

О вероятном сценарии действий США в отношении России в 2006 - 2008 годах

On a Likely Scenario of Action of the United States toward Russia in 2006-2008

Moscow, July 2006

The analytical report presented here was written in the middle of July of this year and handed over by the authors at that same time to the Kremlin and to the State Duma. However, the report was only given the official go-ahead on 18 September – that was when it was sent out to a series of State Duma deputies. Right after this, the report attracted the sharpened attention of certain politicians to itself. On 22 September, the newspaper *Moscow news* published excerpts from the report in a volume of around half of the whole of this text. *Politichesky klass* is publishing this report in its entirety. The authors of the report are the famous Soviet diplomat Valentin Falin and one of the former heads of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, Gennady Yevstayev. Today they are independent experts.

Our goals are idealistic, our methods and actions pragmatic.¹

Concept of the National Security of the USA - 2006

Abstract

1. This report is an attempt to consider the most likely scenarial actions of the USA toward Russia in the period of the election cycle of the years 2007 - 2008, when the question of providing for the continuation of the course of V.Putin is going to be decided in our country. The report does not pursue the objective of justifying a transition to confrontation in relations with the USA: nobody needs it today. Its objective is to demonstrate a proper understanding by the Russian foreign policy elite of the true intentions of the USA toward Russia in a period of escalation of the ideological struggle on the question of the paths for the further development of our country.

2. The essence of the threat consists of the refusal of the USA to come to terms with the strengthening of the role of Russia in world affairs as an independent centre of power, possessing real resource capabilities for the effective projection of its soft power at a minimum on the post-Soviet space. In the years 2005 - 2006, the USA finally stopped attempting to control or influence the content and direction of the foreign policy of Moscow and has switched to a line of shaping it "from within" – through providing for an internal transformation advantageous for Washington of the political regime of sovereign democracy that has emerged under the presidency of V.Putin.

3. The most dangerous elements of the American course toward Russia are:

- international-law isolation of the top leadership of the RF. The creation of a permanently tense atmosphere with the help of the mass resuscitation of corruption cases and the realisation of "corruption-related" *kompromat*, the establishment of "external management" over the theme of "the struggle with corruption" in the Russian leadership;
- intensification of international pressure on the Russian leadership by means of non-recognition of the results of the presidential elections of the year 2008;
- activation of the search for an American "protégé" on the left flank of the Russian political spectrum while providing for his support from the side of the liberal forces as a "struggle with a corrupt regime";

¹ Translator's note: This document contains numerous citations from American sources, originally written in English. Ordinarily in such a case, I would simply seek out the original English texts on the internet and reproduce them here, rather than re-translate the Russian translations back into English. However, since this document is a Russian perception of how the Americans perceive Russia, I felt it was important to understand how the Russians had translated these original American documents in the first place, since the translations themselves would affect this perception. I have therefore actually taken the Russian translations of the American texts and translated them to English throughout this document, in order to show what Russians *think* Condoleeza Rice said, not what she actually said. The "Concept" document being cited here and elsewhere, by the way, is the March 2006 edition of *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.

- intensification of support for disintegrational processes in the RF by way of advancing recommendations on the desirability of returning to the “Yeltsinite” concept of electoral federalism;
- disruption of the strategy of the energy sovereignty of the RF. Advancement of the strategy of the privatisation of Russian energy companies by Western players in the context of the “struggle with corruption in the RF”;
- activation of the process of the acceptance of Georgia and the Ukraine² in NATO at the summit in Riga on 28 - 29 November of this year.

4. For the selection of the optimal line of resistance to the new course of the USA, the time is ripe for the political leadership of Russia to:

- - advance and organise the realisation of a long-term strategy of democratic modernisation in the capacity of the key mission of the RF on the post-Soviet space and in the world as a whole;
- proceed to a reorientation of diplomatic activeness in the CIS toward really attainable goals – strengthening of the Eurasian Economic Space without the Ukraine, creation in the medium-term future of a “confederative core” (Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan) with the subsequent incorporation of Uzbekistan.

5. We likewise consider it fundamentally important to undertake the following political steps:

- qualitatively intensify work with Russian NGOs and increase their input to the development of fundamental concepts of nationalities policy. In particular, deploy large-scale activity to provide domestic [*i.e.* not foreign] grants for encouraging the activeness of structures of civil society
- provide for a convincing demonstration of support by Russian society for the continuation of the course of V.Putin by way of successful realisation of national projects and other large-scale initiatives to modernise the country. The emerging tandem of liberals and leftist nationalists must be deprived of electoral attractiveness;
- deploy a broad and effective struggle with corruption, remove in this way the threat of external management of the anti-corruption campaign aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the RF;
- raise the problem of the real threat represented by the arms race being deployed by the USA at the international level and in the domestic political context.

Formulation of the problem

Russian-American relations are once again at a crossroads. The Leitmotif in the mass media both in the USA and in the West in general: Russia just doesn't fit in with “Western civilisation”; by its nature it is not suited to be an equal partner of the Western democracies. This is an outcome of the latest attack of intolerance by American and a series of Western European politicians of those who think differently, and all the more so of Russia's acting differently in questions of principle in domestic political and international life. The American establishment simply does not get it that the chain reaction of the collapse of Russia has stopped, the former paradigm has endured cardinal changes and it's about time to move on and work out new conditions of interaction with Moscow.

However, there are sufficient grounds to regard today's intensification of the White House's anti-Russian rhetoric not as a tactical “cooling”, but as the beginning of long-term changes in the Russia policy of Washington. The relations between the two countries have started to gradually deteriorate after Bratislava (February 2005).

The threat lies not so much in the American strategy toward Russia – this was fully predictable for those who know the established American mentality of superiority and who proceed from the premise that Moscow is going to have a growing potential for an independent foreign policy based on real resource capabilities. The danger is represented by how fast a rate this change takes place at. This rate is determined by the intensifying foreign policy setbacks of the Washingtonian administration and the not-simple situation within the USA itself, where crisis phenomena are brewing both in politics and in economics. There arises a situation of relatively weak predictability of possible actions by the USA toward Russia. In any case, the behaviour of the current American administration toward the Ukraine,

² The Russian text uses the old Russified versions of the names of Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, which are considered demeaning by many Ukrainians, Moldovans, and Belarusians, respectively. These names are faithfully reproduced in this translation as “the Ukraine”, “Moldavia”, and “Byelorussia”.

