Out of the many, many interesting quotes we got from Vice President Joe Biden during his famously candid Wall Street Journal interview (which sounded like it was done in a cocktail lounge), was the following appraisal of the United States believes that Russia must feel about the possibility of Iran becoming armed with nuclear weapons: "I can see Putin sitting in Moscow saying, 'Jesus Christ, Iran gets the
nuclear weapon, who goes first?' Moscow, not Washington." Logically and rationally, of course Biden is correct here. Russia and Iran may be enjoying a brief honeymoon in their relations, but over history there are still some serious unresolved conflicts, involving everything from regional political disputes, pan-Islamic anger over Chechnya policy, potential competition in the energy field (Tehran is a Gazprom monopoly killer laying in wait), disagreements over imbalances within the SCO, and frustrations over the on-again, off-again teasing with the Bushehr civilian nuclear energy facility and the delivery of Tor-M1s and S300 systems. All this plus the fact that for every additional country which goes nuclear, Russia's international influence vis-a-vis its weapons holdings decreases. We've even seen a few omens of what could happen, hundreds of protestors in the streets have begun shouting a new slogan: "Death to Russia."
But predicting Russian foreign policy based on what are believed to be
their logical and rational interests is a big mistake, and Biden's
quote is representative of a widespread misapprehension in Washington -
this idea that Russia really has any interest in helping the
anti-proliferation efforts. Still that's the current thinking I think we can see going on as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrives to do some business in Moscow this week.
On this blog we've covered a number of theories to explain why the Kremlin is in no hurry to cooperate with the West. For one, as Bob argued in his last article in the Moscow Times, policy in both Moscow and Tehran is run by a series of clan interests, whose personal business portfolios in the short term and whose demand for mutual legitimation obscure the decision-making process. There is also the argument of Russia's "swing position" on Iran, which was recently knocked off kilter by the sudden Obama Administration concession to pull back from the missile shield plans in the Czech Republic and Poland (oddly, if the status quo was the goal, than the removal of the missile threat is actually very bad news for the siloviki). Lastly, there is the issue of Iran and Russia's mutual interest in market disruption to maintain a tolerably managed instability in the region which keeps energy prices high, though it's hard to imagine that this would ever be sufficient reason to allow another country on your border obtain nuclear weapons.
Of course, a lot of people could choose to take President Dmitry Medvedev's statements about Russia's lack of concern over Iran at face value. There are all variety of state-approved pundits in Moscow following the Iranian line: the country is not seeking nuclear weapons, even if they were, they are not a danger unless attacked, sanctions are unthinkably inappropriate, and the government always deserve more chances and more time to work with the IAEA. However even Russian diplomats felt they were caught off guard by the last missile tests.
It might not even matter at the end of the day. As the dominant theme goes in Russia's foreign relations with the world today, it is always important to have these issues of "respect," "prestige," and "influence" as the global power that they insist they have resurged toward. A lot of this is a legitimate complaint that there does exist a gap between how the world sees Russia and how Russia sees itself, but in other respects - like dealing with Iran - this newly reclaimed power has never been tested, and the true extend of the Kremlin's influence over Iran may be vastly overstated for all we know.
Writing in the Jerusalem Post, Boris Morozov hits up the laundry list of points of why Russia came to love the Iranian bomb despite all the conflicts with what we assume to be rational national interests. The article is worth reading, though I do think there is one thing being left out of the equation - Russia may well be playing the gentle pro-Iranian stance out of the firm knowledge that the full muscle of Israeli and Washington influence may work to reduce the Iranian nuclear threat, serving Russia's own security interests, without them having to lose one iota of political capital. Really, the ball will be in Iran's court, to decide if they feel that Russia isn't living up to their stated promises of a priveleged relationship.
For now, with Hillary in Moscow, we should get to see a pretty agile tightrope walk to appear interested in the concept of cooperation on sanctions, while never committing to the full support of either party.
On this blog we've covered a number of theories to explain why the Kremlin is in no hurry to cooperate with the West. For one, as Bob argued in his last article in the Moscow Times, policy in both Moscow and Tehran is run by a series of clan interests, whose personal business portfolios in the short term and whose demand for mutual legitimation obscure the decision-making process. There is also the argument of Russia's "swing position" on Iran, which was recently knocked off kilter by the sudden Obama Administration concession to pull back from the missile shield plans in the Czech Republic and Poland (oddly, if the status quo was the goal, than the removal of the missile threat is actually very bad news for the siloviki). Lastly, there is the issue of Iran and Russia's mutual interest in market disruption to maintain a tolerably managed instability in the region which keeps energy prices high, though it's hard to imagine that this would ever be sufficient reason to allow another country on your border obtain nuclear weapons.
