Der Spiegel has supposedly obtained confidential documents written by the EU team led by Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini that is investigating the war last summer. There are quite a few interesting little nuggets in Der Spiegel's write-up. Here are a few:
The confidential investigative commission documents, which SPIEGEL has obtained, show that the task of assigning blame for the conflict has been as much of a challenge for the commission members as it has for the international community. However, a majority of members tend to arrive at the assessment that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili started the war by attacking South Ossetia on August 7, 2008. The facts assembled on Tagliavini's desk refute Saakashvili's claim that his country became the innocent victim of "Russian aggression" on that day.
The experts found no evidence to support claims by the Georgian president, which he also mentioned in an interview with SPIEGEL, that a Russian column of 150 tanks had advanced into South Ossetia on the evening of Aug. 7. According to the commission's findings, the Russian army didn't enter South Ossetia until August 8.
But the report apparently doesn't let Russia entirely off the hook. From Hamburg-based international law expert Otto Luchterhandt, another commission member:
Georgia's attack, Luchterhandt argues, constitutes a breach of this agreement, thereby giving Russia the right to intervene. Nevertheless, he writes, the Kremlin, with its overwhelming intervention in western Georgia, can be accused of "violating the principle of proportionality."
And then there's the war crimes accusation:
The commission also cited many serious attacks on Georgian civilians by South Ossetia militias. According to a report for the commission by Swiss legal expert Théo Boutruche, militia members, most of them young men, looted and burned down several villages inhabited by Georgians, beat civilians and murdered more than a dozen Georgians. According to the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, the Russian occupying force was obligated to reestablish public order. But it did almost nothing to prevent the atrocities, which a commission dossier classifies as "war crimes."
Finally, the closer:
But Tagliavini's team won't be questioning any Americans. According to one member of the commission, "our director and the EU apparently lack the courage" to take that step.
While Der Spiegel insists that the leak it has is legitimate, Tagliavini's office denies that it ever had any contact with Der Spiegel on the matter. According to an email exchange between her office and the state-owned Russia Today:
"Spiegel's article is not based on information provided by... Ambassador Tagliavini, or any other authorized sources.... There has been no interview, background briefing or any other way of communication in order to provide information for the article. The report... shall be presented to the EU Council of Ministers by 31 July 2009 and comes under the sole and exclusive responsibility of Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, and not under the responsibility of the Mission's experts or the majority of its experts."
Now, as we get our knives sharpened and ready, there's just one more thing. Recently shot interviews are up on YouTube now in which Svante Cornell of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of John Hopkins University, Paul Goble, former State Dept. official and blogger at Window on Eurasia and David Satter of the Hudson Institute speak about motives, tactics and implications in Russia-Georgia relations.
Okay my deed here is done. Go ahead now, rip it up. All of it.
Your analysis of this issue is extremely shabby.
The only issue that matters is whether prior to August 7th Ossetian forces were bombarding Georgia and whether Russian forces were violating Russian airspace. There is no doubt, anywhere, that this was the case. Given this, any allocation of blame to Georgia implies it should have simply continued to absorb this punishment, something Putin on his side explicitly refused to do in regard to the Georgian incursion, even though NATO did nothing to protectt Georgia from the attacks. It's absurd for anyone to suggest that Georgia had any obligation to let its people be attacked.
Moreover, Georgia never crossed a boundary that the world recognized as foreign, but Russia did. Russia's use banned weapons was far more egregious, and its annexation of Abkhazia, totally uninvolved in the hostilities, was barbaric.
Finally, attempting to speculate about the contents of a report that hasn't been published is irresponsible and in no way helpful.
Oh my La Russophobe, this report must really chap you guys. For ages you've been pushing the line that poor little Georgia was invaded by Russia.
Well..... reality sucks when it explodes your little myths.... eh?
The point that many of us are making is not that Georgia isn't a wonderful country with wonderful people but rather, that Mr. Saakashvili made a monumentally stupid mistake when he unilaterally initiated a military attack on two republics which have had a long and painful relationship with Georgia.
The proper strategy should have been for Mr. Saakashvili to pursue a constructive dialogue with the two republics in an effort to find a mutually agreeable solution. But, unfortunately, he had an impetuous decision to attack on August 8th.
Nobody denies that there were rebels in South Ossetia who used military force against civilians in Georgia proper. These actions of their part are reprehensible and deserved a proper response. However, the proper response was not to start a ground war against everyone in South Ossetia.
We all understand that you guys have a direct mandate to spin this conflict between Russia and Georgia in Georgia's favor. You have your job to do and this report will make it that much harder for you to spin it so as to implicate the Kremlin. The very fact that this report blames Saakashvili even a little is quite amazing considering the vested interests Europe has with Georgia. Nonetheless, blame Saakashvili the report, supposed, does.
The question everyone who is interested in this topic needs to ask is whether at the end of the day Saakashvili's response to sporatic rebel attacks was proportionate. Apparently, you guys behind the anonymous anti-Putin project will now find yourselves with less supporters.
PS: You still have produced no supporting evidence to your radical thesis that Russia's ultimate goal is to take over Georgia in a military attack and throw out Saakashvili. The fact is that had Russia really wanted to topple the Saakashvili government by force and annex Georgia and turn it into the southern-most krai/oblast it would have, and easily could have, done so last August.
The fact that Russia pulled back into South Ossetia and Abkhazia blows a huge hole in your thesis.
Of course, neither Timothy nor La Russophobe are really being fair here. Both are exaggerating, each to his/her favorite side.
Mr Saakashvili certainly doesn't deserve to win a congeniality contest, and Georgia is not Shangri-Lah on the Caucausus. The conflicts between the central government and the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has a long history, and many events happened that do not shine a good light on Georgia. It may very well be that at least Abkhazia (and to a lesser extent South Ossetia) have as good a reason to secede as Kosovo did. Timothy's question about whether or not Saakashvili's reaction to the rebel attacks was proportionate is also quite relevant, as much so for Gorgia's reaction as for Russia's later reaction. La Russophobe's anger cannot change that.
However, the situation also hardly justifies the schadenfreude that flows from Timothy's post. Aggressions by South Ossetian forces, as well as violations of Georgia's airspace by Russian drones, were clearly provocations, obviously attempts at getting Mr Saakashvili angry enough to do something stupid, and he obliged by doing that. Such provocative behavior is hardly commendable, and Timothy offers no excuse for it. Also, saying that Russia pulling back into South Ossetia and Abkhazia blows a hole in the theory that Russia wants to occupy Georgia is not quite true. Of course, Russia could have done it; but are we ready to say that Russia would go that far in ignoring public opinion in the outside world and the reaction of other governments? The way things happened, one could argue that even pulling back into South Ossetia was a result of direct Western pressure (Sarkozy's peace plan, etc.), and might not have happened if the West had paid no attention.
And also, Timothy, here's another question: since Mr Saakashvili only attacked South Ossetia, what was the need of opening a second front in Abkhazia? As far as I know, there was no Georgian attack on Abkhazia at the time.