Georgia, Moldavia and in a series of other situations gives evidence of a reduction in the influence of realistic assessment of the state of affairs and an increase in the impact on the minds of American politicians of the landmark great-power philosophy that has defined their strategy for the entire 20th century. As applies to relations with Russia, this can under certain conditions be fraught with a conscious rolling back to direct political confrontation, which Moscow – and indeed the entire world in the 21st century – is not interested in. It can not be ruled out that the neoconservative-Republican part of the American elite will continue to expand the list of complaints against the Kremlin and consistently push things toward an escalation of relations with Russia in order to cover up its domestic and foreign policy setbacks and to preserve chances for victory at the upcoming presidential elections, of which there are practically none at the present moment.

The neoconservatives who predominate in today's political establishment of the USA and who consider themselves to be the continuers of the political line of R.Reagan had for all intents and purposes already "passed final judgement" in principle against today's Russia back in the years 2004 - 2005 on the wave of euphoria from the success of the "velvet revolutions" in Georgia and the Ukraine. The essence of this judgement is a rejection of the agreement of the White House with the Kremlin that had been secretly discussed in the years 2003 - 2004 (consent to "benevolent" broad partnership on the part of Moscow in exchange for the recognition of the CIS as a zone of its interests) and a transition from attempts at controlling the policy of Moscow to its forming "from within", i.e. the implementation of an "orange project" in Russia. It is thoroughly obvious that the USA in recent times has not had, and still does not have to this day, any kind of real plan for substituting today's Russian course with a more pro-American one. Hence are possible poorly-conceived and even provocational lunges against Russia, especially in those regions where mutual interests collide.

A factor that stimulates the activation of the actions of the USA to replace today's ruling grouping in Russia is the firm choice of the leadership of the country in favour of real measures toward the social-economic modernisation of society. The refusal to follow liberal-monetarist templates in their radical treatment, the initiating of a system of "national projects" and the beginning of investments in the betterment of infrastructure are understood in the USA as a clear, albeit slow, beginning of a process of social modernisation of the country and transformation of abstract macroeconomic potential into real positive shifts for the populace. And this, in its turn, is an instrument for overcoming the deep gap between the elite and the majority of society, which in the period of Yeltsin's rule forced the ruling elites to orient themselves at none other than the USA – the only source of their own stability and legitimacy. Under the condition of a relatively successful realisation of at least part of the national projects by the year 2008, the crystallisation of a new structure of social relations and balance of power in the elite may appear, under which the dominant domestic policy consensus that has emerged (the "Putinite majority") becomes the decisive factor in politics. In such a manner, the "window of opportunity" for fundamentally uprooting the trends developing in Russia and inspiring the coming to power in Moscow of a sufficiently pliant leadership is relatively not large.

The growing energy and political independence of the Kremlin, the changes taking place in the psychological mood of Russians, as well as the re-evaluation of values by the Russian political elite in relations with the West and the search for a new identity in its assertion of Russian national interests, have disrupted the previously firmly established designs of the Republican administration to "put the squeeze on Russia" already at the stage of the electoral cycle of the years 2007 - 2008. The Russian state-political framework, despite all its shortcomings, has turned out to be more robust than they had assumed in the White House.

The reason for the miscalculation and, by corollary, today's change in the tactics of the USA: the judgement was passed on a weak Russia, which could be "squeezed", but bringing it into execution now has to be done toward a strong Russia. The new financial might of Russia undermines the base principle of the paradigm that has laid at the foundation of Russo-American relations throughout the end of the 80s - 90s. The USA was the donor, while Russia was the recipient of aid/assistance, and other things. The paradigm shift has for all intents and purposes led to a re-evaluation of priorities in the spirit of classic "*Realpolitik*" – key for Washington is becoming the task of undermining Russian sovereignty, depriving the Kremlin of its main sources of power and stability and returning the RF to a "Late-Yeltsinite" manageable state.

In so doing, it is more than obvious that in its aspiration for control over Russian energy resources and natural riches Washington will be constantly need to expand "political pressure points" on the RF. The new, in many ways waning, ideology of the White House is accurately described in a quote from the journal *Foreign Policy*: "Certain monstrous regimes now have so much money that they are capable of accomplishing evil deeds for a long time still, while many worthy democratic countries are forced to grovel before them in order to receive oil and gas." In one form or another, this thought is now inherent to representatives of both parties in the USA. Thus, in June of this year, one of the American lobbyists of

YUKOS, a retired official from a series of Democratic administrations, Stuart Eizenstat, openly declared that 'the plans of the Kremlin to reassert control over Russian oil' do not suit Washington.

There can be no doubt that despite all the declarations about readiness for cooperation on an equal footing, the main motivation for the actions of the USA and of the West in general is the aspiration to adversely impact the interests of Russia wherever possible and to solve its own long-term economic and political tasks at Russia's expense.

Hence the inevitability of the increase in American complaints along the whole spectrum of problems of the domestic and foreign policy of the Kremlin. In other words, Moscow is going to have to proceed from the fact that the USA is "not going to leave us alone" for the foreseeable future. In this sense, any hopes of the withdrawal of American "concerns" by a reduction in activeness in the assertion of our positions of true principle, an intensification of PR support of the activities of the Kremlin, "model democratic behaviour" or partial concessions to Washington in the energy and certain other spheres are illusory and harmful from the point of view of the national interests of our country.

Russia is tenaciously returning as one of the main powers onto the world proscenium. The content of its foreign and domestic policy is determined and will in the future continue to be dictated by the sovereign decisions of democratically elected Russian authorities,³ tasks of the preservation of its unity and cohesiveness, and not by here-and-now considerations or the "compliance" of this policy with the interest of the authorities of other countries. Everything gives evidence that precisely this line of the president of the RF enjoys the overwhelming support of Russians.

This report is called upon to show the possible scenarios of actions of the USA toward Russia in the years 2006 - 2008.

The essence of the threat

The information being received gives evidence of Washington's growing disillusionment with the prospects for a quick repeat of the classic scheme (a charismatic oppositionist "protégé", the resource of the crowd, and so forth) for an "orange revolution" in the RF. Hence the contours of the new bipartisan consensus of the American neoconservatives and liberals toward the Kremlin. The first step in this direction has already been made – the Bush administration has moved the point of reference of the bipartisan policy toward the RF substantially in the direction of a cold war. From a political struggle for democracy, the so-called "battle for Russia", the USA is openly moving toward a regime of neutralisation of the RF as an independent – and in a series of instances even an attractive – centre of power and influence, of sabotage of its main "weapon" – the new Russian energy strategy – and broader – toward a straightforward struggle for Russian oil and gas (C.Rice: "Russia has shown itself to be an unreliable supplier").

