Three Factors Haunting Chávez's Political Future

The referendum for perpetuity held on the 15th of February in Venezuela was fully imbalanced. On the one side was the opposition, without economic resources (in Venezuela parties are not given public funding), and exhausted following years of protests. On the other side was Chávez, with all the economic and propagandistic power of the State and hundreds of thousands of public servants illegally working for his cause.

Having closed, harassed, or fined the few media outlets that have opposed him, Chávez utilized the impressive media network he has built (300 radio stations, subsidized newspapers, five television channels just in the capital), dedicating it day and night to the propaganda of his indispensable and ubiquitous persona.

For the opposition, vetoed and slandered by the state media, they were left only with one television channel and cable outlet (that Chávez, in all probability, will close very soon). In addition, there was no shortage of force and intimidation.

With the knowledge of the growing antagonism toward Chávez on behalf of the youth, first-time voter registration for more than 300,000 students was blocked. Public employees were passing out flyers supporting unlimited reelection: "Chávez loves us, and love is rewarded with love."

The pitch was not just economics nor social justice, but also love. And it caught on: "I vote for what he says," said a chavista supporter in a common neighborhood on voting day. "He can change the entire constitution if he wants to. He loves all the people, and gives us much providence. So fine, yes, he is my God, so what?" Finally, the man elevated to deity has reached his proposal, but can he govern here for eternity?

The first limit will be economic. In 2009, income from oil exports could be less than one third of those in 2008. The government could postpone the inevitable reduction in spending for a few months by making use of international reserves, but the magnitude of the crash will make a significant cut in spending unavoidable. The people will watch their personal incomes fade, eroded by galloping inflation. One possible solution may be the reactivation of the productive apparatus. But Venezuela will no longer be able to count on this pillar of dynamic growth.

The country has become dependent like never before on an income which was believed to be inexhaustible. Public employees and those involved in the direct transactions around the "missions" will suffer a fall in their purchasing power. The client base will lose its handle. Loyalties will only be maintained for ideological reasons or out of fear of losing the little that they have left. The same will happen, in all likelihood, on the international level: allies of circumstance, won over by multimillion dollar handouts, will distance themselves from Chávez in direct relation to his ability to give away money.

The second limitation will be in the opposition. There is a vibrant and active civil society in Venezuela. There 6.3 million people who voted for Chávez (among sympathizers, the devoted, and clients), and 5.2 million who voted against him (a record figure). More than five million abstained. The opposition is spread among a wide social array: workers, homemakers, labor leaders, small- and medium-sized business owners, intellectuals, academics, artists, writers, clergy, journalists, and a very considerable sector of poor people. The students, in particular, have been in the vanguard of the struggle. For them it is unthinkable that Chávez still be in power for their children and grandchildren.

The third factor which could place limits on Chávez is regional geopolitics. Days before the Feb. 15 referendum, Fidel Castro - the "father" of Chávez - compared him with Bolivar. But Raul - the "uncle" of Chávez - might not agree with this heroic interpretation of his "nephew." A rapprochement between Cuba and the moderate left of Chile and Brazil and the unfreezing of relations with the United States (including, of course, the immediate lift of the embargo) would isolate Chávez. His discourse would appear more and more solipsistic and anachronistic.

The combination of these three factors will affect Chávez in 2009 and will condition the important legislative elections of 2010. If the opposition doesn't lose its nerve, they will be able to win over an important representation at this date, and from there exercise supervision over government to augment their credibility for 2012. This gradual and peaceful fade away is the best scenario for the escape from the grotesque monocracy the country is suffering from.

But unfortunately there is another factor which could put an end to Chávez in a bad way: his own hubris. Facing an economic crisis, opposition pressure, and an adverse geopolitical environment, will he toughen his policies and radicalize his positions, or make a call for consensus? The most like is that, in an opposition direction as Cuba (which will begin to orient itself toward the Chinese model), Chávez will walk toward a reprint of the expired Cuban model, with Iran playing the role of Russia. If Bolivar was the hero of the 19th Century, and Castro that of the 20th, Chávez is looking to be in the same place for the 21st Century. This is the delirium which motivates him. In this case, he will take polarization to its limits. And Venezuela, like many times in its history, could precipitate into violence.

Photo: Supporters of Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez celebrate outside Miraflores Palace after the electoral court announced a victory for Chavez in a national referendum to decide whether to allow him to stay in power for as long as he keeps winning elections, February 15, 2009. (Reuters Pictures)