The conclusion is, of course, that neither Georgia nor Russia are angels. Both did wrong things, and none of them has the right to brand herself as an angel of innocence. Russia has no more love for South Ossetians and their human rights than Georgia has. It all looks just like your usual Realpolitik.
Russophobe:
Actually, I didn’t conduct any analysis at all, I just pointed you to someone else’s.
If you open the youtube link embedded in the final paragraph of the post, and watch Svante Cornell’s interview, you’ll find he actually says outright that regardless of what happened August 7 or 8, “the body of evidence that suggests that this war premeditated on the part of the Russian leadership is overwhelming.”
As for speculating, I am merely pointing you to Der Spiegel’s summary of a report that it claims to have. If that is how you define speculation, then so be it. You may not find it helpful, but I would venture that there are other readers of this blog who find it very helpful to know that a European news outlet generally viewed as reputable claims to have proof that the EU appears likely to come down on Russia’s side in the matter, thereby scooping Ambassador Tagliavini and her colleagues on their own story.
@Asehpe
Unfortunately Georgia had attacked Abkhazia with a small military operation (blowing up some bridges) weeks before they entered South Ossetia. The Russian peacekeepers there had already responded to that by closing the borders between Georgia and Abkhazia. Georgia responded on this by moving its military south for and in between Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Then it was for Russia to wait which country they would attack first. South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Off course the georgian army choose South Ossetia first, because it doesn't have a strong defense system. Ossetian soldiers had found Georgian attack plans some days before the war broke out when they managed to take over some newly build Georgian look-out posts outside of Tskhinvali. These plans revieled a full scale attack on South Ossetia that should take about one day. The Georgian army was to secure Tskhinvali in one day and then move quickly forward to the Roki-tunnel to close it. Right after that the Georgian army had planned to invade Abkhazia from the east side, because Abkhazia had stationed most of its army-equipment at its southern border as a reply to the attack and closing of the borders some weeks before. Russia wouldn't be able to enter with tanks to help out, because the Roki-tunnel would be closed.
Russia had because of these plans all the right to secure Abkhazia before the Georgians would launch a genocide attempt on the Abkhazian people as well. It was all in the cards that Abkhazia would be next.
That Russia would have annexed the whole of Georgia is something I highly doubt. Sure Russia is very interested in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is nice to have a port in the black sea and having controll over the roki-tunel. Build up a military presence south of the Caucasus mountains is very desirable for Russia. But Russia isn't the bad Russia as so many people in the west (especially the media) like to portrait. They have become a country with a blooming economy and are a international player when it comes to trade etc. It would be very stupid to ruin good relationships by playing war games out of nothing. Russia isn't the US, that just decides to throw over governments and place one on the seat that they like more.
Yes, the Russian Army carried their riposte into the facilities from which the Georgian attack on S. Ossetia was mounted and sustained, and pursued the fleeing Georgian Army units involved to their final destruction. It would have made no sense at all to leave these forces and facilities intact and in a condition to try again.
And what is really suprising is that the military casualties far outnumber the civilian. For US wars, such as Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the civilian casualties vastly outnumber the military casualties.
And that alone deserves a big "Well done!" to the Russian Army.
@Asehpe
You make a number of interesting points. Let me try to be specific in my response.
1. "... However, the situation also hardly justifies the schadenfreude that flows from Timothy's post....."
Actually, I think in all fairness that a tiny bit of schadenfreude is justified. Those of us who maintained that Saakashvili's actions last August were unwarranted represent a very small minority in the Western Russia Watcher community and I think we can be forgiven a moment or two of quiet gloating. Especially when compared to the daily personal assaults originating from the La Russophobe project and the complete disinformation campaign by reporters from The Wall St. Journal, The Washington Post, and the New York Times. Nonetheless, I agree, let's move on.
2. "...Aggressions by South Ossetian forces.......
Yes, the aggressive actions by the South Ossetian "forces" (i.e. rebels, gangs, militias, thugs, etc.) is the strongest argument that Georgia has on its side. Probably most observers would not fault Saakashvili had he instructed his military to specifically go after these rebels. Georgia had a lot of justification for such counter-measures. The problem is that Saakashvili doubled down big time and throw away all sense of moral perspective when he instructed his forces to use heavy artillery on a civilian population (there is some speculation that they also used cluster bombs).
Let's not forget that it was specifically Russia, which had been pleading diplomatically for the West to engage in serious discussions about such independence movements could and should be handled under the rule of law. Let's also not forget that NATO procrastinated in engaging in such discussions because it would have made the declaration of Kosovo that much harder to justify.
Also, keep in mind that Russia was pushing Saakashvili to accept the agreement not to use force to settle such conflicts. I point this out because it refutes the claim that Russia is hell-bent on using its own military to "conquer" Georgia. Why bother if it really was trying to provoke Saakashvili so that it could retaliate militarily?
Keep in mind, Saakashvili's actions were not the equivalent of "military man-slaughter" in that he responded in the passion of the moment. Rather, Saakashvili's strategy was the equivalent of "premeditated military murder." The date and time chosen were done so for very specific strategic reasons.
The fascinating question from a military strategy point of view is what was the logic not to secure the Roki tunnel immediately. Again, circumstantial evidence leads some to believe that he was really gambling that the Russians would be preoccupied (by the Olympics) and that he would have at least 24 hours of unfettered access to the republic. I don't know the answer but let's not forget that Saakashvili's decision to attack Tskinval(i) resulted in the unnecessary death of lots of civilians (whether dozens, hundreds, or thousands is immaterial to the point).
Again, I'm not a military expert (hardly) but from my layman's perspective there may be a corollary to Saakashvili's strategy and the American experience in Vietnam (remember that American advisors have been training Georgia for some time).
Specifically, it is accepted wisdom that in a guerilla war with rebels (think Pakistan and Afghanistan also) one of the hardest dynamics to overcome is the fact that the rebels embed themselves in civilians populations and thus, when the outside military force tries to dislodge them there are significant collateral damages (i.e. innocent civilians die). While there may be some hardcore hawks who argue that war is ugly so civilians be damned, I am not one of them.
So Saakashvili may have become "Kurztian: (Apocalypse Now) in his approach to obliterate the civilian city of Tskinval(i) in the hope that the civilians would flee throw the tunnel (perhaps one reason for not initially securing it) and the resulting depopulated republic would become docile in its resistance to the plan to reincorporate it into Georgia proper. Scary thought but not that farfetched.
Sidenote: I can already anticipate one response, which is to point to the Chechnya conflict with Russia and Russia's use of similar tactics. I would argue the same as above- that it such cases (again think Afghanistan), it is soft power that ultimately wins these types of wars. I would argue that Russia's strategy wasn't the deciding factor in Chechnya's rebirth recently but rather, it was the economic revival. Actaully, Russia's military approach may have delayed the "victory."