Proceeding from the logic that has remained unchanged in the post-war time – that of keeping foreign policy (especially in the Russian direction) in a zone of relative consensus among the two parties – one can confidently assume that any subsequent administration of the USA, irrespective of its party affiliation, will inevitably keep score of the successes and failures in the dialogue with Moscow from the new, attained "norm" already. Whatever the result of the upcoming 2006 and 2008 elections in the USA, we should not expect a radical improvement in Washington's attitude toward the Russian authorities. A fully sovereign Russia, developing such a defensive potential that renders the American offensive might worthless, and not enmeshed in the construct of "global American leadership", not vulnerable to pressure from without is unacceptable in principle for the USA.

It is obvious that right now the White House, first and foremost out of pre-election considerations, is trying to keep the initiative in its hands and not let the Democrats turn Russia into one of "their" issues. In this sense, the latest and harshest anti-Russian declarations by leading the policy people of the administration, and speeches and publications by "administration-friendly" political scientists, are so far being addressed to a greater degree at the American establishment, more than an outside audience, including Russia.

Literally in the last few months, representatives of the administration of the USA and of the Republican political establishment, against a background of condemning the "authoritarian" character of the domestic policy of Putin and the "neo-imperial" status of the foreign policy of Russia, have intercepted and voiced just about all the key "demands" of the Democrats toward our country: from the call to cardinaly review the relation toward democracy to the recognition of the post-Soviet space as a zone of priority interests of the United States. Ideological and cultural pressure on Moscow with the use of human rights themes is

³ Throughout this translation, the Russian word *vlast*, which is sometimes given as "The Power", will be rendered as "authorities". In Russian, the word technically refers to state power in the abstract (as in "in a democracy, *vlast* is in the hands of the people"), but is understood by everyone to mean those who actually wield it (as in "*vlast* does not tolerate dissent").

significantly intensified, evidence of which are the latest reports of "Freedom House" and a series of other "independent" organisations controlled by the USA.

In September of 2005, a draft of the nuclear doctrine of the USA developed by the Joint Committee [sic] of the Chiefs of Staff was made public. In essence, it assumes the infliction of preventive strikes on any nuclear facilities on the territory of states representing a threat for the USA, or on the camps of terrorists possessing a weapon of mass destruction. In December of last year, in a series of declarations, highly-placed American officials (Rice and others) unambiguously hinted that for them, the "fundamental nature of ruling regimes means more today than the international balance of power". As always, the Republicans fortify their designs with an unprecedented build-up of the military budget, which already now is practically equal to the aggregate defence spending of all the other countries in the world combined. Along with this, a centralised reduction of obligations in the realm of disarmament and a reconsideration of approaches to the implementation of the principles of verification and inspection in the sphere of arms control and WDM non-proliferation are taking place.

In March of this year, the bipartisan Edwards-Kemp group, under the aegis of New York's influential Council on International [sic] Relations, prepared the report "Russia's False Path: What the USA Can and Should Do", which presented an expanded inventory of problems in Russo-American relations and Washington's accumulated complaints about Russia. In parallel, the State Department of the USA published an annual report about how America had supported human rights and democracy in the years 2005 - 2006, recording the "further erosion of democratic principles and human rights in Russia."

The middle of March of this year saw the publication of an updated version of the *Concept of the National Security of the USA*, a characteristic feature of which became the further ideologisation of the foreign policy of the USA, in particular the bid for an active "democratising" role for Washington in the countries neighbouring Russia and the Greater Middle East with the aim of creating a "no man's land" unfavourable for Moscow. According to the new Concept, working together with Russia is possible only in those places where this is vitally necessary. In the military section of the Concept, the traditional reliance of the American elite on preventive strikes – "offensive and defensive" – for "detering both states that are enemies of America and non-state formations of its adversaries" – is essentially confirmed and enhanced. In continuation of the topic, published in the April issue of *Foreign Affairs* is a pre-emptive article of two American experts with a conclusion about the opportunity emerging in the USA to be the first to inflict a disarming nuclear strike on Russia without fear.

At the beginning of May of this year, at a meeting with the editors of leading American publications, C.Rice declared that America wants for "the Russians to admit that we have lawful interests and our own relations with their neighbours, even if these countries were at one time a part of the Soviet Union". At that same time, the vice-president of the USA, R.Cheney, while visiting Vilnius and Astana, voiced analogous assessments. For the first time at such a high level, the USA declared that Russia is "retreating from democracy".

Contained in a series of publications of the leading American mass media in the spring of this year were the demands of Moscow, enumerated privately by the administration, that it was supposed to fulfill before the G8 meeting. The greater part of these demands has a demeaning character for Moscow and extends substantially outside the scope of the standard agenda of bilateral relations. For all intents and purposes, what is being demanded of us is that we turn the country into a raw-materials depot for the West, under the control of the USA.

Although relations between the two countries have already for all intents and purposes fallen hostage to the logic of the American pre-election campaign, we would like to emphasise one more time that today's cooling is not the latest "tactical diplomatic advance", having as its objective to minimise the risks for the administration in the run-up to the G8 summit in St. Petersburg, but a sufficiently obvious qualitative shift.

The collapse of the illusion of the American establishment relative to the ability to impose its line on the Russian leadership and its "sobering up", as it were, toward Russia was objectively predetermined: over the years of relative thawing of relations between the two countries, effective mechanisms for settling the contradictions that inevitably arose never were created; they accumulated, and negative changes had to take place sooner or later. Throughout the last decade, the bilateral agenda, which has been steadily whittled down to the highest priority questions for the USA (selectively chosen spheres of control over weapons, non-proliferation, the struggle with terrorism), has been effective in providing for "breakthrough decisions" during high-level contacts and the success of personal meetings between the presidents. However, it turned out to be clearly insufficient for "digesting" the qualitative growth in complaints by the neoconservatives toward Moscow in their attempts at control over Russian policy in the realm of energy sources and at anchoring Russia in the position of an "eternal" junior partner.

