

Feeding the Hand that Bit You: Voting for Ex-Authoritarian Rulers in Bolivia and Russia

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ABSTRACT

What could be motivating voters in some emerging democracies to vote for leaders who have proven themselves to be skilled at violating human rights, repressing civil liberties, and ruling without democratic institutions? We test hypotheses related to this question by using a least-similar-systems design in which we search for common predictors of vote choice in presidential elections from two countries that differ in their past and current political and economic situations: Bolivia and Russia. We find consistent patterns in these two very different countries that lead to the conclusion that voters for ex-authoritarian candidates or parties are not merely motivated by the factors that typically shape vote choice in long-standing democracies, but that they additionally exhibit a clear preference for non-democratic political systems.

INTRODUCTION

During the 1990's and early part of the 21st century, voters in new democracies around the world voted in free elections after decades of non-democratic rule. Surprisingly to some observers, many of these voters chose to cast their ballots for the very leaders who previously repressed their countries. For example, voters in Latin America have cast their ballot for former dictators, military governors, coup-plotters, and torturers.¹ In Africa and Southeast Asia former dictators and coup plotters have also been voted into office in competitive elections.² Likewise, the election of ex-communists and communist successor parties has been a prevalent trend in former communist countries.³ These elections have come at a time in which, despite the proliferation of electoral democracy, the quality of many new democracies seems to be deteriorating (Diamond 2002, 22; Rose and Shin 2001, 331). While questions about the quality of democracy have received attention in political science literature, the topic of why people vote for former authoritarian rulers in free elections has rarely been analyzed (although see Azpuru 2001; Canache 2002a; Carrión 2001), and especially not in a cross-regional framework.

We believe that the question deserves more focused consideration. Understanding voters' motivations for electing leaders who once wielded the whips of authoritarianism could shed light on whether this voting behavior is one of the reasons for the deterioration of democratic quality. If former authoritarians are elected in countries in which there is a deep commitment to democratic norms among the mass public, then the risks to democracy of that election might not be serious. However, in the absence of a commitment to democracy, the joint effect of an election of a former authoritarian plus the absence of a mass public that could arrest the drift toward authoritarian rule could result in democratic decline. In this manuscript, we approach the mass public piece of the puzzle by seeking to determine whether the election of

former authoritarians is indeed brought about by mass publics who support authoritarianism, or whether voters for former authoritarians are committed to democracy and cast their ballot for more conventional reasons that are more conducive to democratic governance.

Empirically, we compare the decisions of voters in two presidential elections in Bolivia and Russia. We do so in order to use a least-similar-systems design in which we search for commonalities in countries that differ in many respects. In Bolivia we examine the vote in the 1997 presidential elections for General Hugo Banzer, who had ruled as the military dictator of Bolivia from 1971 to 1978. In Russia we explore why voters cast their ballot for Genadii Zyuganov, the Communist Party candidate in the 1996 presidential election. Thus we hope to determine whether voters for former authoritarians are motivated by common attitudes in two vastly different contexts.

We proceed as follows. In the next section, we present our hypotheses and address the prominent variables for which we need to control when testing these hypotheses. We then discuss the benefits of conducting a cross-regional comparison and provide some background information on the elections analyzed. The remainder of the paper is devoted to empirical analyses which, while many faceted, provide support for the primary hypothesis: in the two cases examined, voters for ex-authoritarian candidates or parties are in part motivated by a preference for non-democratic political systems.

VOTING FOR FORMER AUTHORITARIANS: HYPOTHESES

The main question that we seek to answer is whether voters for ex-authoritarian candidates and parties are antagonistic to democracy and prefer the authoritarian past that these candidates represent, or whether they are merely following more benign voting patterns that happen to move them in the direction of these candidates. The possibility that voters for former

authoritarians prefer authoritarianism to democracy is alarming because the combination of a pro-authoritarian mass public and leaders who are experienced authoritarians could bring about the downfall of democratic institutions.

A disposition to authoritarianism, or what some have called an “authoritarian personality,” has been thought to motivate support for authoritarianism in a variety of contexts, ranging from support for the Nazis (Adorno 1950) to support for the authoritarian governments in the former Soviet Union and Brazil (Geddes and Zaller 1989, 339; McFarland *et. al* 1992). Moreover, recent surveys have shown that in many democracies in which former authoritarians compete in elections significant percentages of the population express a preference for authoritarianism. For example, in fifteen post-communist countries surveyed by the New Europe Barometer in 2000, an average of 55% of respondents said that their countries should be governed differently, and among this group, 23% preferred a return to communist rule, 8% preferred military rule, and 33% preferred strongman rule (Rose 2001, 99). Survey results from Africa and Latin America also show that substantial percentages of the populations in some countries where former authoritarians have been elected prefer dictatorship over democracy (Bratton and Mattes 2001, 109; Lagos 2001, 139). We therefore seek to test the hypothesis that respondents who report a preference for authoritarian forms of government and rule will be more likely to support ex-authoritarian candidates and parties. Assessing the degree of support for this hypothesis forms the primary goal of our analysis.

Closely related to pro-authoritarian attitudes is the question of social capital. A preponderance of research has linked social capital to democratic attitudes, which suggests the possibility that voters who have little social capital, and are therefore presumably less favorable towards democracy, would be more likely vote for former authoritarian candidates. Much of the

research about social capital argues that participation in civic associations generates social capital, which in turn fosters democratic behavior (Putnam 1993, 1995). Researchers who have tried to understand why civic participation generates social capital have emphasized the importance of trust. For example, according to Brehm and Rahn (1997, 1001, 1017) social capital at the individual level is the “reciprocal relationship between levels of civic engagement and interpersonal trust,” and this relationship builds individuals’ trust in democratic political institutions. Trust in democratic institutions, sometimes called “system support,” has been argued to be conducive to democratic sustainability (Inglehart 1988, 1205; McAllister 1999, 201; Norris 1999, 268). In addition to promoting democratic behavior through trust, social capital has also been found to generate political knowledge (Lake and Huckfeldt 1998), and political knowledge has been found to generate support for democratic norms (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 272). Thus we test the following three hypotheses. First, people who participate less frequently in groups, and therefore have less social capital, may be more likely to vote for ex-authoritarian candidates and parties. Second, people who trust democratic institutions less may be more likely to vote for ex-authoritarian candidates and parties. Third, people who have less political knowledge may be more likely to vote for ex-authoritarian candidates and parties.