3. .........as well as violations of Georgia's airspace by Russian drones, were clearly provocations, obviously attempts at getting Mr Saakashvili angry enough to do something stupid, and he obliged by doing that. Such provocative behavior is hardly commendable, and Timothy offers no excuse for it......"
The airspace argument is specious. Russia "violates" American airspace, NATO "violates" Russian airspace, Russia "violates" Georgian airspace, and Georgia "violates" Russian airspace. These actions are not provocations for full-scale war; rather, these "provocations" are a cat and mouse game that goes on all the time. Therefore, it is silly for Saakashvili to point to these activities as any kind of justification for his actions.
The argument that "Russia made Saakashvili do it" is juvenile in its logic and a complete copout. Mr. Saakashvili is a very bright man who should have understood the dynamics involved. If Saakashvili was unable to control his emotions then he has nobody to blame but himself and clearly is unqualified to hold such an important post as President.
4. "... Also, saying that Russia pulling back into South Ossetia and Abkhazia blows a hole in the theory that Russia wants to occupy Georgia is not quite true. Of course, Russia could have done it; but are we ready to say that Russia would go that far in ignoring public opinion in the outside world and the reaction of other governments?"
The reason Russia didn't push into Tiblisi and over-throw the Georgian government has nothing to do with public opinion. Western public opinion was completely anti-Russian during the conflict last August and so that would have actually been the perfect time for Russia to over-throw the Georgian government had that been its original objective (which it wasn't). The reality is that the Kremlin really, really dislikes Saakashvili with a passion (perhaps an understatement) but that it has zero interest in using military force to get rid of him.
5. "...The way things happened, one could argue that even pulling back into South Ossetia was a result of direct Western pressure (Sarkozy's peace plan, etc.), and might not have happened if the West had paid no attention...."
I'm not sure your logic holds because much of the pro-Saakashvili crowd maintains that Russia is now in violation of international accords regarding the number of troops it can have in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. So, actually, Russia is ignoring direct Western pressure and standing by its principles. If Russia really put Western sentiment as its number one objective then it wouldn't have gone in the republics and especially into Georgia proper (temporarily) in the first place. Russia cares but not to the point of sacrificing its beliefs.
6. "....And also, Timothy, here's another question: since Mr Saakashvili only attacked South Ossetia, what was the need of opening a second front in Abkhazia? As far as I know, there was no Georgian attack on Abkhazia at the time...."
See @Seraphiel's comment above
7. "...The conclusion is, of course, that neither Georgia nor Russia are angels. Both did wrong things, and none of them has the right to brand herself as an angel of innocence. Russia has no more love for South Ossetians and their human rights than Georgia has. It all looks just like your usual Realpolitik...."
This statement reminds me of recent statements from Western officials who when confronted with irrefutable evidence that it was Saakashvili who started the actual conflict, they say, "Eh, let's not worry about who started what. The fog of war is too thick. Let's move forward and......"
Sorry, the point the EU report is to actually assign blame for who started the conflict. If the West really wants to reset the relationship with Russia then it is going to have to eat a little crow (prepared by the Bush-Cheney administration) and admit that Saakashvili is a destabilizing force in the Kavkaz and the sooner Georgia holds new elections the better.
Rkka, this problem -- forces that are based on facilities on the other side of the border and that invite retaliation are exactly what the Georgian government claimed led them to attack South Ossetia. If you justify the Russian reaction (which many qualify as exaggerated) by saying "it would have made no sense at all to leave these forces and facilities intact and in a condition to try again", then so can the pro-Georgia party justify Saakashvili's. It is also true, you know. The question, for Saakashvili as for Putin/Medvedev, is whether or not the reaction was commensurate with the threat.
And what is really suprising is that the military casualties far outnumber the civilian. For US wars, such as Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the civilian casualties vastly outnumber the military casualties.
And that alone deserves a big "Well done!" to the Russian Army.
Indeed, rkka. But one other conclusion from this is that it is very much in agreement with the idea that this Georgian war was planned in advance -- which was not the case for the war in Kosovo. And if Russia had been planning to enter Georgia way before Saakashvili did anything against South Ossetia... then this is one more point in favor of those who accuse Russia of a "complot".
@Asehpe
Your first and second paragraphs contradict each other.
You claim in the first that, "...are exactly what the Georgian government claimed led them to attack South Ossetia." In other words, Georgia started the conflict but was justified.
You claim in the second that, "...Russia had been planning to enter Georgia way before Saakashvili did anything against South Ossetia..." In other words, Russia would have "invaded" Georgia regardless of what Saakashvili did or didn't do.
While this may be conceptually comfortable for you as you struggle with the reality of August 2008 differs dramatically from what you want to believe, the fact remains.... Saakashvili started it.
@ Timothy,
First, thanks for all the trouble writing so many interesting points up. It's always a pleasure to discuss with someone who actually cares about the topic, not about emotions.
So, regarding your first post:
You claim Georgia had attacked Abkhazia weeks before South Ossetia (with a small force), and the response was Russia closing the Abkahzia border with Georgia. I tried to google this fact, but couldn't find it -- with "Georgia attack Abkhazia", all I could find was claims from the Russian media that Georgia "was going to do that", but not that it had. I checked on Wikipedia (in the article on Abkhazia) and did not find any mention of an attack from Georgia in the period immediately preceding the South Ossetian war -- only references to the Georgian UAV that the Russian forces shot down (in violation of what was
then still Georgian airspace) in April 2008, and then a mention to the Abkhazian forces opening fire on the Georgian forces in Kodori Gorge on August 9, in apparent coordination with the start of the South Ossetia war. I'd appreciate it if you could provide me with a link to a reliable source showing the details of this attack by Georgian forces on Abkhazia immediately before the beginning of the South Ossetia war.
I'd also appreciate a link to this Georgian attack plan you mentioned that South Ossetian soldiers found. You see, in such a hot political climate, and with two sides (Georgians and South Ossetians) which are both on record as committing gross human rights violations against the other side (see the Human Rights Watch report on the 1993 war at http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/g/georgia/georgia953.pdf), one might expect the soldiers to exaggerate a little.
You say "of course they chose South Ossetia first", and I agree they probably would have gone on to attack Abkhazia if they had been successful in South Ossetia. But the point is that they did not, and if they did not attack Abkhazia, and if Abkhazia is supposedly not the same country as South Ossetia, then entering it is not what I'd call a reasonable reaction. As always, you have to wait till they attack first or you lose the moral high ground -- after all, they might change their plans; or something else might happen. Else, why even wait for the attack on South Ossetia? After all, military hawks always say attack is the best defense... Claiming "the enemy will attack X or Y" before anything happens to justify an open attack on that area is more reminiscent of the tactics of fascist countries (or also of American McCarthyism, or Dick-Cheneyism) than of sensible international politics.