The evolution of the programme of actions of the current Republican administration in the Russian direction is evidence of the long-term securing of the dominance of neoconservative thought in the

echelons responsible for the adoption of decisions toward our country. On the strength of the domestic policy considerations of the USA in the foreseeable future, neoconservatism is going to “rule the dance” in the Republican and Democratic establishments, squeezing out the least ideologised, moderate politicians from the top posts. Hence the futility of hopes for pragmatism on the part of individual representatives of “the party of Lincoln” – the Republicans. The new bipartisan consensus on Russia that is emerging in Washington is deeper and broader than the limits of the current Republican administration. The “ideological dividing line” does not travel along party lines, but between the “hawks” – incapable of “sacrificing principles” – and the pragmatists – ready to find compromises (even though they be temporary) for the sake of attaining that very same ultimate goal: the no-other-alternatives dominance of the USA in the world.

In conditions of rising fuel prices and lack of investor confidence in the prospects for the American economy, there is reason to have doubts about the Republicans’ chances in the upcoming mid-term elections in the autumn of 2006. The possible loss of control over one or even both of the houses as early as 2006 could have unpredictable consequences for the current administration, including the initiation by the Democrats of an impeachment procedure for Bush even before the 2008 elections.

Even if, by some miracle, the Republicans manage to ensure continuity in 2006 (the mid-term elections) and 2008 (the presidential [elections]), today’s degree of the White House’s cooling relations with our country will already be impossible to compensate for with some kind of traditional measures. No one in the Russian establishment (including the likely successors to president V.Putin) can boast of close personal relations with the likely Republican candidates (McCain, Romney [*sic*], Allen and others). Furthermore, in conditions of an acute “personnel famine” among the Republicans and pressure on the part of the Democrats at the Republican primaries coming up in the year 2007, the chances increase for such populist radicals as Senator J.McCain, who will set the tone of anti-Russian rhetoric for the entire pre-election campaign.

The result of the two “turbulent” terms of the presidency of a neoconservative Republican could easily become a return of the pendulum of the mood of the establishment, elites and electorate to a dosed [measured?] isolationism on the foreign policy arena. It can not at all be ruled out that in the nearest time, the Democrats will succeed in taming this tendency. However, in this case too, we will have to proceed from the objective reality: the current degree of bipartisan consensus in Washington on Russia issues is extremely large. A reflection of this is the similar positions on Russia among the current favourites of both American parties (at the current stage this is Republican Senator J.McCain and representative of the Democrats Senator H.Clinton). The Democratic establishment in the USA is experiencing an acute allergic reaction to V.Putin – hence the unchanged support of Bush in those aspects of Americo-Russian relations where one would expect to observe that the Republicans and Democrats might have certain differences. Indicative in this sense is the position of A.Gore, J.Edwards, S.Sestanovich, R.Holbrook, S.Talbot[t] and others.

Today’s bipartisan consensus in a known sense forces both parties to adhere to a nearly identical line toward the RF: generally speaking, the Democrats are finding themselves in a situation where they are already not so much Democrats as representatives of the entire elite of the USA and have to defend already emerged approaches and realities of their positions in the world.

The hardening of the line toward our country in a certain sense is disadvantageous personally for G.Bush, who has wagered his “presidential legacy” on the card of solving the Iranian problem. The president of the USA, being under acute domestic political pressing, is also seriously concerned by the danger of “non-success” in relations with V.Putin. Optimal for him would be to get full assistance from Moscow on Iran in exchange for a loud declaration about how “it was not for nothing that he trusted Putin”. It is noteworthy that for now he is avoiding public anti-Russian statements.

In such a manner, today’s intensification of the anti-Russian thrust of the policy of the White House is an attempt by the American political establishment to evaluate possible actions in the Russian direction: a hardening of position, a return to the traditional strategy, proven over the years and decades, of bleeding Russia dry, a managed confrontation and containment. As long as the administration and the Democrats are not working out a more detailed and diversified approach, toughness toward Moscow will be practically the only stable component of Washington’s Russia policy.

Together with this, the USA so far does not have powerful and reliable enough instruments at its disposal that would allow for a transformation of rhetorical toughness into successful actions and an implementation of the changes on the Russian political scene necessary for Washington.

Today’s Russian opposition is lacking a mass resource; also insufficiently powerful are the remaining instruments of influence individually taken.

Analysis of the publications of the American mass media, expert assessments and moods in the

circles close to the White House give evidence that the key wager of the USA in the year 2007 - 2008 will be placed on an attempt to initiate (through the involvement of all the instruments and figures of influence accumulated way back in the 90s) such a clandestine realignment of forces within the upper echelons of the Russian leadership and political and business elite as would lay the path to a “quiet” implementation of a Russian version of an “orange revolution”.

The main methods are: delegitimisation of the authorities in Russia, facilitation of a schism in the Russian elite; hindering of the international activities of Russian business (we can not underestimate its vulnerability, associated with a broad offshore component) other than that oriented toward the USA, and ultimately providing for moral and indirect material support to pro-Western groups; neutralisation of political forces resisting against the USA’s protégés in the Russian political establishment.

The main predictable steps in this direction

1. International-law isolation of the top leadership of the RF, the “*siloviki*”, and key representatives of business. The creation of a permanently tense atmosphere around them with the help of the mass resuscitation of corruption cases and the realisation of “corruption-related” *kompromat* and the “attachment” to it of concrete figures and their relatives. In the medium-term perspective – the accumulation of court decisions in the West on the majority of category “A” Russian officials with large-scale advertisement of “summons being served”, blocking of entry [into Western countries], visa problems, and others. Likely are the initiation of new cases like the scam with the Bank of New York, the demonstrative search for and arrest of assets in the West, and the like. Appearing as allies of the US and the West in the struggle with Russian officials will be their competitors – individual Russian opposition politicians and oligarchs.

Washington’s task is to make the future of key Russian officials (financial well-being after retirement, the opportunity to get a high-paying post in large international organisations or corporations and others) fully dependent on Washington’s good will.

The realisation of this scenario has already been evaluated in the Ukraine, is being partially evaluated in Byelorussia and on Cuba. Washington’s task is to form the instruments of international “independent” monitoring of the assets and offshore activeness of key Russian players. On the basis of the decisions of the summit in Gleneagles to increase the transparency of trade in energy sources, the creation of a special “offshore commission” that will be entrusted, among other things, with monitoring the foreign assets of Russian officials (along the lines of the international monitoring for incomes from trade in uncut diamonds already in effect) can not be ruled out in the future.