An alternative hypothesis is that voters for former authoritarians are firmly committed to democracy, but view the incumbent party or candidates as having failed to provide important goods to society. Having decided not to vote for the incumbent candidate, the voter may then consider the former authoritarian candidate an effective alternative who could provide these goods. We consider this to be a “benign” alternative because it suggests that the election of former authoritarians is linked to demands consistent with functioning democratic governance and therefore is less threatening to democracy than it would be if voters for former authoritarians

are casting their ballot with the intent to roll back democracy. Such an approach is rooted in the retrospective economic voting literature, which has been found to explain vote choice in many contexts around the world (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2000; Alvarez and Nagler 1995; MacKuen 1992; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). Given the nature of new democracies, evaluations of the economy might not be the only concern that motivates voters for former authoritarians. A number of studies have shown that residents in new democracies perceive crime and corruption as having worsened since authoritarian regimes have been replaced by democratic ones (Galeotti 1998; Rose and Shin 2001, 342-343; Weyland 1998). Grigoriev and Lantz (1996, 160), for example, draw a link between the fact that income fell and crime rose in Russia prior to the 1995 parliamentary election and the subsequent success of the communists in that election.

It is crucial that we control for these types of retrospective analyses in our attempt to measure the effect of pro-authoritarian attitudes on voting for ex-authoritarian candidates. Failure to do so would allow for the possibility that we would incorrectly identify retrospective dissatisfaction with incumbents as a preference for authoritarian forms of government. Controlling for retrospective evaluations allows us to find three possible sets of findings: both retrospective evaluations and pro-authoritarian factors are at play, one but not the other motivates vote choice, or neither has an effect. If voters are motivated only by their concerns about the incumbents' ability to provide goods, our primary hypothesis regarding the effect of pro-authoritarian attitudes would be falsified.

In addition to controlling for retrospective voting, we also control for demographic characteristics of the respondents. While there are a myriad of theoretical explanations for why different socio-demographic groups might be more or less likely to support ex-authoritarian

candidates, our primary concern here is to make sure that any effects we identify for pro-authoritarian attitudes are not serving merely as proxies for certain demographic characteristics.

THE ADVANTAGES OF CROSS-REGIONAL COMPARISON

We test these theories on the cases of the Russian and Bolivian electorates. At first glance, it may seem that Russia and Bolivia are such different countries that it is unreasonable to compare the voting behavior of their populations. They differ in their economic histories – Bolivia has had no experience with state socialism whereas Russia had 70 years of it – and their contemporary standard of living: Russians are, on average, wealthier than Bolivians, are better educated, and have longer life expectancies.⁴ Bolivians were ruled by a military dictatorship, Russians by a ruling one-party state. Moreover, Russia was a superpower, while Bolivia has never been even a regional power.

While acknowledging the stark differences between Russia and Bolivia, these differences have the advantage of allowing us to search for similarities among the cases by employing a least-similar-systems design (Keman 1999, 11-12; Przeworski and Teune 1970). We follow the advice of Peters (1998, 38-40), who writes that a “most different design” is the best strategy when the researcher is looking at individual behavior, as we are here in our examination of voter choice. According to Peters, this design allows us to spot robust relationships that hold in different places, which can give us “greater confidence that there is a true relationship, not one produced by some unmeasured third or fourth or fifth variables that exist in all relatively similar systems” (Peters 1998, 40). The differences between Bolivia and Russia make any similarities that we find in the motivations of their electorates more consequential for attempts at theory building than had the countries we are studying shared traits in the way that countries from a similar region, such as Latin American or Eastern Europe, do with each other.

Moreover, as the phenomenon of voting for ex-authoritarian rulers is indeed a truly international one, comparative analysis across traditional regional boundaries is a useful means of advancing the literature. By focusing on two countries, we are able to preserve the advantage of detailed micro-level analysis of specific voting behavior while at the same time introducing a comparative dimension to the analysis. To the best of our knowledge, such a study has not before been attempted in this manner, so we consider this research a useful first step in trying to understand why voters generally support ex-authoritarians in democratic elections.

THE ELECTORAL CONTEXT

Before exploring the data, we provide background information on our two cases, beginning with Bolivia. General Hugo Banzer ruled as the dictator of Bolivia from 1971, when he ascended to the presidency by orchestrating a military coup, until 1978, when another military coup removed him from the executive office. Throughout Banzer's rule he demonstrated contempt for democratic liberties. For example, at one point he ordered the military to crush a protest staged by a group of Quechua-speaking indigenous people, which resulted in the massacre of 78 of them. He also ordered repressive acts against civil society groups, universities, political parties, unions, and the media (Conde 2001, 19-20; Calderón and Szmukler 2000, 145; Langer 1999, 81; Dávila 1978, 19-21).

Upon being ousted from his dictatorial post, Banzer founded a new political party called *Acción Democrática Nacionalista* (A.D.N., Nationalist Democratic Action). He ran for president in the first post-authoritarian election, in 1979, but won only 12.9% of the vote. His vote share increased in subsequent elections, however. He won 14.7% of the vote in 1980, 28.5% in 1985, 22.7% in 1989, 20% in 1993, and 22.3% in 1997, when he was elected president (Corte Nacional Electoral 2003; Romero Ballivián 1998, 21-43; see Appendix I for full results).⁵

Even though Banzer paid lip service to democracy during his presidential campaigns, he was clearly identified as an authoritarian candidate by competing political parties and the media. For example, before Banzer's 1979 presidential campaign journalists' associations reminded voters that during Banzer's dictatorship journalists were repressed (Rivadeneira Prada 1980, 164). Also during that campaign, political parties such as the left-of-center Democratic and Popular Unity (U.D.P.) coalition and the right-of-center Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (M.N.R.) reminded voters of Banzer's responsibility for human rights violations (Rivadeneira Prada 1980, 78-79, 124). In the 1985 presidential elections the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (M.I.R.) presidential candidate cast himself as a more democratic candidate than Banzer (Toranzo Roca 1989, 128). Finally, in the 1997 campaign, advertisements in Bolivian newspapers warned of the "national and regional consequences that the probable rise to power of the former dictator could bring to the region" (McFarren 1997).