Actually, the Roki tunnel, which you mention, is one thing that makes me think maybe Georgia's plans for this war were either badly conceived, or non-existent. If you have a look at the tunnel, you'll see it goes right through a mountain. I don't understand why Georgia simply didn't send one or two trucks full of dynamite to blow it up (the tunnel would fill with rocks) and stop the Russians from entering South Ossetia -- they could have done it in a couple of hours, right as they shooting the first shots against South Ossetia (or better yet, a little before), and that by itself would have delayed the Russian reaction by a while. A few troops to make sure the Ossetian rebels couldn't stop them should be sufficient to protect the trucks. Why didn't Georgia do that? It is of course perfectly possible that they are not so good at planning wars, and that this was simply an honest tactical mistake. But the other possibility -- i.e. that these plans didn't really exist, or existed only in embryonic, not well thought-out form -- shouldn't be dismissed.
The Russian reaction, on the other hand, swift and clearly articulated, with minimal loss of civilian lives, looks much more likely to have been planned ahead. Which I don't begrudge the Russians for: it is common sense to do war games and have good plans about possible conflicts. It's just that they deny having done that (or did, until that Russian officier said on Ekho Moskvy that these plans had indeed existed -- did you see that?)
You say: "Russia had because of these plans all the right to secure Abkhazia before the Georgians would launch a genocide attempt on the Abkhazian people as well". It's not a good idea to jump ahead from "military attack" to "genocide attempt" -- though such things, sad to say, are certainly known to happen in this area. Still: such plans, if they really exist, should have been made widely available, placed in the hands of the UN, discussed legally as an argument against Georgia in every forum. As it is, I even find it difficult to google a reliable source that mentions them--much less the plans themselves. In the absence of such discussion in international legal fora -- UN, OSCE, the Hague tribunal, you name it -- one can only conclude that the Russian reaction was at best hasty. And what if these plans were forged by South Ossetian nationalists? I wouldn't put it beyond them to do such things.
You say Russia wouldn't be interested in annexing all of Georgia, and you may well be right: in today's world, that would cause bad reactions even from neutral parties. If the desire to do that exists... well, from Lermontov on, you can certainly find justifications written by Russians for conquering the whole Caucasus. I don't find it hard to imagine that a number of people in Russia still view this idea favorably, especially if they remember that all these areas, including Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, were part of the USSR (which I would call the Russian empire) not so long ago. Did you see the positive references in the Russian press about the possiblity of annexing South Ossetia and Abkhazia not long ago?
Besides, there are other options. Invading Tbilisi, putting a puppet government in power, preserving "independence" but keeping Russian forces in the country and Russian advisors everywhere (with a wink to Bush's disastrous Iraq campaign as a precedent) is also a possibility: all the power of annexing Georgia without the legal emcumbrances.
As you point out, it would indeed be very stupid for Russia to ruin good trade relationships by playing war games out of nothing. I certainly hope Russia won't do that. I can't say I can tell you for sure -- the Russian press seems to be full of elements that would welcome the opportunity. But I sincerely hope that the Russian government will think as you think about that. It would indeed be better for everybody, including them.
@ Timothy,
on your reply to my post to rkka: indeed, the paragraphs do contradict
each other, in an attempt to show by analogy that there is a contradiction
in rkka's claim that it was OK for the Russians to go after their enemy
into Georgian territory but not for the Georgians to go after their enemy
into what was de jure still Georgian territory.
In other words, my contradiction mirrors his, as an attempt to make it stand out.
The plans to invade Georgia seem to follow from the way the Russian forces were deployed. I'm not necessarily saying they would have invaded regardless: they would still need a pretext, and a smarter guy than Saakashvili might not have given them one. So, despite having a plan, they might very well never have invaded. One thing does not follow logically from the other.
@Aehpe
I think that you may have confused my Comment with @Seraphiel's Comment at 5:45am. I will let him answer your questions concerning Abkhazia because he is much better informed than am I.
As I briefly touched upon in my Comment 1:05pm Point #2 there is a 3rd explanation to your statement concerning the Roki tunnel question (see below):
You wrote: "...I don't understand why Georgia simply didn't send one or two trucks full of dynamite to blow it up (the tunnel would fill with rocks) and stop the Russians from entering South Ossetia -- they could have done it in a couple of hours, right as they shooting the first shots against South Ossetia (or better yet, a little before), and that by itself would have delayed the Russian reaction by a while...."
As you point-out, there first explanation is that the Georgian's made a tactical mistake. The second explanation, again as you point out, is that the Georgians were badly prepared.
While I, of course, have no idea on what was the true explanation let me briefly (I promise) offer a third explanation.
It may have been that the Georgians purposely left the Roki tunnel unsecured because they wanted and expected that the civilian population would flee Tskinval(i) after the initial bombardment started. Additionally, the Georgians took a calculated risk that the Russians would militarily react slowly, if at all.
The Georgians basically were sick and tired of South Ossetians living in South Ossetia and made the stone-cold decision to force as many of the civilians out of the republic as possible and as quickly as possible.
The plan may have been to blow-up the tunnel once enough civilians had "escaped" through it to North Ossetia.
So when you put it all together, the Georgians may have acted completely logically but made some seriously flawed assumptions.
@ Timothy,
let me now comment on the points you raised in your
post to me. (By the way, I mistook Seraphiel's post for a post from you, hence my reference to you in my first reaction -- sorry about that, Timothy and Seraphiel.)
1. Actually, I think in all fairness that a tiny bit of schadenfreude is justified.,
Actually, I can agree with you here -- in fact, too many people jumped to the conclusion that this was a black-and-white situation with Russia at the black end. And I can see the point when you say that, when confronted with the emotionally driven claims that e.g. La Russophobe makes, one can be excused for some less than noble feelings. Indeed, I agree. But maybe gloating is not the right thing -- it looks like hubris, inviting fate to prove us wrong, as it were. (I won't comment on the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and the New York Times, etc. without knowing which claims of theirs you consider disinformation. I point out that these newspapers have a reputation for seriuosness and journalism that goes beyond La Russophobe's.)
2. The problem is that Saakashvili doubled down big time and throw away all sense of moral perspective when he instructed his forces to use heavy artillery on a civilian population
Indeed. The best anti-Saakashvili argument is that his reaction was out of proportion with the threat posed by the rebel forces. If he indeed exaggerated in the use of force (and the newest reports, including the one mentioned here in the blog post we're commenting on, do support this position), then he deserves to be criticized by it. Fair is fair: if Russia can be accused of exaggerating, so can Georgia, if the facts support that.
Why bother if it really was trying to provoke Saakashvili so that it could retaliate militarily?
Precisely because of the international situation and the reactions that this would cause. Even Stalin, when annexing the Baltic states, needed to make it look like a legal move by having rigged elections. Hitler also frequently made comments about how much he loved peace, and how he was angry at Jews for "forcing" him to war. Now, I don't want to insinuate that the current Russian government is as bad as Stalin or Hitler -- it obviously isn't. But I do want to point out that governments always love to be able to claim that they were "forced" to war -- who on his/her right mind would ever, in today's world, claim to have started a war for any other reason? If you read the Georgian websites, they're also full of claims about how the Georgian government tried to negotiate with the Russians, but all to no avail. Saakashvili also wanted to be seen as having been forced to war.
