U.S. businessmen are expected to use a Russia-U.S. business summit on Tuesday to press Moscow to rein in corruption and improve conditions for western companies operating in the country. (...)
"It looks like the Kremlin doesn't really want this discussion and Russian business is not very keen either," said one industry source. (...)And in a sign of unease about the business summit, industry sources say the list of executives who will meet Obama and Medvedev may be cut to 10 from each side from 18 and access for media may also be restricted.
They also said the meeting could be moved to the Kremlin from a luxury hotel, in a further indication that Russian authorities wanted to keep a tight grip on the talks. The Kremlin declined to comment.
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Stephen Blank has an interesting new article on Forbes in which he assesses the economic damage being caused by Russia's inability to effectively reduce legal nihilism and corruption, both of which are dragging on the country's attempt to recover from the crisis. Sticking out like a sore thumb is of course the second trial of Mikhail Khdorkovsky, which will be in full session during the first state visit of President Barack Obama. Blank describes the Khodorkovsky trial as a "palpable judicial farce," and if President Dmitry Medvedev is unable to take action to solve the situation it will "confirm the widespread belief that he is merely a tool of his predecessor, a placeholder until Putin resumes the presidency."
When he was a candidate to lead Russia, Dmitry Medvedev denounced the country's "legal nihilism." Now, as president, he has often spoken in favor of judicial independence. Yet one year after his inauguration, with President Obama set to pay a state visit on Monday, Russia remains engulfed by a tidal wave of corruption, hamstrung by a politicized justice system that is chasing away the enduring foreign investment and economic stability that Russia so desperately needs.
No villas in the south of France for Russia's top bankers this summer, if Vladimir Putin gets his way.
Russia's prime minister has sternly warned bank chiefs not to plan any holidays until they have sorted out the financing of the country's recession-hit economy.
It will take a huge effort, with output forecast to fall by about 8 per cent this year and hopes of a quick recovery fading.
From the Financial Times:
Magna, with which GM signed an MoU to buy 55 per cent of Opel alongside Russia's Sberbank in May, remains in a leading position to sign a definitive sale agreement. The Canadian group has the support of the Social Democratic part of Germany's government, regional governments and unions.
However, talks have hit obstacles over future access to GM's global technology, which Magna wants to secure on behalf of its Russian partners. If the sale proceeds, Magna and Sberbank plan to build Opel-based cars in Russia with Gaz, Oleg Deripaska's car company.
Some in GM feel Magna is using its political backing to press for unfair terms. GM also wants the future right to buy back some or all of the stake.
It should be noted that an international industrial group Thales is one of the world's leading manufacturers of defense products. In 2008, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the company delivered its products to customers in the amount of more than $9.3 billion, taking tenth place among other top defense corporations in sales volume. Memo to Pentagon: Thales also actively participates in supplying technology and products to NATO countries, so how exactly will its cooperation with Moscow affect French military relationship with Washington? Especially given how much Russia and US compete on the global arms market? Anyone?
I see that Anders Aslund from the Peterson Institute née IIE is defending Latvia's currency peg again, this time in the Moscow Times. Given the dearth of such defenders among the conventional economics wisdom crowd, and considering Russia's kabuki-like rhetoric over its own currency policy, I thought this something worth drawing attention to. Not only that, but I dare say currency peg cheerleaders are a dying breed. This is not to say that pegs are uncommon, but simply that nowadays no country is ultimately considered to be fully developed until it can float its own currency in the international foreign exchange market, somewhat like sitting for an exam without a crib sheet to consult (Hong Kong is an obvious exception, but also not technically a country).
Now, I could get all petty-nitpicky-snipey with Aslund's defense and quibble that rejecting a comparison to Russia c. 1998 and ignoring a comparison to Argentina c. 2001 while choosing to compare Latvia with Denmark and Barbados - all while contending that Latvia is a special case - is a non-sequitur, self-serving, disingenuous and lazy all wrapped up in one. Or, I could get all econo-geeky and point out that substituting the triple-whammy of wage cuts, tighter government spending and deflation for a currency devaluation is tantamount to trading six for half a dozen when faced with an asset-liability mismatch as deeply embedded as Latvia's.
But that's not what I want to do here, in part because plenty of others have already taken enough of a swat at it from an economic standpoint (and indeed, those predicting a devaluation are many: Business Monitor International, Paul Krugman, Edward Hugh, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Marxist theoretician Boris Kagarlitsky, and, with an Op-Ed that frankly reads as though it was penned by one of his underpaid student assistants, Nouriel Roubini). No, what I would rather do is propose the Latvia currency situation as an example of politics trumping economics.
As the global recession deepened last winter, Russia spent about $200 billion, or a third of its precrisis foreign currency reserves, defending the ruble during a gradual devaluation. This spring the tables quietly turned as oil prices rose, and the Russian Central Bank has made back about $30 billion since March by intervening to prevent the ruble from appreciating, the report said.
