:
The key question is whether the Venezuela-Iran relationship can best be understood as merely a political alliance -that is, a byproduct of self-interested jockeying and rapidly shifting poles of power in the world --or rather as something more sinister meriting an energetic response from the United States and other governments concerned about peace and security in the Americas. Apart from irritating Washington, what does Venezuela gain from the alliance? And what are the possible benefits for Iran in its global strategy?...
Aside from opportunities for grandstanding and symbolic gestures, what does Chavez get from the relationship? The short answer is, apparently, not too much. True, Chavez's alliance with Ahmadinejad gives him yet another reason to thumb his nose at the US with great glee, but it is doubtful that he derives many other benefits from the partnership. Trade between the two countries is notably modest (at roughly $52 million in 2008) and the array of economic projects begun by the two presidents, ranging from dairy sales to automobile production, have reportedly turned out to be more of a liability than an asset. (The same can be said in Nicaragua, where promises made by the Iranian regime for enhanced investment have reportedly not been met.) Nor is the relationship with Iran likely to yield economic dividends for Chavez in other sectors, although it does enable him to keep oil prices high (which helps at least in the short term).
An alliance with Ahmadinejad also does not strengthen Chavez's claim that his government is working on behalf of global peace. In actuality, it hurts Chavez's relationships with potential allies in Europe and even in Latin America that are worried about Iran's nuclear aims. And it is not even clear that the relationship helps Chavez politically at home. Venezuelan and Iranian cultures could not be further apart. The two governments do currently share an antipathy for the United States (though, curiously, rather warm feelings historically in their respective regions towards what Chavez calls the "empire"), but Ahmadinejad is like a fish out of water in Venezuela, where he does not seem to arouse a lot of excitement even among core Chavez supporters.
For Ahmadinejad, the benefits of the relationship seem a bit clearer. Befriending Chavez opens the way for Iran's entry into the Western Hemisphere, thus irritating Washington and projecting a more global presence. It also helps Iran overcome its status as an international pariah and gain a measure of legitimacy in a region regarded as mostly democratic. Still, while Venezuela may offer Iran some hospitable terrain to pursue its strategic objectives, it is hard to argue that Venezuela is fundamental to Iran's foreign policy agenda. Whatever geopolitical aims Iran may have are at best only marginally advanced by the alliance with Venezuela. The economic advantages of the relationship for Iran are even more elusive.
More here.
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