Indeed, both sides claim they were always interested in peaceful solutions and negotiations. Who is telling the truth here? Isn't it better to look at their actions?
As the facts are now becoming better known, nobody can defend Saakashvili's attack on Tskhinvali -- the best excuse now is that he thought there were lots of rebels there so that it was necessary to attack the city (a poor excuse if you ask me -- it's obvious that the attack on the rebels was simply seized as an opportunity to try to regain control of the breakaway province). Indeed, some military advisers claim that attacking civilian populations is unavoidable when dealing with guerilla warfare, as you mention; maybe this was on Saakashvili's thoughts, but it is just as likely that he simply wanted to occupy the local capital.
As I said in my other post, the fact that Georgian forces didn't immediately destroy the Roki tunnel does not seem to speak in favor of a well thought-out planning for their actions. You mention American advisers, Vietnam errors, etc., but it would still all boil down to poor planning -- which is possible. Or no planning -- the "military manslaughter" you mention -- which is also possible. I don't see how to exclude the latter possibility: that Saakashvili did, indeed, more or less act on the spur of the moment. That is, as far as I can tell, the most obvious (not necessarily the true one, but we still need to wait for more research) explanation for the failure to destroy the Roki tunnel.
Keep in mind that there had been provocations (the Georgian UAV shot down in what was still officially Georgian airspace, etc.). Trying to claim that Russia was all innocent here is, to me, as misguided as trying to claim that Saakashvili was innocent. And when people respond to provocations, they do tend to react in an irrational manner.
Which leads to:
3. These actions are not provocations for full-scale war; rather, these "provocations" are a cat and mouse game...
Indeed. But what do you think the Russian press, and the Russian government, would say if, for example, Chinese drones were flying regularly over Vladivostok or the Kamchatka peninsula, and precisely at a time of international tensions between China and Russia, with the respective governments exchanging vehement accusations against each other?... Even more to the point, do you think the Chinese government would not know the (provocative) effect of sending these drones precisely at that moment? It would be extremely naive not to think that they were perfectly aware of the provocation effect, and that it indeed was part of what they were trying to achieve.
And a violation is a violation. I'm sure Russians would complain about American drones flying over Russian territory--hell, the main reason for being against the missiles in Poland and the Czech republic is that it would make it that much easier for Americans to spy on Russian territory (the missiles themselves are too few and too inefficient to be a threat against Russia by themselves), something which I can understand: nobody likes to see what looks like an unfriendly person spying on them. To think that Georgia's complaints about that should be dismissed as irrelevant is, to me, not rational.
And also: provocations rarely are provocations for full-time war; they are almost always cat-and-mouse games. When they get to full-time war level, they become ultimata. The point is: what is each side trying to achieve with it? To irritate the other, so that it does something irrational. Which, in this case, seems to have worked.
Now, this is not to say that "Russia made Saakashvili do it". As you point out, Mr Saakashvili is responsible for his own emotions, and he could always have answered differently to Russian provocations. In fact, he clearly should have. Mr Saakashvili bears the responsibility for his choices, period. But to claim that Russian provocations were not aimed at making him do something stupid -- fishing for a result, as it were -- would be, I think, very naive.
As always, nobody's an angel here. Maybe the Russian government is from Mars and the Georgian from Venus (or the other way around), but none of them are from Heaven.
3. The reason Russia didn't push into Tiblisi and over-throw the Georgian government has nothing to do with public opinion. Western public opinion was completely anti-Russian during the conflict last August and so that would have actually been the perfect time for Russia to over-throw the Georgian government had that been its original objective (which it wasn't). The reality is that the Kremlin really, really dislikes Saakashvili with a passion (perhaps an understatement) but that it has zero interest in using military force to get rid of him.
That is hard to believe. First, as you pointed out elsewhere, Russia has good trade relations with a number of countries that would have been flat-out against a total occupation of Georgia; as it is, without a march on Tbilisi, Russia already got Sarkozy quickly flying there to try to broker a peace agreement, a number of leaders going to Tbilisi to show support for Saakashvili, etc. But no economical sanctions. Now, suppose Russia had gone further and occupied Tbilisi, arrested Saakashvili and brought a puppet government to power: the reactions would probably have been stronger. Public opinion might have led various countries to economic sanctions or more determined action than simply trying to get the Russian forces to stop and finally to retreat (which, as you remember, they weren't quick to do). The new puppet government would probably not have been recognized, which would lead to further tensions between Russia and the West. So: was this really the best time, or the worst? In fact, the best moment to do such a thing would be when the world were worried about something else -- some other war, some other nuclear threat from North Corea, etc. Remember: Stalin entered the Baltic states when the world was looking at Hitler entering Paris.
That the Russian government dislikes Saakashvili with a passion, we all know. The reason is harder to understand. I don't really think it's his human-rights violations (I don't see Russia hating China because of Tiananmen Square, or Zimbabwe because of Mugabe's crimes, or Sudan because of Darfur, etc. etc. etc.). Also, I don't see why Russia should love Abkhazians and South Ossetians more than, say, Albanians in Kosovo, or the Chechens in Chechnya. So really, why is it that Russia hates Saakashvili so much? More than Ahmadinejad or Netanyahu, more than Milosevic, more than Kim Jong-Il? More than a number of African leaders guilty of thousands of murders? To me, this has less to do with South Ossetia and Abkhazia (other than as territories to establish domination over) or human rights violations than with Saakashvili's anti-Russia stance. Which, all in all, looks like the ultimate reason for all this conflict.
5. I'm not sure your logic holds because much of the pro-Saakashvili crowd maintains that Russia is now in violation of international accords regarding the number of troops it can have in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The logic here is the following: one interpretation of the situation is that Russia is trying to comply as little as possible with international accords because they prevent Russia from doing what she wanted (get Saakashvili, put a puppet government in Georgia or even annex it), but it has to comply to some extent so that the pro-Russian government party can say they are trying to collaborate.
Indeed, Russia doesn't think all that well about Western sentiment, but it may very well be afraid that the reactions would go beyond La-Russophobe-style vehement blog posts and actually into areas were it might hurt.
I don't see the Russian government here standing by any principles. Which principles exactly? Again, why is Saakashvili and Georgia any worse than a number of other conflicts with strong leaders in many other areas of the world? I don't see how to escape the conclusion that it's not principle, but self-interest, that rules here, on both sides of the Georgia-Russia border.
6. On the Abkhazia question -- see my answer to Seraphiel (who I mistook for you, so I addressed my answer to you -- sorry about that!)
7. This statement reminds me of recent statements from Western officials who when confronted with irrefutable evidence that it was Saakashvili who started the actual conflict, they say, "Eh, let's not worry about who started what. The fog of war is too thick. Let's move forward and......"
That is bad thinking indeed, and shows other motivations. But then again, doesn't your own statement sound similar, albeit in the opposite direction? You seem to be saying: "Since Saakashvili shot the first shot, of COURSE anything Russia did came from its pure heart and its deeply Christian beliefs."
