Today's POLITICUS in the New York Times tries to fathom the extent to which NATO and the Western powers really trust Russia to cooperate in putting pressure on Iran, regarding its nuclear programme. Whilst certain recent moves by the West suggest an element of confidence in the Kremlin's good nature, such as the Mistral deal, and, depending on who you read, the scrapping of the missile defence scheme, others imply a latent distrust.
How much trust do -- or should -- the Western allies accord Russia in attempting to get its cooperation to stop Iran's drive for nuclear weapons?
And while good faith is the issue, what practical Western steps or accommodations are understood in NATO Brussels' home-office line that the allies owe Moscow recognition of its "security interests"?
The slithers of answers that are emerging look contradictory.
On one hand, a report published last week rated the U.S., British and French belief in Russia's reliability low enough so that, for fear of Moscow informing Tehran, they refused for months to tell the Russians of their strategy relating to a secret Iranian nuclear site in Qum before its public disclosure in September.
Going in the other direction, Adm. Igor Burtsev of the Russian Navy indicated to Russian media over the weekend that France was now ready to sell it a helicopter-carrying assault ship and a license to produce four similar advanced vessels. They are the warships that the Russian Navy's commander in chief, Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky, said, glowingly, would have allowed his forces to complete its tasks in the 2008 invasion of Georgia in 26 minutes instead of 40 hours.
Although the French have confirmed negotiations but not a sale, the purchase would be the first ever of such technological magnitude -- and strategic comfort -- involving a NATO member and Russia.
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