As opposed to Banzer, Genadii Zyuganov had never personally ruled a non-democratic Russia. Zyuganov became a Communist Party official in Russia's Orlov Region in 1974. He remained in party positions until the collapse of the Soviet Union, rising during this period to become a member of the Politburo in 1989 and secretary of the Russian Central Committee of the Communist Party (Otto 1999, 38). In 1993, he co-founded the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the legal successor of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union that had ruled Russia since 1917. Unlike many Eastern European successor parties, the KPRF consciously eschewed recasting itself as a reformed social-democratic party.⁶ After leading the party in the 1995 parliamentary elections, Zyuganov became the KPRF's candidate in the 1996 presidential election. While his general campaign message vacillated between appealing to the Russian center and the more traditional left, it clearly included many themes

related to the Communist era, including reviving Russian prestige abroad, rebuilding the Soviet Union, more state control over the economy, and a greater role for workers in the government (McFaul 1996). Indeed, Zyuganov has been called a “one-dimensional ‘communist revanche’” (Otto, 1999, 37). Thus by comparing Zyuganov and Banzer, we are able to add another comparative dimension to our most-different design by comparing the vote for a presidential candidate who had personally ruled as a dictator to the vote for a candidate who represented the party that had ruled during the non-democratic era.

The 1996 elections in Russia took place in the aftermath of a disastrous showing for pro-government and pro-reform parties in the December 1995 Russian parliamentary elections; in particular, the KPRF emerged from this election as the dominant party in the parliament (Miller, Reisinger and Hesli 1998; Tsipko 1996). In the immediate aftermath of the parliamentary election, and only six months before the presidential elections, the anti-communist incumbent Boris Yeltsin had an 8% approval rating, and all signs “heralded Yeltsin’s crushing defeat in the June 1996 presidential election, a conclusion reached by many in Russia and the West” (Brudny 1997, 255). Yeltsin’s primary opponents were Zyuganov, nationalists Aleksandr Lebed and Vladimir Zhirinovskii, and the more reformist oriented Grigorii Yavlinsky. Despite the poor initial support, though, Yeltsin managed to regain popularity and win the first round of the presidential election, receiving 35.3% of the vote, compared to Zyuganov’s 32% (White, Rose and McAllister 1997, 260). As neither received a majority, Yeltsin and Zyuganov advanced to a second round, where Yeltsin soundly defeated Zyuganov (McFaul 1996; 1997; Wyman 1997). Full results of the election can be found in Appendix I.

A final point is necessary to emphasize why we include only Zyuganov as the “ex-authoritarian” candidate in our study, as there were other candidates competing in the election

with communist pasts. Yeltsin himself had been a prominent communist official, Lebed a Soviet military hero, and even Yavlinsky had been a member of the communist party from 1985-1991 (Yeltsin 1990; Kipp 1999; Rutland 1999). These backgrounds notwithstanding, we focus our attention solely on Zyuganov because he was the candidate running as the official candidate of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the successor of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that had ruled Russia since the time of Lenin. Our goal is to explore how voters respond to a candidate representing an authoritarian past; in Russia that past belonged to the Communist Party and Zyuganov was the only candidate of that party in this election. To say that other candidates had been members of the Communist Party is to miss the context of this election, which McFaul (1996, 319) describes as the “last ‘revolutionary’ election in which voters were asked to choose between two fundamentally different systems . . . [which can be] understood as the last ‘referendum’ on Communism.” Regardless of Yeltsin’s or Yavlinsky’s pasts, there was only one candidate in this election that represented the pro-Communist vote in this referendum, and that was Zyuganov.⁷

DATA AND METHODS

In order to study the vote for Banzer, we analyze a national public opinion survey carried out in July 1998, 13 months after the June 1, 1997 presidential election. The survey was executed by Encuestas y Estudios, the Gallup International affiliate in Bolivia.⁸ Although the timing of the survey may be problematic, since there is some tendency among survey respondents to claim in retrospective voting items that they voted for the winning candidate even though they did not, the percentage of Bolivians who actually voted for Banzer (22.3%) is only slightly lower than the percent in our survey who report having voted for him (27%). Of the 2,272 respondents who reported voting, 622 reported voting for Banzer. In our preliminary

analyses, we code people who voted for Banzer as 1 and all other voters (including those casting a null ballot) as 0; non-voters and those who could not identify for whom they voted are omitted from the analysis.⁹

To test our hypotheses in the Russian context, we present evidence from a three-wave national election survey of Russians. The survey includes 2,841 respondents and was conducted under the direction of Timothy Colton and William Zimmerman.¹⁰ In our analysis we are limited to the 86.4% (2,456) of respondents who completed the third wave of the survey when the question regarding presidential vote choice was asked. If the respondent voted for Zyuganov, we code the dependent variable as 1; if the respondent voted for any other candidate (or against all) we code the dependent variable as 0.¹¹ This leaves us with a sample of 2078 voters, 639 (31%) of whom reported voting for Zyuganov.¹²

As we are analyze data from two separate surveys, we conduct separate statistical analyses of the Bolivian and Russian data. Whenever possible, we have attempted to use the same variables. As with any secondary survey analysis, however, this is not always possible. For this reason, a supplementary appendix that details how all of the independent variables were coded is available from the authors upon request and can be found at the following website (web address omitted). Overall, the variables across surveys are quite comparable.¹³

As our primary theoretical concern is distinguishing the vote for the ex-authoritarian candidate from the vote for any other candidate, the analyses discussed in the following section employ binomial logit analysis. In addition to mirroring our theoretical concern, binomial logit analysis has the added advantage of producing concise tables of coefficients and standard errors that can be easily presented. However, binomial logit has the disadvantage of leaving us unable to exclude the possibility that the effects we are observing may be being driven primarily by the

nature of the opposition (one of the other candidates contained in the “other” category). We address this concern in the penultimate section of the article, presenting statistical evidence from multinomial logit analysis – as well as additional binomial logit analyses – that allows us to refute this possibility.¹⁴

Another shortcoming of logit analysis is that coefficients lack intuitive substantive meaning. Thus to facilitate a discussion of the substantive effect of different variables, we have also calculated first difference measures of the change in the predicted probability of supporting Banzer/Zyuganov when all variables are held at their mean and the variable in question is shifted from its minimum to its maximum.¹⁵ All first differences are calculated from the full versions of the analysis (Model 3), and can be found in Figures 1 and 2.¹⁶ Although we report first differences for all of the variables, if we have little confidence in the coefficient of the variable, we should have little confidence in the first difference as well. Thus we include an indicator of our statistical confidence in each variable on Figures 1 and 2.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

-- INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE --

In order to measure preference for authoritarianism, we use two variables, one that captures a direct preference for the appropriate authoritarian form of government – in Bolivia, a dictatorship (*Dictatorship vs. Democracy*), in Russia, the Soviet political system (*Soviet Political System*) – and one that measures a preference for an aspect of authoritarian government. In the Bolivian case, the general preference for authoritarianism is framed as a tradeoff of *Order vs. Liberty*; in the Russian case, it is a trade off of *Order vs. Freedom* (see the supplementary appendix for details).

