Yet the gap is an extraordinary one: to cite just a few aspects of the situation, from 1805 onwards Russia was a key player - indeed, in some respects the key player - in the international relations of Napoleonic Europe; the campaign of 1812 was not just an episode of positively epic dimensions, but also a moment of seminal importance in the history of modern Russia, the echoes of which continued to reverberate throughout the life of the USSR, if not beyond; and finally in the bloody battles of 1813-14 it was Russian troops who made up the largest part of the Allied armies and, arguably at least, Russian leadership that ensured the overthrow of Napoleon.
Fortunately for all students of the Napoleonic era, this massive gap in the historiography has now been filled by a massive book. Crafted by Dominic Lieven, perhaps one of the most distinguished specialists in nineteenth-century Russia of his generation, Russia Against Napoleon truly reaches the parts that other works do not. Beginning with the failed alliance of Tilsit between Russia and France, which Lieven presents as an arrangement that was based on a cool and realistic appreciation of Russian interests, the author charts Alexander I's steadily deteriorating relationship with Napoleon and explains how by 1810 the tsar had been forced into a position of open enmity with the French empire, in part because of the latter's relentless aggression, but also because of growing internal pressure (throughout the book, indeed, great stress is placed on the importance of domestic Russian politics). Hostility to France, however, did not necessarily mean war and, as Lieven shows, in 1811 Alexander eschewed the idea of attacking Napoleon: rather, he would wait to be attacked and, initially at least, adopt a purely defensive strategy. When war came in 1812 it was therefore very much the responsibility of the French ruler, and in arguing thus Lieven places himself in the camp of those who argue that the struggles of 1803-15 were in the most literal sense Napoleonic wars.
"Beginning with the failed alliance of Tilsit between Russia and France, which Lieven presents as an arrangement that was based on a cool and realistic appreciation of Russian interests
In 1942 , the Romanian amabassador Gregoire ( Gregory ) Gafenco compared the Tilsit pact to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact .
As count de Lauriston , the german ambassdor in Moscow thinked that these agreements were leading to the formation of a " Kontinentalblock " which will challenge the infamous Anglo-Saxonic " sea power " .
In 1812 , the Taurogen agreement led to the " Ostpolitik " of Bismarck , the Rappalo pact , the Molotov - Ribbentrop pact , the " Ostpolitik " of Willy Brandt and the Schroeder-Putin alliance .
Most of Russians see the Napoleonic invasion on nearly the same level of the Nazi invasion of 1941 which shows that History is like a blueprint : It shows the same thing but from different angles .
There is a famous cartoon of Boris Yefimov showing Hitler as the " bad ( frozen ) pupil " of the " teacher Napoleon " if front of Moscow .
Napoleon had a geopolitical project of creating an independant Cossack state in the place of Ukraine as " Napoleonide " .
Alexander was rather under the influence of the British and some argues that Pavel was killed by British agents .
Pavel had the project to form an army with Napoleon in order to invade the " British Raj " throught the Caspian Sea and Persia .
The lesson of History , is that there are phenomenons which pass the centuries and still are there .