Sorry, who-started-it is not everything; history is not a winner-takes-all game. If history were ever that simple, we wouldn't have so many books about it. Saakashvili is to blame, no doubt about it. Russia is not an angel, no doubt about it either. The one who bets with Realpolitik may be, in some sense, a pessimist about human nature, but s/he is rarely wrong.
Timothy,
we seem to be crossing posts quickly here -- I'll be brief here, just
in case you have already reacted to my last post. (Besides, my daughter should be back from school any moment now, and we're supposed to go out to buy groceries...)
As for the Roki tunnel: as I pointed out, it may indeed be the case that this shows poor planning on the part of the Georgians. But as I also said: it may also show no planning on the part of the Georgians -- the "spur of the moment" theory. I don't see how you can exclude that logically. You claim: "The Georgians basically [...] made the sone-cold decision to force as many civilians out of the republic as possible and as quickly as possible". Maybe, I don't know. As far as I can see, it remains just as possible to say "The Georgians basically didn't have any plans, (over)reacted on the spur of the moment against provocations by South Ossetians rebels -- like the Russians did in Chechnya, a province that only wanted the same that Abkhazia and South Ossetia want -- and didn't stop to think about what they were doing, so they never thought about the tunnel."
The truth is probably somewhere in-between, and we'll need to wait more research on the topic.
@Asephe,
I'm sorry, but you misunderstand the situation in South Ossetia totally.
About the Roki-tunnel. You seem to think South Ossetia is part of Georgia in such a way that the Georgian army has access to South Ossetia whenever it wants etc. This is not the case. Since the last war in the 1990's there are only Georgian and Russian peasekeepers in South Ossetia. Both the Georgian and Russian peacekeepers work together. And the Russian peacekeepers would never allow the Georgian peacekeepers to blow up the tunnel. The georgian army has to invade South Ossetia first in order to reach the roki-tunnel. Besides the Ossetian army would have stopped such tunnel-blow-up attempts right away, because that tunnel is guarded on both sides, by russians and ossetians.
About the Abkhazia part you can't find on Google. I have the original link here: http://en.rian.ru/world/20080701/112744626.html about the border closure.
I must admit that it were bombs that went of on an Abkhazian marketplace that made the Abkhazian authorities close bridges. It was long time ago it happened. So sorry for that.
The kind of things you read there in that article is very common since the war in 1990. And therefore not very interesting for the general media. Therefore you will have a hard time finding thins on google about it.
It is somehow very difficult for the western world to understand that Abkhazia and South Ossetia don't want to be part of Georgia since they were forced to by Stalin. If there are several almost fascistic Georgian governments on top of that you can't blame those cultures to want to be separated from Georgia.
Actually South Ossetia wants to be a part of Russia, or better said, they want to reunite with the rest of their country to become Ossetia again.
What Chechnya wants is independence.. yes, but for a whole different reason and different background. And besides natural resources being the most obvious reason, Russia has some very good cards in it's hands that prove it is best not to let Chechnya out of its control. But that is for another topic.
@Seraphiel,
thanks for the data and the link. That helped a lot.
First of all, let me make one thing clear. I do not think that Abkhazians or South Ossetians should be forced to be part of Georgia if they don't want to. Looking at the history of conflict between them, it's not hard to see that they may have good reasons for separating from Georgia.
What I do contend -- and I don't see that you necessarily disagree -- is that the Russian's interest in this story is not simply human rights--or else there are a dozen other areas of the world where the Russians should be as outraged as in South Ossetia. As far as I can see, Russia wants governments that will do her bidding around her--and it looks likely that Kokoity in South Ossetia will do that, and also Abkhazia (though Bagapsh's victory seems to show a certain desire for independence also from Russia).
In other words -- it seems to me Russia is exploiting the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict for her own ends. Realpolitik, as I said above. Like the British exploited local conflicts in their Empire to strengthen their own position.
This has per se nothing to do with the reasons Abkhazians and South Ossetians have for wanting independence -- and they look good to me.
If South Ossetians want to be a part of a greater Ossetia (like Kosovar Albanians), so be it -- I would be the last one to be against that, since I've always been in favor of autonomy and self-determination. However, it seems to me that, should this reunited Ossetia ever want independence from the Russian Federation, the Russians would not treat it with any more kindness than the Georgians treated their own South Ossetia. They are just as much against local secession as the Georgians, even when the local population does have real grievances.
On the Roki tunnel: it wouldn't be Georgian peacekeepers blowing the tunnel out. No. What I mean is: if there was a pre-planned military operation scheduled for August from Georgia, they would be stupid not to have a special task force charged with destroying that tunnel. With most Russian forces still on the other side of the border, it wouldn't have been difficult for such a task force to enter South Ossetia (just as the regular Georgian troops entered when they started the attack), go as quickly as possible to the Roki tunnel and destroy it as the first shots were being shot in Tskhinval(i) -- perhaps even before the first shots were fired. A small group, a couple of fast trucks with a few accompanying troops, perhaps (if need be) supported by a couple of jets, could have done that in a few hours. The peacekeepers at the tunnel wouldn't have been able to stop them, especially if they had surprise on their side.
I don't want to misrepresent the situation in South Ossetia, so if I'm wrong and there's a good, tactical or strategic reason why this operation wouldn't have been possible, please let me know. And, in case it is possible, I assume military planners would have thought of that -- well, I have, and I am no specialist in military strategy.
And again, this was South Ossetia, not Abkhazia -- at the time of the August war, Georgia was not attacking Abkhazia. Abkhazians -- and Russians -- simply took advantage of that moment to do what they wanted, i.e. get the Georgians out of their last enclave. So there, in Abkhazia, they attacked first. The market bombs you mention are like the South Ossetian rebel attacks against Georgia, which the pro-Russian government people now claim were not a justification for this response; and they happened quite a while before the South Ossetian war.
In conclusion, please don't think that I'm against independence for Abkhazians or South Ossetians. Like Kosovars, Chechens, Ingushets and Dagestanians, the Abkhazians and South Ossetians certainly have the right to become independent if they so wish. It's the idea that Russia was simply defending human rights, and that her provocations against Georgia were innocent, that I really find hard to accept.
(NB: you mention Chechnya is a wholly different case. I think every case is different, of course, but all in all they're entitled to independence just as much as Abkhazians and South Ossetians. And, frankly -- if Abkhazia were a province of Russia and wanted independence from it, do you think the Russians would have reacted any differently than the Georgians? The Chechnya case suggests they wouldn't.)