The results are remarkably consistent with our primary hypothesis. In both Russia and Bolivia, the vote for an ex-authoritarian candidate is at least in part motivated by a preference for authoritarianism. In all of the specifications of the model, the coefficients on the authoritarian variables are always in the predicted direction (positive), have relatively large ratios of coefficients to standard errors, and have substantively meaningful effects. Moreover, these effects are present when controlling for both demographic characteristics of the respondents and more traditional retrospective evaluations.

Given that the empirical evidence is supportive of the authoritarianism hypothesis in both the Bolivian and Russian case, it is possible to make two further distinctions about the findings. First, there appears to be a larger effect for the preference for an authoritarian form of government than for the more general preference for order. In both cases, the substantive effect of the former variable is more than twice as large as the latter (see Figures 1 and 2). Additionally, in both cases the ratio of the coefficient to the standard error is larger for the former, regardless of whether we look at the reduced form of the model (Model 1 in Tables 2 and 3) or the full model (Model 3 in Tables 2 and 3). Second, the effects appear to be more important in the Russian case than in the Bolivian case. In terms of statistical significance, both Russian variables are significant at a $p < .001$ level in the full model, while the coefficients from Bolivian variables are closer to $p = .05$. Moreover, the magnitude of the effects from the Russian variables – 45% for Soviet Political System and 18% Order vs. Freedom – are larger than their Bolivian counterparts. In the Russian case, preference for the Soviet political system seems to be by far the strong predictor of the likelihood of voting for the ex-authoritarian candidates, while in the Bolivian case, there are other variables that have similarly strong effects.¹⁷ These distinctions, however, should not detract from the basic finding that there is strong evidence to

suggest a common explanatory variable across the disparate contexts of Russia and Bolivia to help explain the vote for ex-authoritarian candidates: preference for authoritarianism.

-- INSERT FIGURES 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE --

Given the empirical support for the effect of pro-authoritarian attitudes, it comes as somewhat of a surprise that there is absolutely no empirical support for any of the social capital hypotheses.¹⁸ In no case are the ratios of the coefficients to the standard errors of any of these variables in either the Bolivian or Russian analysis large enough for us to have any confidence in rejecting the null hypothesis that the variable has no effect.¹⁹ Consequently, we also have little confidence in the somewhat large substantive effects of the *Trust in Institutions* variables, which are actually in the opposite direction from what the social capital hypothesis would predict.

Although our primary reasons for including the retrospective voting and demographic variables in the analysis were to control for these factors while assessing the authoritarianism and social capital variables, our results allow us to make several observations. In regard to retrospective voting, there is empirical support that these types of factors matter in both the Bolivian and Russian cases. In the Bolivian case, those who feel *Unemployment* is the most serious problem facing the nation and those who report having been asked for bribes are more likely to vote for Banzer. The substantive magnitude of the *Unemployment* and *Corruption* variables seem to be roughly similar, with respondents being 7% and 9%, respectively, more likely to support Banzer if they are concerned about these problems. In Russia, voter dissatisfaction with economic conditions had a clear and substantively large impact on the vote for Zyuganov. Indeed, after preference for the Soviet political system, dissatisfaction appears to be the second most crucial factor in influencing the vote for Zyuganov, with those who are most dissatisfied with the economy over the past 12 months being 30% more likely to support

Zyuganov than those who are most satisfied. Somewhat surprisingly, the *Crime* variable is statistically and substantively significant in the wrong direction.²⁰

In terms of demographic characteristics of respondents, the clearest finding is that in both Bolivia and Russia older voters were more likely to support ex-authoritarian candidates.²¹ We suspect that older voters may remember with fondness some of the benefits of the authoritarian period, but there are other possible explanations. Younger voters may be less likely to vote for former authoritarians because they have been socialized under democratic regimes in which the authoritarian past may have been portrayed negatively by their teachers and in the media, though this is more likely the case in Bolivia than Russia. Alternately, older voters – and especially pensioners – may prefer the short-term economic benefits that a return to authoritarian rule could deliver, even if there is a long term cost to political and economic development from abandoning the democratic framework. We suspect younger voters to be less likely to support this trade-off.

In Bolivia, there is little additional evidence of demographic factors affecting the vote for Banzer. In the Russian case, however, we find fairly constant effects for both *Low Income* and *Working Class*. The magnitude of these effects is smaller than *Age*, leading to a 6% and 7% increase, respectively, in the likelihood of supporting Zyuganov. Moreover, there is evidence that additional education might make respondents less likely to support Zyuganov, although this effect disappears once we control for authoritarian attitudes. This suggests that the path from education to support for an ex-authoritarian candidate might run through authoritarian attitudes, with additional education making people less likely to hold authoritarian views.²²

ADDITIONAL EMPIRICAL TESTS

As noted above, one of the shortcomings of binomial logit analysis is that it cannot exclude the possibility that the results one finds are being driven primarily by one of the parties

in the “other” category. It is possible that by switching our party of interest with another party, we could find largely the same results from a similar binomial logit analysis. We would then be making claims about the vote for ex-authoritarian candidates that could just as easily be demonstrated for other candidates, thus undercutting our theoretical objective. In this section, therefore, we present three additional tests to assure readers that this is not the case.

First, in Tables 3 and 4 we present the results of a series of additional binomial logit analyses where, in turn, each of the other candidates who received more than 5% of the vote is coded as the dependent variable. If the results we observe for Zyuganov and Banzer are primarily being driven by the vote for one particular “other” candidate, we would expect to see results that are similar to what we find for the ex-authoritarian candidate for a number of the other candidates. Were this the case, we could conclude that the results we find for the ex-authoritarian candidates are simply an artifact of pulling any one party out and making it the focal point of the analysis as long as some other primary party is still included in the “other category.” Tables 3 and 4, however, demonstrate that this is not the case. Strikingly, there is almost no case where we can find a variable that is statistically significant for either Banzer or Zyuganov that is matched by a variable of similar magnitude, significance, and direction in any of the other regressions, let alone a pattern of multiple variables across candidates.²³

-- INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE --

As a second test, we run multinomial logit analyses (MNL) of both elections. The seven-category dependent variable in each case includes five categories for each of the five candidates who received over 5% of the vote. We also include a category in the Russian data for respondents who cast a vote against all parties, and in the Bolivian data for respondents who submitted a null ballot. Additionally, we create a residual “other” category for anyone who

reported voting for a candidate who received less than 5% of the vote. Figures 3 and 4 (below) present first differences calculated from these MNL analyses that show the predicted effect of variables on the likelihood of a respondent supporting each of the candidates (including the against all/null and other categories).²⁴ The figures only display these effects for the variables that we found to be statistically significant predictors of the vote for Zyuganov/Banzer in the binomial logit analyses, as these are the effects whose legitimacy we need to check. If the binomial logit results are masking the fact that the results are being driven by the vote for another candidate, then we would expect to see numerous other candidates with first differences that are similar to those we find for the ex-authoritarian candidate in terms of both size and direction.

-- INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE --

Again, Figures 3 and 4 clearly demonstrate that this is not the case. Far from finding numerous instances of similar substantive effects of variables on other candidates, we find almost none. In almost every case, the substantive effect of the variable on the vote for Zyuganov or Banzer is clearly distinguishable from the effect of that variable on all of the other candidates. Again, the lone exception is the preference for order as opposed to freedom in the Russian case, where there are significant effects for both Lebed and Zyuganov, although the effect is twice as large for Zyuganov as it is for Lebed.²⁵ In sum, the statistical analyses of the vote for other candidates in the Bolivian and Russian elections provide additional support for the contention that the vote for Banzer and Zyuganov was to a certain degree motivated by pro-authoritarian sentiments on the part of Bolivian and Russian citizens.

The Russian data offers the possibility for a final test to demonstrate that our results are not being driven primarily by the nature of the opposition. While the data presented above

describe the vote in the first round of the 1996 presidential elections, there was a second round of voting between the top two candidates from first round, Zyuganov and Yeltsin. We therefore rerun our analysis using the vote for Zyuganov in the second round as the dependent variable. In this case, there could be no concern that the results were being driven by the composition of the “other” category, as the choice is now dichotomous. Were our findings to have changed greatly across these two analyses, then we would again have reason to be concerned that all of the findings above were in fact being driven by candidates that were no longer involved in the second round of the election (although this would have been highly doubtful given the fact that Yeltsin and Zyuganov received close to 70% of the vote between them in first round). Table 6 confirms that this is not the case, as the results are very similar. There is almost no effect on either the authoritarian or social capital variables. Indeed, the only real change of note is that the low income and crime variables cease to be statistically significant predictors in the second round of the elections (although neither change the direction of their effect).

-- INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE --

COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS

In our research we find that a preference for authoritarian regime types is a key predictor of support for ex-authoritarian candidates for president in two vastly different countries: Bolivia and Russia. Despite the different past and contemporary economic and political characteristics of these two countries, voters choose to support ex-authoritarian candidates in free elections in part because they favor authoritarian regime types. Social capital variables, though, seem to have no effect on this vote choice. Pro-authoritarian attitudes, however, are not the only factors driving support for these candidates. In the Bolivian case our evidence suggests that voters may also prefer ex-authoritarian candidates because of concern over unemployment and corruption.

In the Russian case, concern over the state of the national economy clearly plays a role. In both countries, older voters are more likely to support ex-authoritarian candidates. In Russia we find similar patterns for poorer and working class voters as well.

Our findings have potentially important implications for the future of democratic consolidation in new democracies where voters support ex-authoritarians. Our results show that attitudes supportive of authoritarian regimes and attitudes expressing concerns about the economy make a potent cocktail driving voters to support candidates and parties that history suggests may have little sympathy for democracy. As one of the primary reasons that voters choose to vote for former authoritarians is because they prefer an authoritarian system to democracy, we worry that the former authoritarians may interpret electoral victory as a mandate to govern in authoritarian ways, which could promote the kind of deterioration of new democracies that some researchers have observed (Diamond 2002, 22; Rose and Shin 2001, 331).²⁶ If elites and masses believe that authoritarianism works better than democracy, fragile new democracies may be in danger. At the same time, there is also a clear economic dimension to the support for ex-authoritarian candidates. It seems possible that support for renewed authoritarianism might increase in the absence of an improvement in economic conditions.

As we have examined only two cases in which voters have cast their ballots for former authoritarians, there remain many questions for future research. As a first step, it would be illuminating to examine whether we find similar patterns in other post-communist and Latin American countries in an effort to make sure we have not merely stumbled upon an exclusively Bolivian-Russian connection. Moreover, this analysis was deliberately limited to Presidential elections to facilitate more seamless comparison across the two cases. Having established a realistic basis for comparison, future work could consider parliamentary elections, as well as

sub-national elections, in hopes of seeking further evidence of the generalizability of our findings. Finally, we have found that authoritarian attitudes motivate voters to cast their ballot for former authoritarians, but in this paper we have not investigated why some people have preserved (or recently formed) pro-authoritarian attitudes. This is a crucial question whose answer would take us even further in understanding impediments among mass publics to democratic consolidation.

Appendix I: Election Results

Results of the 1997 Bolivian Presidential Election

Candidate and (Party)	Percentage of the Vote*
Hugo Banzer (ADN)	22.26%
Juan Carlos Durán (MNR)	18.20%
Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR)	16.77%
Ivo Kuljis (UCS)	16.11%
Remedios Loza (CONDEPA)	17.16%
Other	9.51%

Source: Corte Nacional Electoral, <http://www.bolivian.com/cne/nal-r.html>.

Party Abbreviations:

ADN.: Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action)

CONDEPA.: Conciencia de Patria (Conscience of the Fatherland)

MIR.: Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left)

MNR.: Movimiento Nacionlista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement)

UCS.: Unidad Cívica Solidaridad (Civic Solidarity Union)

Results of the 1996 Russian Presidential Election

Candidate and (Party)	Percentage of the Vote: Round 1	Percentage of the Vote: Round 2
Boris Yeltsin (Independent)	35.28	53.83
Gennadii Zyuganov (KPRF)	32.03	40.30
Aleksandr Lebed (Independent)	14.52	
Grigorii Yavlinsky (YAB)	7.34	
Vladimir Zhirinovskii (LDPR)	5.70	
Others	1.17	
Against All/Invalid	2.96	5.87

Source: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation: *Vybory Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii 1996*.