Also likely is media and organisational coordination of the anti-corruption campaign of the Russian leftist-nationalist and liberal opposition with police and judicial measures in the West against the property abroad of individual Russian officials and businessmen. Highly symptomatic in this regard is the finding by a Swiss court that minister of communications L.Reiman is the actual beneficiary of the offshore [companies] contesting the right to the shares of the cellular operator ‘Megafon’.

However, in recent times, this line is encountering difficulties in connection with the pre-emptive actions of V.Putin, who activated an anti-corruption line in domestic policy.

2. Intensification of domestic political pressure⁴ on the Russian leadership by means of non-recognition of elections. Seen as the main scenario here is the following chain of actions:

- conscious violation by certain opposition figures of current legislation on elections as a provocation for the removal of a candidate by the authorities. Organisation of various kinds of boycotts and loud campaigns around this in the West and inside Russia about the violation of human rights;
- refusal of observers of the West to recognise elections to the SD and of the president of the RF as free and democratic; publication of official reports by OSCE and CE observers about “mass violations during the course of the elections”;
- organisation of hearings and anti-Russian resolutions in the European Parliament, within the framework of other international organisations; the issuance of corresponding resolutions with reference to the results of the elections in the RF.

The key candidacy for the role of removed candidate for now appears to be Mikhail Kasyanov, as not having any electoral prospects, but valuable in the capacity of a “victim of the regime”. Unambiguously pointing to the realisation of this scenario is the content of the teaching seminars and trainings just conducted by the leading American sponsors of the “orange revolutions” (in particular, the National

⁴ *Sic.* On page 1 of this document, the second bullet of item 3 states “intensification of *international* pressure”.

Democratic Institute) with activists and supporters of the Kasyanovite People's Democratic Union. In them, Russians were given unambiguous messages – to proceed *a priori* from a recognition of the imperfection of Russian electoral legislation and the impossibility of the conducting by the authorities of “honest and fair elections”. Hence the recommendations to “skip over” the “imperfect and non-working” Russian legal norms and the “ineffective, authoritarian authorities”, to appeal directly to the West.

The main problem for the USA in this scenario are [*sic*] a certain moral vulnerability of the candidate and the restraint of Europe in the sense of reaction to the actions of the Russian authorities on the strength of a serious dependence on deliveries of Russian energy sources (in the 80s, Europe did not support the embargo of the USA on purchases of oil from Libya and Iran).

3. Use of the objectively existing potential of social protest in the RF. Encouragement and initiation of appeals by the organisers of Russian protest movements (motorists, cheated depositors, co-investors in housing, resettled owners of real estate, in the future – as the result of the heady increase in housing-and-utilities tariffs – the dissatisfaction of the “hapless renters-lessees of housing” and others) to the West (the Council of Europe, the European Court) as to the last instance of intercession with the objective of legitimising these channels of pressure on Moscow.

The build-up of criticism on the so-called third basket (legal claims filed by Russians in court instances abroad against the leadership of the country on account of violation of democratic rights and freedoms, manifestations of totalitarianism, and so forth) until there arises a “critical mass” that justifies the introduction of international-law sanctions, all the way to the limitation in extreme cases of Russian sovereignty (the “freezing” of state funds on the accounts of foreign banks and others).

4. Activation of the search for an American “protégé” on the left flank of the Russian political spectrum. The inability of the Russian liberals/rightists to efficiently digest even a minimum of investments and to activate in full measure the resource of the crowd forces Washington to turn its gaze to the potential of the protest activeness of other strata of the Russian electorate. While narrowing the spectrum of search for a “protégé” (just about all the representatives of the rightist Russian opposition have been in Washington in recent times), and preserving the traditional level of support for the old “pro-Western forces” in Russia (M.Kasyanov, N.Belykh, G.Kasparov), the White House is ever more obviously inclining toward placing its wager on the unification of certain leftist and liberal circles in the Russian opposition.

Hence the approval of the current convergence of their positions with the human rights rhetoric of Washington toward the Kremlin and the transformation of this construction into a stable electoral opposition bloc (at the very least for the period of the pre-election campaign) enjoying the “trust” of both the populace and the West. The promotion of a “protégé” under slogans of an anti-corruption, anti-*nomenklatura* campaign (something of a remake of the years 1990 - 1991 in the RF and the year 2004 in the Ukraine – the “*zlochynna vlada*”⁵). An electoral tandem of Ryzhkov-Rogozin appears to be the most effective and advantageous one for certain forces in Washington.

The following actions are already found in this zone:

- the approved forming of relations by the Civil United Front of G.Kasparov and marginal units of “Yabloko” with the National-Bolsheviks of E.Limonov, the beginning of the funding of the NBP through the CUF, the beginning of the “pre-election” campaign of the NBP as an ostensibly registered party;
- regular confidential consultations of V.Ryzhkov in Washington, his public support at the level of the highest political leadership of the USA (Cheney, Rice);
- negotiations of D.Rogozin with highly-placed emissaries of the USA and the beginning of his work on the creation of a mass youth movement, the emergence of D.Rogozin in the Ukraine with the objective of forming a trans-national civic-political movement in defence of Russians at an international scale, the non-Russian registrations of the movement opens [*sic*] up the opportunity for receiving funding from Western NGOs;
- a temporary rejection by SPS leader N.Belykh of rightist rhetoric *per se*, the assimilation of leftist-protest themes, ever more frequent participation in joint events with leftist nationalists;
- interaction of “the whole crew” with analytical/PR-structures funded by L.Nevzlin and B.Berezovsky (S.Belkovsky, M.Litvinovich, etc.);
- a public attempt to combine the efforts of the liberal and leftist-nationalist opposition in the struggle with the authorities within the framework of the announced civic forum “The Other

⁵ Ukrainian for “criminal authority”. Judging by the number of web hits, this is apparently quite a prevalent phrase used to describe the situation in Ukraine in 2004 – so prevalent that even Russians have heard of it and use it in documents such as this one.

Russia" (CUF, SPS, NBP, "Labouring Russia", Union of Communist Youth, individual representatives of "Rodina" and the CPRF plus the traditional array of human rights organisations);

- a likely demonstrative support of the forum on the part of the political leadership of the USA (participation of representatives of the American embassy or even the coming of highly-placed officials of the State Department is entirely possible).