@Asehpe
I have joined the debate a little late. So i wont comment on the earlier posts by you & Seraphiel. In your last post however , you say that Russia's objective in the Caucausus is Realpolitik & not humanitarian . Offcourse it is so , but I wont be as cynical about the Russians as you are. If you want to focus on the Big Picture of this conflict , let's focus of the Complete big picture . If you see the West's, especially US' push for NATO into Ukraine & Georgia , blatantly poking a finger in the Russians , you cant blame the latter to be irritated. Now in Georgia, Russian Realpolitik was in direct response to American Realpolitik. The neocons in US openly armed Saakashvili's regime knowing fully aware how shortsided & mercurial that man is. There were enough signs that he would want to use those arms to pursue American interests in that region . It was foolish to imagine that Russia would take this highhandedness in its own backyard lightly .I am from INdia & we are concerned about increasing Chinese presence in Sri Lanka , Myanmar , Nepal etc . Trust me , you dont have to "undemocratic" to feel threatened by such unwarrented NATO presence, especially when it is violation to West'sown commitments not to do so .
American Realpolitik was foolish in more ways than one. Rightly the biggest headaches for US lie in Iraq , Iran , Afghanistan & NOrth Korea. Long term stability in Iraq CANNOT be acheived without resolving the Iran issue m which in turn cannot be resolved without Russian cooperation . The west needs RUssian cooperation in order to sustain its mission in Afghanistan . Same can be said in N Korea, though Russian influence there dwarfs the Chinese one. In this background it never made any sense for US to create new hostilities in Russia's neighbourhood & threaten the above mentioned common objectives.
The bottom line is that if you do not want Russian realpolitik in Georgia, Ukraine you must do away with your own realpolitik in these regions.
@ Mihir
You make some very interesting comments, Mihir. I certainly don't consider the US a nation blessed with angelic principles only: they were, in Bush's administration, as firmly rooted in national interests and Realpolitik as everybody else (and the signs from Obama's administration is that, even though the calculations will change, this still will remain true).
It may very well be that US support for Saakashvili is to an extent motivated by idealistic principles -- "spreading democracy in the post-Soviet space" -- but it certainly also contains elements of old Cold War thinking. Yes, they certainly knew that supporting Saakashvili would anger Russia, and that is probably what they wanted: a Russia with problems with her neighbors is a Russia that is easier to attack on international fora.
What I am accusing here is the claim -- by either Russian or American government, or by parties defending either of them -- that their motives are pure. America supported Saakashvili partly because this would go "against Russia". And Russia was angry at Saakashvili partly because he was not silently obeying their orders, as they wished he would (the recent squirmishes with Belarus' Lukashenka show what the consequences are). That Saakashvili also was an angry individual quite capable of using brute force for political goals may have played a role in the Russian reaction, but I don't think it was very important (just like, frankly, I don't think Saddam Hussein's human rights violations -- much worse than Saakashvili's -- really played that important a role in the American decision to invade Iraq). If Saakashvili were the Mother Theresa of post-Soviet leaders, his unwillingness to do Russia's bidding (unlike the Armenian and Azerbaidjani leaders) would ultimately cause Russia's anger.
Now, if you want my personal opinion -- I think it is wrong for Russia to be so obviously concerned with influencing the internal politics of its neighbors. "Wrong" not simply on an ethical level -- these neighbors are supposed to be independent countries perfectly capable of making their own decisions in foreign policy, not simply "Russia's backyard" -- but also, quite frankly, in a pragmatic way: it won't make it easier for Russia to get what she wants (in any way other than by military intervention).
You mentioned China and her "string of pearls" policy of increasing presence in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal (and I had heard also Bhutan? Or am I wrong?). Whatever you may say about the motives of the Chinese -- and I'm willing to bet they're ultimately as imperialistic as the motives of the Russians or the Americans -- you have to concede they're dealing with it in a much more efficient and apparently "peaceful" way than the Russians are. No big, vehement accusations against neighboring regimes in all political fora (and that despite having North Corea as one of their neighbors!), no drones flying over neighboring countries, no implicit threats of war or "legitimate retaliations"... No, rather, economical aid (like the recent increase in investment in the ex-Sovietic Central Asian republics).
A Realpolitik thinker would hope the Russians would concentrate on becoming an economical power and start trying to influence their neighbors the Chinese way, rather than this "strong-arm contest" they seem to prefer. In today's world, that would make their goals much easier to achieve. (And note that I do not want to support China. China is an authoritarian regime much in need of criticism. But I do point out that China is not using the kind of juvenile aggressive tactics that Russia is using.)
Note that NATO did not create the hostilities between Georgia and Russia (or between Ukraine and Russia, or the Baltic States and Russia, and now between Belarus and Russia for that matter). Note that NATO did not influence the CSTO countries not to support Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's independence.
NATO (and the EU and the US) may well be thinking of their own interests in this area as well. But I don't see that their interest in these areas goes against Russia's interest in developing itself--unless you want to suggest that NATO was preparing an all-out attack on Russia at some point. No, if at all, this is just a contest about who can or cannot have more political influence -- there is no threat to Russian security here (just as, quite frankly, there is no threat to Indian security from the Chinese "string of pearls" policy--; rather increased economical rivalry and "spheres of influence" politics at the local level). NATO is not interested in threatening Russia, because, as you point out, Russia is very much necessary for tasks such as keeping Iran's nuclear ambitions under control.
What I wished for is that these countries would stop thinking about "spheres of influence" -- "I can topple that dictator over there in that country and you cannot, nyah nyah nyah!" -- and started thinking in terms of economical integration.
""I can topple that dictator over there in that country and you cannot, nyah nyah nyah!" -- and started thinking in terms of economical integration."
The Russian government would like that. So would the German, french and Italian. But the US government hate the notion of Russia being economically integrated with these nations, and bitterly oppose it every way they can think of. The US government prefer Russia isolated and excluded.
Asehpe
Its probably wrong to assume that Russians "should not " view NATO as a threat .You have to note that the West had promised not to advance NATO in return for Soviet/Russian withdwaral from East Europe. Against this background I dont see a reason why Russia should not be suspicious of the current push . & they are not the only ones who think that is going to create hostilities .They have themselves suffered invasions both frm the East & the West , hence security guarantees [especially promised ones] are seriously taken .PUtin isnt perfect , but hes right to grumble that the West neglected Russias concerns when it was weak, & now they are strong again they must rectify the equation. The Germans & the French are very less enthusiastic about the missile shield in Poland & Czech Republic. The Germans have their own reason not to start up a new confrontation with Russia. 100 years of a shared, but not so pleasant history is more than enough .
American policy here is "short sighted" . NOte im not using the word immoral or amoral , because that does not matter. Bringing the Baltics in Nato is one thingm but Ukraine is another. Ukraine has a huge Russian population [in regions which have always been inhabited by russians] , morover many Ukrainians have strong affinity to Russia . You must know that Ukaine is essentially the birthplace of the Russian State & RUssian Orthodoxy. So NATO annexation will polarize that country & may bring out the worst. Underestimating this ethnic equation can be as disastrous for Ukraine itself , as underistatiming the equation b/w Shias , Sunnis Kurds was for Iraq.