Yet other factors are weighing on Russia's prospects, the World Bank report said. A swoon in domestic demand, worse-than-expected global growth, tight credit and declining infrastructure investment are taking a toll, it said.
"How much is pork?" Putin asked astounded store attendants, Interfax reported.
Seeing a price tag of 335 rubles ($11) and consulting a pricing table that listed the item's purchase price as 160 rubles, Putin's calculation yielded an unhappy result.
"This is double the price. Is that normal?" the prime minister asked Yury Kobaladze, the managing director of X5.
"Is 120 percent a high markup?" Kobaladze asked.
"Very high," Putin said.
"It will be lowered tomorrow," Kobaladze said.
Kingsmill Bond, London-based senior Russia analyst at Troika Dialog:
"Russian corporates are used to handling volatility and difficult times. They can adapt quite quickly. Other countries are not used to such dramatic changes in the economic landscape. Russian firms are used to being thrown around and rebounding very quickly. They have had periods of high growth and high inflation in the past, and they have recovered. Russia is better positioned to bounce back when markets return. Russia will bounce back harder and quicker [than in 1998]."
Alexandra Evtifyeva, Senior Economist of VTB:
"They still need to do a lot on cleaning of banks' balance sheets. Non-performing loan levels are rising quickly." Most estimates put the proportion of non-performing loans in the system at between 10% and 20%. "There will be a major shakeout of Russia's 900 banks. Risks are quite concentrated in the largest banks. The smallest banks don't take risks. We expect some restructuring in the banking sector."
Unnamed analyst:
"The country needs to produce a good-bank/bad-bank structure, but politicians appear to be shying away from the big decision." Such a lack of clarity mirrors the early reluctance of Russia's politicians to admit that the country was facing any sort of crisis.
Ok, enough of the peanut gallery. On to the award winners:
Prosecutors accuse the ex-Yukos managers of embezzling 350 million metric tons of oil, equivalent to Yukos' entire oil output for six years. Defense lawyers and several independent legal observers have expressed bewilderment at the new claims. They note that in their previous trial, the two managers were convicted of underpaying taxes on this same output, implying that it was legal business activity. The alleged embezzlement occurred when Yukos was Russia's largest oil company and one of its most visible companies overall.
Now these concerns have been echoed by the author of the Council of Europe report, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, a former German Minister of Justice. "The legal justification of the new criminal cases against Mr Khodorkovsky and Mr Lebedev has me perplexed," she writes, adding that "any accusation must fulfill minimum standards of logic."
From the Wall Street Journal:
As countries announce their emissions targets in advance of the talks in Copenhagen this December, there's been some maneuvering on this issue. The Australian delegation has proposed a plan that would allow each country to submit its own schedule for reducing emissions, effectively allowing them to choose their own baseline year. Japan would like to use 2005, because the country's emissions have been creeping up in recent years.
All this, of course, has to do with politics. Nations that commit to emissions targets want other countries to try just as hard. It's easier for politicians to sell belt-tightening at home if it appears that everyone in the international community is shouldering an equal burden.
And on that front, Russia's plan looks like a dud.
There are a lot of arguments that one could make about what this transaction means for foreign business in Russia, but we should stop calling it "a test" of Russia's investment climate. There is no test and there is no investment environment - we're in the middle of the second absurdist trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, countless companies have been expropriated and partially expropriated, and the threat of government intervention is omnipresent and increasing. Let's start being realistic, and stop pretending anyone is surprised that Norway has been thrown into the maw of lawlessness just like everyone else.
Today the defense team for Mikhail Khodorkovsky is running a letter, bearing the signature of Robert Amsterdam, in the global edition of the Financial Times. The story has been covered by Dow Jones and some other news outlets. Below is the full text of the letter.
An open letter to the boards of directors, management, auditors, and shareholders of Rosneft, Gazprom, Eni, Enel, and other purchasers of Yukos assets.
RE: Russia's obligation to seize your assets?
Beginning in December 2004 with the sham tax auction of Yukos's main production subsidiary Yuganskneftegaz, management and lawyers and shareholder representatives for major oil companies as well as private investors have had to evaluate the risk of purchasing Yukos assets and, subsequently, the oil produced by one of the prior production subsidiaries. This dilemma continued during the illegitimate Yukos bankruptcy where the receiver liquidated the company's assets through a series of auctions. Actions for damages resulting from the expropriation of Yukos have been filed by Yukos shareholders, e.g., the Hulley and Yukos Universal Energy Charter Treaty case and minority shareholders under bilateral investment treaty cases, as well as an action filed by ex-Yukos western management before the European Court of Human Rights and defenses asserted in other actions.