5. Activisation of negotiations with the big business of Russia both to provide for financial support for the Russian opposition and to block counter-actions by pro-government forces. The minimum objective is to force Russian oligarchs to "not place all their eggs in one Kremlin basket". Realisation of this part of the scenario has already begun, for all intents and purposes: resolution of the largest current so-called corporate conflicts, including those on which there is no unity among all the Kremlin "towers", is found in the hands of the USA and the West because of their predominantly offshore ownership. There is every reason to fear that the White House is going to employ "smouldering" conflicts ("Alfa" - "Sistema", "LUKOIL" - "British Petroleum" [*sic*], the situation around "Megafon" and so forth) to undermine the Russian political and business elite from the inside.

6. Facilitation of a "quiet sabotage" of the Kremlin's policy on the part of Russian mass media, including those nominally under the control of the Kremlin, pressure along the line of creating so-called public (but in practice pro-Western) television. Activisation of the work of the West with the media community, encouragement of a formalised approach by the mass media toward implementing the recommendations of the authorities, *i.e.* for all intents and purposes, a discrediting of the Kremlin in the eyes of Russians with the hands of loyal mass information media. Targeted work with leading journalists toward a "rebellion against lies". Organisational and financial assistance to campaigns of the leftist-nationalist and liberal opposition "for mass media freedom", "equal access", "against lies on television", and others.

7. Targeted use of pro-Western groups, printed publications, and individual figures in the Russian expert community.

It is obvious that in conditions of a serious toughening of Russian legislation toward Western NGOs and a complicating of the activities of other "non-resident" agents of influence in the RF, Washington will place its wager on the use of the channel of financial grants to completely legally existing Russian non-governmental organisations, first and foremost those orienting themselves toward the West, with the aim of transforming them in the period of 2007 - 2008 into more effective conduits of Western influence, including in the sphere of international politics.

Recently, the influential Trilateral Commission published a report with the "telling" title "Engaging Russia",⁶ where it proposed to develop cooperation with Russia in every possible way along the NGO line. It is particularly important that this channel of cooperation is entirely familiar to indigenous [*i.e.* Russian] experts and fits in with the traditional good relations with the moderate part of American "Sovietologists" (T.Graham, N.Zlobin, M.Macfaul, A.Kuchins). The latter have already begun a repeat of the line of 2002: "Russia should not quarrel with the USA; it's better to coordinate one's actions with it [*i.e.* the USA]" in cultivating Russian politicians and experts, once again offering the paradigm of the "junior partner".

The first to be activated will be many structures and persons who had formerly been funded by Russian oligarchs and are now using Western money and find themselves in an active search for additional sources of funds for survival. The mechanism of interaction between many such structures and the West has been fine-tuned over years of cooperation, often to the level of "bonds of trust", allowing not only for the "extraction" of expert information, but also the conducting of active undertakings toward the formation in the Russian elite of the notions and convictions needed by Washington.

8. Intensification of support for disintegrational processes in the RF by way of advancing recommendations on the desirability of returning to the "Yeltsinite" concept of the federalisation of the country, an increase of the wager on separatism and detonation in individual national regions, first and foremost in the North Caucasus. This can be done with the aim of bringing out onto the political arena of individual "ethnoses" and groups shattering the integrity of regional territorial communities. The key wager in the given line will be placed on elevating the status of "promising" "subversive elements", their advancement closer to the structures of authority, orientation on the struggle for the political resource (in the regions, pro-Western forces are ever more frequently coming to the organs of state with proposals on "partnership and cooperation"). In addition to the republics of the Volga River basin [*e.g.* Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, etc.] and the North Caucasus [*e.g.* Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, etc.], the regions of

⁶ The only such report found on the web was dated 1995, not "recently".

the north of the European part of the RF – Karelia, the Republic of Komi, Murmansk oblast, the Nenets okrug, and others – may be pulled into the orbit of Western influence in the near future.

The medium-term scenario for the undermining of the federative unity of Russia “from within” can be easily read: with the help of managed NGOs (in the majority of cases incorporated as completely legal ethnic civic organisations, for example the “Cherkessian congress” in Adygeia or “New Bashkortostan”, organisations of Finno-Ugrics, Karelians, Veps, Komi, and others).

For all intents and purposes, the West is actively achieving the grafting of the nationalistic opposition with socio-economic and political protest forces.

In recent times, in the majority of the potentially “explosive regions”, the ethnic/ethno-confessional opposition is coming out with traditional leftist slogans (resignation of unpopular state officials/governors, repeal of monetisation of benefits and housing-and-utilities reform,⁷ an increase in pensions, and others).

In the more distant future, yet another scenario of the West becomes relevant – support for Far-Eastern and Yakut geo-political and economic separatism. Here, a whole network of pro-Western NGOs has existed for a long time, latently advancing into the circles of a worried public an “understanding” that “the policy of the federal Centre is not commensurate to the geo-political significance of their regions, aimed merely at siphoning out material resources”. This is being built on a real base. In essence, the social policy of the state toward the populace in the Far East and in Yakutia was as far back as the 90s replaced by a “policy of humanitarian aid” organised with the involvement of predominantly foreign foundations. The continued existence of such a practice could “boomerang” in the foreseeable future, with serious political repercussions.

9. Disruption of the strategy of the energy sovereignty of the RF in the following key directions:

- forcing through a decision on access for alternative international suppliers of energy sources to the export pipeline system of the RF within the framework of the Energy Charter or new strategic agreements with the European Union;
- demand for the privatisation of enterprises of the Russian fuel-and-energy complex and the obligatory participation of Western companies in it – as an element of the “struggle with corruption”;
- activation of the realisation of projects for alternative routes for transporting energy sources from the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe. The opening of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline with the hooking up of Kazakhstan to it is being presented as the first significant success in this direction, an example to emulate of sorts;
- disruption of large-scale plans for energy cooperation with the PRC (blocking of construction of the East Siberia–Pacific Ocean [pipeline], gas pipelines to China out of economic and other considerations);
- intensification of pressure on Moscow supposedly with the aim of “protecting” the energy interests of their partners – the Ukraine, Georgia, Poland, the Baltic States and broader – Western Europe.