Party Abbreviations:

KPRF: Communist Party of the Russian Federation

LDPR: Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

YAB: Yabloko Party

END NOTES

¹ In Argentina, voters elected to gubernatorial and mayoral positions three former military governors (Antonio Bussi, José David Ruiz Palacios, and Roberto Ulloa), a leader of two military rebellions (Aldo Rico), and a former police officer (Luis Patti) who is accused by the Argentine National Commission about Disappeared People of torturing prisoners during the dictatorship (self-citation omitted). In 1997 Bolivian voters elected a former dictator as president, Hugo Banzer. Former coup-plotter Hugo Chávez won the Venezuelan 1998 presidential election (Canache 2002b), and former coup-plotter Lucio Gutiérrez won the 2002 Ecuadorian presidential election. The former dictator of Guatemala, Colonel Efraín Ríos Montt, was elected president of the legislature in 1993 and in 1999, and is currently a presidential candidate (Azpuru 2001). In Peru, Alberto Fujimori, the architect of an executive coup in 1992, was reelected president in 1995 (Carrión 2001).

² Former dictators Moi of Kenya, Rawlings of Ghana, Kerekov of Benin, and Ratsiraka of Madagascar were elected president of their countries during the 1990's (Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998; Herbst 2001, 365). A former Khmer Rouge member, Hun Sen, was elected co-prime minister of Cambodia in 1992, carried out a coup to oust his co-prime minister in 1997, and was reelected prime minister in 1998.

³ Communist successor parties have won parliamentary elections in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland during the 1990's (Tokes 1996; Zhelev 1996). The first democratically elected president in Romania, Ion Iliescu, and the current president of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, were also officials in communist regimes (Higley, Kullberg, and Pakulski 1996, 143; Karpinski 1995).

⁴ In Russia the GNP per capita in 1999 was \$2,270; in Bolivia it was only \$1,010. Twenty-two percent of Bolivian females over the age of 15, and 9% of males, were illiterate in 1998, while only 1% of Russian females and less than 1% of males were illiterate. The difference in infant mortality rates is even more striking. While the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births in 1998 was only 17 in Russia, it was 60 in Bolivia (World Bank 2000, 274-5, 286-7).

⁵ In Bolivia, the Congress chooses the president if no candidate receives a majority of the vote.

⁶ Rose and Munro (2002, 134) describe the KPRF as a party of "old brand Communists . . . not rebranded like its Polish or Hungarian counterparts." For more on the KPRF, see Davidheiser (1998) and Sakwa (2002).

⁷ Likewise, the purpose of this paper is not to explain why people vote for candidates who espouse authoritarian attitudes or programs generally – were this the case, we would certainly have examined the vote for Zhirinovskii and Lebed as well – but instead to focus directly on the phenomenon of voting for ex-authoritarian rulers or representatives of ex-authoritarian ruling parties.

⁸ The 2,977 respondents were selected through a multi-stage stratified sample. First, the country was

divided into its nine departments. Then, within each department, the sample was further subdivided into four strata by population size: 1) towns or cities that had more than 20,000 people, 2) between 2,000 and 20,000 people, 3) between 500 and 1,999 people, and 4) fewer than 500 people. The sample size within the departments was proportional to population size, but the departmental samples were drawn so as not to have extremely small N's in remote, sparsely populated departments such as Pando and Beni. In order to recalibrate the sample to bring it back to PPS criteria, the data were then subsequently weighted so that the population size of each departmental stratum were proportional to the national population distribution. All interviews were conducted in person in Spanish, except for a small number of monolingual Quechua- and Aymara-speaking respondents, who were interviewed in their own language using translated versions of the questionnaire. The response rate was 83.3%.

⁹ There were 468 voters who reported that they could not remember for whom they had cast their vote.

¹⁰ A multistage area-probability sample was drawn from the voting-age population, and selection of respondents within households followed the Kish procedure. Interviewers made three attempts to reach potential respondents and the response rate for the initial wave was 79.8%. The retention rate was quite strong with 2,776 (97.7%) respondents completing the second wave and 2,456 (86.4%) completing the third wave. All interviews were conducted in person. For more on the survey, see Colton (2000).

¹¹ Those who either found it “hard to say” for whom they voted or refused to declare their vote choice are also dropped from the analysis. Very few respondents chose these answers: they represented 0.6% and 3.3% of those who reported voting, respectively.

¹² This figure is quite close to the 32% of voters who actually cast ballots for Zyuganov in the elections (see Appendix I for details). Not surprisingly given the proximity of the survey to the election, there were fewer voters – only 82 – who were unable to state for whom they voted than in the Bolivian case. When these voters are removed from the sample, the percentage of the remaining voters in the survey supporting Zyuganov almost exactly mirrors his actual support in the election at 32%. All independent variables from the Russian data are rescaled along a 0-1 continuum to facilitate comparison of coefficients (Achen 1982).

¹³ The one exception was that we are not able to test the same variables in both the Russian and Bolivian cases for retrospective voting hypotheses. This is discussed in greater detail in the text below.

¹⁴ Running the full version of the model (Model 3) for the Russian data with listwise deletion of missing data results in the loss over 300 respondents (N = 1682; see King et al. (2001) for concerns about listwise deletion). For this reason, we employed multiple methods in conducting our analyses of the Russian data. The results we report in the body of the paper use “mean replacement” in which all non-respondents to questions with substantial missing data (defined as approximately 100 or more non-respondents) are

assigned the mean value of the sample that did answer the question. In order to address concerns that we might be underestimating our standard errors by this approach, we run the regression again using a series of dummy variables to identify all of the non-respondents for each particular question; this method allows us to estimate the effect of the variables in question using only the information provided by those who did choose to answer the question. (We thank (name omitted) for suggesting this approach). The results were nearly identical between using these two approaches. Moreover, the results were almost exactly the same when we used the smaller listwise deleted samples.

¹⁵ As most of the explanatory variables are dummy variables, we chose this approach as the best way to mimic a constant shift across all variables. Predicted probabilities are calculated using Clarify 2.1 (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003) and SPost (Long and Freese 2001).

¹⁶ When we report an increase in the likelihood of supporting a candidate, we are referring to the actual percentage point change in the predicted chance that the respondent has of supporting the candidate, not the percentage of the increase relative to the original chance of supporting the candidate. Thus a predicted change from a 20% to a 60% chance of voting for Zyuganov is reported as an increase of 40% in the likelihood of supporting Zyuganov, not a 200% increase.