Of course, a lot of people could choose to take President Dmitry Medvedev's statements about Russia's lack of concern over Iran at face value. There are all variety of state-approved pundits in Moscow following the Iranian line: the country is not seeking nuclear weapons, even if they were, they are not a danger unless attacked, sanctions are unthinkably inappropriate, and the government always deserve more chances and more time to work with the IAEA. However even Russian diplomats felt they were caught off guard by the last missile tests.
It might not even matter at the end of the day. As the dominant theme goes in Russia's foreign relations with the world today, it is always important to have these issues of "respect," "prestige," and "influence" as the global power that they insist they have resurged toward. A lot of this is a legitimate complaint that there does exist a gap between how the world sees Russia and how Russia sees itself, but in other respects - like dealing with Iran - this newly reclaimed power has never been tested, and the true extend of the Kremlin's influence over Iran may be vastly overstated for all we know.
Writing in the Jerusalem Post, Boris Morozov hits up the laundry list of points of why Russia came to love the Iranian bomb despite all the conflicts with what we assume to be rational national interests. The article is worth reading, though I do think there is one thing being left out of the equation - Russia may well be playing the gentle pro-Iranian stance out of the firm knowledge that the full muscle of Israeli and Washington influence may work to reduce the Iranian nuclear threat, serving Russia's own security interests, without them having to lose one iota of political capital. Really, the ball will be in Iran's court, to decide if they feel that Russia isn't living up to their stated promises of a priveleged relationship.
For now, with Hillary in Moscow, we should get to see a pretty agile tightrope walk to appear interested in the concept of cooperation on sanctions, while never committing to the full support of either party.
""I can see Putin sitting in Moscow saying, 'Jesus Christ, Iran gets the nuclear weapon, who goes first?' Moscow, not Washington."
Logically and rationally, of course Biden is correct here. "
Um, why?
Did you know that the Iranian government did not reply in kind to Iraqi use of WMD during the Iran-Iraq war, despite being technologically able to do so?
"...and frustrations over the on-again, off-again teasing with the Bushehr civilian nuclear energy facility and the delivery of Tor-M1s and S300 systems."
Why have the Russian government delayed delivering these things? Because the USG have asked them not to. The Russian government accepts the risk you point out of irritating the Iranian government as a favor to the US government. Yet this whole, um, blog movement, is a whining complaint that the Russian government refuses to cooperate with "The West" on Iran.
Get your story straight.
I think I fail to see how Iranian conduct in the Iraq-Iran war bears much relation to whether or not Moscow considers it a security risk for Tehran to have the bomb. Russia is located right there in the neighborhood, with its long porous borders and domestic potential for Islamic extremism, and actually stands to have its interests damages much more than the faraway United States. Go on back to Henry Kissinger's appraisal of what Russia really sees in Iran - or perhaps just make the argument directly as to why Iran becoming armed with nuclear bombs is good or indifferent for Russia.
Of course the US asked Russia not to give these things to Iran, and that's also why Israeli PM made his strange secret visit. But they keep going back and doing it again. I've got my story straight - I'm just wondering when Tehran will ask Moscow to do the same thing.
The history is relevant, because it illustrates that the Iranian government are serious in their abhorrence of WMD. That they refrained from responding in kind to Iraqi chemical weapons attacks, despite the tens of thousands of guresome casualties Iraqi chemical attacks inflicted, is a clear demonstration of the iranian committment to refrain from having, let alone using, weapons of mass destruction. All the more reason for the RF government not to fear alleged Iranian nuclear weapons over the trivialities you harp upon.
Further, the accusations that Iran has a nuclear weapons program come from the same people who were So Certain Iraq had one in 2002. We know how that worked out.
So on the one hand, we have accusations from people who erroneously accused Iraq of developing nuclear weapons in 2002. On the other hand, we have an Iranian government that refused to use, or even develop, WMD in response to Iraqi chemical weapons use.
Frankly, the Iranians have much the greater credibility.