It is obvious that under any variant of subsequent development of relations with the RF, Washington will not reject the strategic plan of creating a many-branched infrastructure for oil-and-gas export from the countries of Central Asia through the Trans-Caucasus, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to bypass Russia. Hence the expected activation of pressure by the USA on Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan with the aim of initialling agreements on bringing new transit avoidance⁸ routes on stream. At the first stage of realisation of this strategy, the already partially existing BTC and BTE need to be supplemented with two new trans-Caspian pipelines – an oil one from Kazakhstan and a gas one from Turkmenistan/Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan. In the more distant future is the activation by the Americans of the Iran/Iraq route (to the extent of the realisation of the intentions of the White House for regime change in Teheran).

At the same time, pressure on the global price situation with the aim of achieving a “fair” price for oil (M.Kasyanov has already made a fantastical anti-national declaration that “20 dollars for Russian oil – this is a fair price”). It is obvious that steps will be undertaken in the near future to reduce or completely liquidate the so-called “war premium” on the price of a barrel – Washington has already begun negotiations with certain allies from OPEC, is planning the activation of pressure on Venezuela, etc.

⁷ Two recent social “reforms” in Russia. The first replaced free bus rides and the like for elderly people with a fixed monthly cash payout; the second eliminated or greatly reduced federal subsidies for public housing and utilities.

⁸ Literally “bypass transportation”, which is probably how one says “transit avoidance” in Russian.

In parallel – protestation in courts (via claims by recipient countries or transit countries) of schemes for Russian deliveries of energy sources through the realisation of *kompromat* on companies participating in deliveries of Russian oil and gas, for example RosUkrEnergo, incorporation of this process into the context of the “world-wide struggle with corruption” (formation of an international control organ for offshore zones, intensification of “transparency” in trade in energy sources and others).

In the medium-term future – accusing the RF of using the “monopoly advantages” of geographic location and natural riches with a corresponding toughening of demands on our country on the majority of foreign-economic problems (blocking of WTO accession, retention of discriminatory restrictions in American and other legislations, and others) in the capacity of a “logical response” to the use of the “energy lever” by Russia.

In the more distant future – creation of a system of international recognition of reserves of energy sources and other natural riches as an “inalienable benefit for all mankind” (analogous to water resources and the atmosphere) with the subsequent need to introduce the corresponding correctives in the international-law concept of national-territorial sovereignty. M.Albright has already voiced the longed-for idea about how Russia’s Siberia really ought to “belong to everybody”.

The USA could also use against the current leadership of Russia the fact that the concept of an energy superpower – on the whole founded on a real economic base – has not yet been supplemented by the corresponding modern-day tasks of a block of high technologies (including energy technologies) and continues in the main to be realised within the framework of the traditional energy scheme. Russia is so far poorly incorporated into the processes of the formation of economic relations on the base of new kinds of industry and technological solutions. In such a manner, they are counting in the USA on being able to continue the matter with modern-day Russia proceeding from the premise that the character of its qualitative presence in the world economy has changed insignificantly, which means that on the whole, methods and schemes similar to those that were applied against the Soviet Union are applicable toward it as well.⁹

It ought to be borne in mind that an intensification of repressive-restrictional measures toward the broadening of the expansion of Russian business into external markets and formally limited campaigns aimed at planting doubts within Russian business in the ability of today’s authorities to provide for effective assistance toward advancing the interests of nationally oriented Russian business circles within the framework of the existing political system can not be ruled out. It will be asserted to Russian business, using concrete examples, that only with a change of the political paradigm within Russia will it be able to attain any sort of significant progress in the realisation of its economic potential on the world arena. It would seem that today’s defeat of “Severstal” in the “struggle for ‘Arcelor’[”] has, among others, such a sub-current as well.

10. Undermining of the political prestige of the Kremlin in the world. Reducing official contacts with the Russian leadership to the minimum of decency, in a series of situations with an ultimative sub-text. For all intents and purposes a return to the G7 formula. Not immediately changing the formats of meetings and events of the group of “eight” in principle *de jure*, the United States *de facto* takes upon itself the task of coordinating positions in the seven-sided format and presenting the already agreed upon position of the “seven” to the Russian side (there are recommendations of the Tripartite Commission on a transition to such a format of work of the “eight” from the year 2007 onwards); this is the key in which many events – both ones that have taken place in recent times and forecast ones – ought to be considered:

- the demonstrative reception by Bush of the leaders of the countries of the “orange revolutions” on the eve of important events in the “eight” format (for example, the “urgent visit” of Saakashvili to Washington after the collapse of his negotiations with V.Putin);
- “capturing the agenda” – its whittling down to the highest priority questions for the USA, concerning Iran, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, and Moldavia, as well as Karabakh;
- active negotiations in Russia and moral support for the opposition in the form of regular meetings with human rights defenders and representatives of the opposition;
- the rendering of organisational, technical, and financial assistance (the latter predominantly in covert form) to opposition organisations along the line of foreign NGOs. Just along the line of the Agency for International Development of the USA [US AID] alone, something in the neighbourhood of 7 million dollars were allocated in the year 2006 for “strengthening civil society in Russia”; around 1.6 million dollars for “strengthening democratic political parties in Russia” and 600 thousand dollars for ensuring “free and fair elections”. The objectives of

⁹ This paragraph sounds as convoluted in Russian as it does in translation. Its disoriented tone differs markedly from the rest of the document. The following paragraph is only slightly better, before the document once again returns to a normal level of comprehensibility.

these grants are stated with the utmost clarity: “to render assistance to existing parties in their registration and re-registration, as well as on more long-term efforts in the realm of party building: to prepare one-two democratic parties for participation with full rights in the elections to the State Duma in the year 2007”.

11. Activisation of assistance to “orange regimes”, first and foremost in Kiev and Tbilisi, up to and including the beginning of the process of the practical acceptance of Georgia and the Ukraine into NATO as early as during the course of the current “wave of expansion” of the alliance (together with Albania, Macedonia,¹⁰ Croatia) at the summit in Riga on 28 - 29 November of this year. It is not by accident that during the course of a visit to Washington in July of this year, the Georgian leader was for all intents and purposes able to secure the personal guarantee of Bush of a simplified procedure for consideration of the Georgian candidacy by Brussels.

It is obvious that the adoption in Riga of a standard “plan of action” (MAP) on the attainment of the membership of Kiev and Tbilisi in NATO is the start of a new stage in the strategy of diplomatic pressure on Russia, calculated for the medium- and long-term future. Not having need for such allies in the military regard (an understanding of the costs of a “partnership” with them on the combat effectiveness and mobilisational readiness of the forces of the alliance is growing in the Pentagon), Washington is going to use the dialogue of the Ukraine and Tbilisi with Brussels predominantly as an instrument for diplomatic bargaining with Moscow.