¹⁷ The substantive effect of age needs to be treated cautiously, as it represents a shift from the youngest to the oldest voter in the sample. For the rest of the variables – and especially the dummy variables – the first differences represent swings from larger numbers of respondents (e.g., of the 1,996 Russian respondents who reported voting in the presidential election, 709 felt the Soviet system was best, as compared to 1287 who did not).

¹⁸ Moreover, these results hold when we rerun Model 1 including just the social capital variables, so it is not merely a case of the authoritarian attitudes washing out the effects of the social capital variables.

¹⁹ Preliminary analysis suggests, however, that political knowledge may be an important predictor of attitudes towards authoritarianism in both the Bolivian and Russian cases. We plan to pursue the general question of determinants of pro-authoritarian attitudes separately in greater detail in future research.

²⁰ Even more surprisingly, the biggest beneficiary of concern over crime is the incumbent Yeltsin, which runs counter to the basic retrospective expectation. People who felt crime was the most serious issue were only 1% and 3% more likely to support Lebed and Zhirinovskii, respectively. The likelihood of supporting for Yeltsin, though, increased by 7%.

²¹ Although we code age as a continuous variable, the effect remains constant when we rerun the analysis coding age as either a single dummy variable or a series of dummy variables. In both instances when we use a series of dummy variables and omit the lowest age group, the size of the coefficients increases as the dummy variables capture older sections of the populations. This suggests a monotonically increasing

relationship. Rerunning the analyses with an age-squared variable included, which is insignificant in both cases, confirms this point.

²² There is some evidence to suggest that this is the case in Russia. In particular, 45% of respondents who had not received a high school diploma felt that the Soviet political system was the most appropriate system for Russia today, as compared to 28% of those who had received only a diploma but no further education and only 14% of those with additional education (Pearson $\chi^2(2) = 168.13, p < .001$).

²³ The lone exception to this finding is that Lebed also appears to benefit from a preference for order in a way that is similar, if not quite as strong, as Zyuganov.

²⁴ We choose not to present regression results out of concern for space and because first differences are a more concise way to ascertain if these effects are present. MNL regression results can only describe how the vote for one party is related to another party, and thus it would take close to 40 pages of results to present all of the permutations from the two analyses. In contrast, first differences can concisely show how a variable affects the vote for each party. See Colton (2000) for an example of a similar approach to reporting MNL results using first differences as opposed to regression coefficients.

²⁵ This raises the question of why the results for Lebed and Zhirinovskii do not look more similar to those for Zyuganov along the preference for authoritarianism dimension. As both had tried to position themselves as law and order nationalists during the campaign, one might expect them to benefit from these dimensions in a manner similar to what we expected for Zyuganov. While the topic warrants its own exploration, one tentative explanation for this finding is that pro-authoritarian candidates face a credibility problem. They may advocate what sounds like authoritarianism in a campaign platform, but pro-authoritarian voters will not know if these promises are credible. Faced with a choice between multiple pro-authoritarian candidates, the candidate with the strongest credibility as a “real authoritarian” may be the ex-authoritarian candidate or party. This could help to explain why Lebed, who had at least been a relatively successful military officer, might be seen as more credible than the eccentric and outlandish Zhirinovskii. We thank (name omitted) for this suggestion.

²⁶ And, indeed, Banzer did declare a state of siege in 2000, during which civil rights and liberties were suspended, and military and police officers violently repressed protesters (self-citation omitted).

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Table 1. Estimated Binomial Logit Coefficients and (Standard Errors) of Vote for Banzer

Category	Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics	Gender	-.183 (.113)	-.119 (.108)	-.175 (.116)
	Age	.018*** (.004)	.016*** (.004)	.017*** (.004)
	Education	.019 (.014)	.004 (.013)	.016 (.015)
	Wealth	-.183 (.374)	-.236 (.360)	-.220 (.382)
	Working Class	.112 (.111)	.084 (.109)	.096 (.113)
Authoritarian attitudes	Dictatorship vs. Democracy	.512** (.190)		.452* (.194)
	Order vs. Liberty	.261* (.108)		.209 [^] (.110)
Social capital	Group Attendance	.000 (.002)		-.001 (.002)
	Trust in Institutions	.053 (.046)		.079 (.048)
	Political Knowledge	-.416 (.242)		-.380 (.248)
Retrospective voting	Crime		.305 (.310)	.190 (.320)
	Unemployment		.284* (.125)	.297* (.128)
	Corruption Victim		.340** (.114)	.382*** (.119)
	Constant	-1.479*** (.369)	-1.22*** (.32)	-1.61*** (.39)
	N	1703	1717	1641

*p≤.05, **p≤.01, ***p≤.001; [^]p≤.057

Table 2. Estimated Binomial Logit Coefficients and (Standard Errors) of Vote for Zyuganov

Category	Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics	Gender	-.178 (.131)	-.043 (.112)	-.168 (.134)
	Age	1.28*** (.320)	1.91*** (.289)	1.29*** (.327)
	High education	.124 (.202)	-.508** (.167)	.148 (.206)
	Mid education	-.027 (.154)	-.308* (.133)	-.062 (.158)
	Low income	.316* (.139)	.378** (.124)	.284* (.141)
	Working class	.365** (.123)	.368*** (.109)	.340** (.125)
Authoritarian attitudes	Soviet Political System	2.38*** (.122)		2.22*** (.125)
	Order vs. Freedom	1.26*** (.293)		1.05*** (.302)
Social capital	Group Attendance	-.216 (.289)		-.235 (.297)
	Trust in Institutions	-.004 (.326)		.444 (.339)
	Political Knowledge	-.073 (.278)		-.069 (.284)
Retrospective voting	Crime		-.730** (.279)	-.810** (.308)
	Unemployment		.191 (.140)	.072 (.160)
	Retrospective Economy		-2.74*** (.226)	-1.86*** (.264)
	Constant	-3.34*** (.381)	-.73*** (.21)	-2.73*** (.396)
	Number of observations	1986	1992	1986

*p≤.05, **p≤.01, ***p≤.001

Table 3. Estimated Binomial Logit Coefficients and (Standard Errors) of Vote for Bolivian Candidates