An intensification of pressure along the entire spectrum of Russia’s problems in the CIS – up to and including an initiating of the withdrawal of the Ukraine and Moldavia from the CIS with their acceptance into NATO. What the Americans need today is a Ukrainian government that has enough courage to step into confrontation with Russia in the short- or medium-term future. The Americans did not feel that kind of courage in Yushchenko, even when they declared that they would not leave the Ukraine in the lurch and would accept it into NATO as early as the year 2008. The mass anti-NATO demonstrations in the Crimea in May-June of this year caused great anxiety in the leadership of the Western countries; actions to neutralise these protests should be expected. In connection with this, it is extremely likely that Washington is not going to turn its back on the coalition of “Our Ukraine” with the Party of Regions and will closely contact with the new government in order to “tear it away” from Russia, welcoming the backroom arrangements of the two leading political forces in the country as a “foundation of democracy” laid by the independent actions of Ukrainian politicians in counterbalance to the influence of Moscow.

We should also expect the further exacerbation of the “Byelorussian question”. Activisation of targeted work with Armenia can be clearly seen behind the planned move of the NATO office from Tbilisi to Yerevan and the propaganda of American intermediation in the resolution of the Karabakh problem.

In parallel – an intensification of discreditation pressure on the leadership of the countries that are the closest allies of the Kremlin in the CIS space – Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and others. Making use of the differences that exist between them (especially in Central Asia) in order to complicate the conducting of Russian policy toward the countries of the CIS. Activisation of all existing instruments (“Kazakhgate”, “the suppression of the Andijan revolt”, and so on).

Conclusion

Russian society is unswervingly drawing nearer an important milestone – for all intents and purposes, a referendum will be held in the years 2007 - 2008 on the reforms being carried out by the current authorities and on the attitude of the population toward the line of president V.Putin to re-establish Russia in the capacity of a modern-day powerful unitary state, enjoying the influence it is due in the world. There can be no doubt that despite all the known political and social costs, the predominant part of the Russian populace will choose the path toward strengthening Russian statehood while preserving those achievements of democratisation and economic freedom that were registered in recent years. The choice will be made in favour of a balanced fair social state. Acceleration of further movement toward such an organisation of society is demanded by broad strata of the populace.

In connection with that which has been stated above, questions arise acutely about the readiness of the leadership of our country to find appropriate responses to standing domestic policy and foreign policy challenges, including the systemic transformation of the approach of Washington toward the formation of relations with Moscow.

It is very important to not put off answering a series of key questions:

- does the Kremlin have the strength not only to declare about the strategic principles of the foreign policy of Russia in the 21st century, but also to advance and organise the realisation

¹⁰ The Russian text uses the old Russified version of the name of F.Y.R.O.M., which is faithfully reproduced as “Macedonia” in this translation. Many Macedonians consider the name F.Y.R.O.M. demeaning.

of ideas of non-confrontational democratic modernisation in the capacity of the key mission of the RF on the post-Soviet space and in the world as a whole;

- are the authorities capable of proceeding to a reorientation of diplomatic activeness in the CIS toward really attainable goals – strengthening of the Eurasian Economic Space without the Ukraine, creation in the medium-term future of a “confederative core” (Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan) with the subsequent incorporation of Kazakhstan; in the long-term future – the formation of the economic basis of such a confederation – a gas-transportation union (a ‘gas OPEC’);
- is the leadership of the country ready to go all the way in the use of the levers of economic – and above all energy – policy on the post-Soviet space up to and including the subordinating of the separate corporate interests of key Russian players to the tasks of strengthening the pre-Russian core in the CIS, for example by way of maintaining subsidised prices for energy sources for Minsk and Yerevan, and the creating of a mechanism of “rapid legislative-executive reaction” to the behaviour of partners that would allow in only a few weeks to seriously change the tactical course toward those who are not inclined to behave themselves sincerely with Russia and those who are prepared to work together with it on a long-term basis, not orient themselves at dependency goals.¹¹

In essence, what we are talking about here is the choice of a course that is balanced between two extremes: on the one hand, the loss by our country of sovereignty and its transformation into a raw-materials appendage of the USA and the West for all intents and purposes, on the other, getting involved in a new cold war. It is important in principle that as we assert our interests, we not succumb to possible provocational “moves” by the USA and certain of its allies, not allow relations to descend into the zone of confrontation. With these objectives, it is crucially necessary to define the zone of our vitally important interests, clearly declare about them to the world around us, and give notice of the methods for their defence.

It seems that by tradition, one of the priorities have [sic] to become calibrated steps (and not propagandistic outbursts) on the topic of limiting the most dangerous and potentially destabilising kinds of weapons, especially as a consequence of the appearance of new technologies. There is no doubt that rational proposals in this direction, in tune with the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world, may be formulated and voiced on the leading international platforms. We should likewise try to tie together our readiness to interact constructively with the USA at multilateral negotiations and if necessary in the UN Security Council – including on the nuclear and missile programmes of Iran and the DPRK – with public concessions and commitments by the USA in the realm of economics and a renewal in the nearest future of negotiations on problems of strategic stability and regional security.

We have every opportunity to pass “down the middle”, without unacceptable political costs, but we need to proceed from the assumption that the next few years will become a period of fierce struggle for the conditions of strategic relations with the USA. Russia has already learned anew to advance these conditions; it is important that they be accepted. In order to achieve this, it is extremely important, without going to extremes, to preserve stability in society and develop a dialogue between the authorities and all of its [i.e. society’s] strata – without letting oppositionally disposed circles slip out of our hands and into those of the West, either.

Finally, it is high time that today’s authorities learn how to work seriously with the political science elite of the country, which, with the proper moral and material support (a corresponding system of targeted solid [substantial?] grants, not encumbered by political obligations, is acutely needed), can render the ruling circles of the country invaluable expert help in the scientific elaboration and practical advancement of a strategic line toward strengthening the positions of Russia on the international arena and the propaganda thereof to the external world. This, in its turn, will to a significant degree allow a neutralisation of the use of Russian NGOs by various kinds of Western organisations and foundations in their own interests.

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¹¹ A convoluted way of saying “not just seeking handouts from Russia”.