Category	Variables	Banzer (ADN)	Durán (MNR)	Zamora (MIR)	Kuljis (UCS)	Loza (CONDEPA)
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics	Gender	-.175 (.116)	.271* (.140)	.039 (.152)	.238 (.180)	.042 (.218)
	Age	.017*** (.004)	.002 (.005)	-.015** (.006)	-.019** (.007)	-.023** (.009)
	Education	.016 (.015)	-.024 (.018)	-.022 (.020)	-.040 (.023)	-.045 (.029)
	Wealth	-.220 (.382)	.657 (.460)	.359 (.499)	-.592 (.605)	-1.829* (.754)
	Working Class	.096 (.113)	.000 (.138)	.117 (.147)	-.297 (.182)	-.179 (.216)
Authoritarian attitudes	Dictatorship vs. Democracy	.452* (.194)	.093 (.238)	-.299 (.298)	-.265 (.333)	-.452 (.443)
	Order vs. Liberty	.209^ (.110)	-.033 (.131)	.070 (.144)	.141 (.169)	-.244 (.205)
Social capital	Group Attendance	-.001 (.002)	-.002 (.002)	.004 (.002)	-.001 (.003)	.003 (.004)
	Trust in Institutions	.079 (.048)	.096 (.057)	.130* (.063)	-.069 (.074)	-.344*** (.093)
	Political Knowledge	-.380 (.248)	.048 (.298)	.792* (.320)	.116 (.388)	.330 (.472)
Retrospective voting	Crime	.190 (.320)	.223 (.366)	-1.041 (.659)	-.035 (.514)	-.364 (.714)
	Unemployment	.297* (.128)	-.055 (.161)	-.097 (.174)	.071 (.199)	-.459 (.275)
	Corruption Victim	.382*** (.119)	-.304* (.154)	-.101 (.161)	-.282 (.197)	.108 (.225)
	Constant	-1.61*** (.39)	-2.13*** (.47)	-1.94*** (.51)	-.88 (.59)	.32 (.72)
	N	1641	1641	1641	1641	1641
	Chi Squared	52.008	19.487	27.932	24.380	40.105
	Pseudo R-Squared (Nagelkerke)	.043	.019	.029	.030	.061

*p≤.05, **p≤.01, ***p≤.001; ^ p≤.057

Table 4. Estimated Binomial Logit Coefficients and (Standard Errors) of Vote for Russian Candidates

Category	Variables	Zyuganov	Yeltsin	Lebed	Yavlinskii	Zhirinov.
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics	Gender	-.168 (.134)	.300* (.118)	-.055 (.131)	.024 (.173)	-.422 (.259)
	Age	1.29*** (.327)	.526 (.299)	-.760 (.341)	-1.25* (.480)	-1.70* (.679)
	High education	.148 (.206)	-.063 (.183)	-.022 (.214)	.398 (.301)	-.934* (.471)
	Mid education	-.062 (.158)	-.235 (.152)	.237 (.170)	.373 (.265)	-.216 (.313)
	Low income	.284* (.141)	-.015 (.138)	-.058 (.153)	-.525* (.253)	.334 (.277)
	Working class	.340** (.125)	-.113 (.113)	-.029 (.127)	.043 (.173)	-.267 (.257)
Authoritarian attitudes	Soviet Political System	2.22*** (.125)	-1.94*** (.150)	-.459** (.145)	-.933*** (.232)	.087 (.273)
	Order vs. Freedom	1.05*** (.302)	-1.01*** (.240)	.696* (.281)	-.177 (.353)	-.158 (.555)
Social capital	Group Attendance	-.235 (.297)	.063 (.233)	.501 (.233)*	-.664 (.407)	-.246 (.608)
	Trust in Institutions	.444 (.339)	.945*** (.296)	-1.19*** (.334)	-.533 (.453)	.327 (.670)
	Political Knowledge	-.069 (.284)	.074 (.260)	-.185 (.290)	1.09** (.426)	-.356 (.567)
Retrospective voting	Crime	-.810** (.308)	.339 (.243)	.089 (.287)	-.228 (.411)	.535 (.488)
	Unemployment	.072 (.160)	-.000 (.148)	-.085 (.164)	-.134 (.232)	.038 (.319)
	Retrospective Economy	-1.86*** (.264)	2.05*** (.232)	-.330 (.259)	-.664 (.347)	-.931 (.530)
	Constant	-2.73*** (.396)	-.858* (.338)	-.942* (.382)	1.94*** (.426)	-1.71* (.73)
	Number of observations	1986	1986	1986	1986	1986


*p≤.05, **p≤.01, ***p≤.001

Table 5. Estimated Binomial Logit Coefficients and (Standard Errors) of Vote for Zyuganov in First and Second Rounds

Category	Variables	Zyuganov Round 1	Zyuganov Round 2
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics	Gender	-.168 (.134)	-.187 (.131)
	Age	1.29*** (.327)	.740* (.319)
	High education	.148 (.206)	-.117 (.201)
	Mid education	-.062 (.158)	-.213 (.157)
	Low income	.284* (.141)	.118 (.143)
	Working class	.340** (.125)	.447*** (.124)
Authoritarian attitudes	Soviet Political System	2.22*** (.125)	2.46*** (.125)
	Order vs. Freedom	1.05*** (.302)	.997*** (.296)
Social capital	Group Attendance	-.235 (.297)	.192 (.262)
	Trust in Institutions	.444 (.339)	-.353 .334
	Political Knowledge	-.069 (.284)	.021 (.284)
Retrospective voting	Crime	-.810** (.308)	-.399 (.283)
	Unemployment	.072 (.160)	-.209 (.165)
	Retrospective Economy	-1.86*** (.264)	-2.35*** (.264)
	Constant	-2.73*** (.396)	-1.54*** (.384)
	N	1986	1991


* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$

Figure 1. Substantive Effects of Variables on Likelihood of Voting for Banzer




All variables shifted from minimum to maximum to calculate first differences. All calculations are made from the full model (Model 3). * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$: refers to statistical significance of coefficient in regression (Model 3) results. (Note: Order vs. Liberty is $p \leq .057$.)

Figure 2. Substantive Effects of Variable on Likelihood of Voting for Zyuganov




All variables shifted from minimum to maximum to calculate first differences. All calculations are made from the full model (Model 3). * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$: refers to statistical significance of coefficient in regression (Model 3) results.

Figure 3. Substantive Effects of Key Variable on Likelihood of Voting for Major Candidates in 1997 Bolivian Presidential Election



All variables shifted from minimum to maximum to calculate first differences. All calculations are made from multinomial logit (MNL) analysis.

Figure 4. Substantive Effects of Key Variable on Likelihood of Voting for Major Candidates in 1997 Russian Presidential Election



All variables shifted from minimum to maximum to calculate first differences. All calculations are made from multinomial logit (MNL) analysis.