Yes you rightly identified the "String Of pearls". It s naive to assume that Chinese are doing it in a "peaceful way" . China has already occupied Indian territory in Kashmir : Aksai Chin after the 1965 war [So you see Kashmir isnt only about india-pak] . It has been claiming Arunachal Pradesh in India's Northeast since long . But thats a different debate.
Russia on the other hand hasnt claimed any of Ukraine's territory nor of the Baltics . That was just a fearmongering by Mccain & co. to earn brownie points against Obama's "naiveté" .Besides with increasing trade between RUssia & Germany , Italy m France [the big 3 of EU] it will be suicidical on russia's part to invade the west. As far as Georgia is concerned, EU knows that Saakashvili is at fault & hence France , Germany resisted suspension of EU-Russia dialouge as demanded By Poland & the Baltics.
If the West responds positively to Russia's concerns [atleast makes a start] , im sure it will be reciprocated. Building trust is more important than building bases & missile shields.
The point is the same as I wrote before. It does not serve any interest for the West to provoke Russia making it feel threatened , when it needs Russia to cooperate on many things so very vital for its own well being.
I however agree that Russia fails to promote its intersts in a professional way . They have never been good on PR. The openong up of Russia has in fact put it in a much stronger position to promote itself than ever. This work can be done by Russian Artists , cultures , cuisine than by Olg & gas . Id rather prefer Maria Sharapova, Anna Kournikova, as Russia;s spokespersons than seasoned officials
May i know which country you belong to ?
@Asehpe
With regards to your claim of Russian drones flying over neighbouring territories in april 08 , You would like to know that it was Georgian UAVs who violated Abkhazian airspace in complete violation to Moscow agreement which Georgia was obliged by . It sent many UAVs over Abkhazia , one of which was intercepted by a Russian MIG.
A UN condemned Russia's downing of the UAVs , but have also rapped Georgia of violation of the ceasefir agreement. The fact that Georgia was conducting reconnaissance missions over the territory was a provocation , & the UN body confirmed that . You cant blame the Russians to have warned about Georgian aggression, can you ??
Here is a link of that report : --
http://www.unomig.org/data/other/080526_unomig_report.pdf
******************
36. By the same token, and from the same peacekeeping perspective, the Mission
reiterates its position stated to the Georgian Minister of Defence on 7 April 2008 that the
overflight of the zone of conflict by surveillance aircraft constitutes a breach of the
Moscow Agreement. In their explanation of the purpose of the 20 April overflight,
Georgian officials have referred to the need to conduct reconnaissance of Abkhaz
military formations and movements north of the Ceasefire line. However legitimate this
purpose may seem to the Georgian side, it stands to reason that this kind of military
intelligence-gathering is bound to be interpreted by the Abkhaz side as a precursor to a
military operation, particularly in a period of tense relations between the sides. (It is
worth recalling that the Abkhaz side reported 16 UAV overflights since last August). A
ceasefire regime has a major advantage – preventing war. It does however impose, in
return, limitations on the freedom of the sides, including the undertaking by one side of
measures that can and will be perceived as threats by the other side.**********
Mihir, interesting post. I agree that the promise not to expand NATO was not kept, but notice that this was not really a result of NATO's own efforts -- rather, the Eastern European and Baltic countries literally begged NATO to take them in. As you remember, there was a lot of internal discussions about the desirability of such a move, and it was not easy to get it accepted. Just as right now, again, the governments of Georgia and Ukraine are practically begging NATO to accept them -- and see how difficult this seems to be (Germany and France are against it, etc.).
So to me, it's not hard to understand why NATO failed to fulfil the promise -- given these circumstances, this would have been very hard indeed, and would have looked as if they wanted to exclude the whole of Eastern Europe from Europe itself -- since most Western European countries were NATO members. NATO ascension was seen (rightly or wrongly, your call) as part of the process of "going to Europe". The fact that all of these countries were very much angry at Russia for what it did to them, and for its constant interferences in their internal affairs, shows that they also had good reasons -- they wanted to distance themselves from an earlier imperial overlord (see Prague Spring, Hungary in 1957, etc.) who still wanted to exert influence on them.
Should NATO have stuck to its promise? Perhaps. In the long run, it might have been better: it might have been a signal that Russia was being accepted as an equal and respected in her intereests. But frankly, considering the legitimacy and the good reasons Eastern Europeans had for wanting to escape the Russian sphere of influence, I'm afraid such a gesture might have sounded like Chamberlain's appeasements -- forget the grievances of the small countries, concentrate only on the offended honor of the one with the big stick (nuclear weapons). I admit it might have worked -- but it might have led to much stronger confrontation later on.
If Russia wants to regain influence in that area, I suggest the Chinese path: economic growth (let's go beyond oil and weapons!), aid to neighboring countries, good lucrative trade relations, and "soft power": Russia has a great cultural tradition, a very deep and beautiful literature, world-class musicians, dancers, artists, some of the best scientists around... they could do it the "soft way" if they wanted. And everybody, including Russia, would be much better off.
The West could have done better for Russia when it was weak, and it should have. As I've said to rkka above, I think it's a mistake the West now regrets. Still: all of Eastern Europe also had real grievances against the Russians. To ignore all of Eastern Europe to please Russia -- that might have worked, but then again that might not have worked.
Ukraine, as you point out, is a special case, since about 30% of its population is ethnic Russian (including, by the way, my wife, who is a Russian Ukrainian) and a good part, probably the majority of the population, doesn't want to enter NATO. Ukraine still has to come to terms with itself and find out which role it wants to play in Europe; given the current political chaos there, this looks very unlikely. I agree that letting in enter NATO now wouldn't help anyone, even Ukraine herself. (But I hasten to add that Russian influence there -- e.g. covertly through Russian news channels -- is quite an important part of the 'anti-NATO' feelings there. It's not like Ukraine has been allowed to decide by herself, without Russian influence -- see Putin's last outburst about the West "leaving Russia-Ukraine relations alone".)
I agree that China has occupied Indian territory -- I didn't know that, but you're right, I've found the references. Still: 1965 China is not 2008 China, just as 1965 Russia (USSR) is not 1993 Russia, which is again not 2009 Russia. It seems to me the China of Hu Jintao is being so careful not to cause military trouble with its neighbors (even with Taiwan, which it doesn't recognize) that it wouldn't claim Indian territory. Of course, you're right to point out the historical precedent, and maybe China will become more affirmative and demanding in the future.
As for Russia not making claims to territory... although no "official" claim has been made, Crimea is quite a good example of a part of Ukraine to which Russia feels (rightly or wrongly, it's a difficult question) entitled. Russian-language press is full of claims about it. The suggestion to split Ukraine in two, with the "Russian" Eastern joining Russia, has also already been made. Remember Putin's claim to Bush in Bucharest that Ukraine 'isn't even a real country'? I don't think China has ever said that about India.
I don't think Russia will invade the West, even Ukraine; a Georgia-style military operation would have all the bad effects on trade that you have mentioned. But there's a different strategy: keep exerting covert influence inside these countries to destabilize them. Current Russian policy on Ukraine seems to involve tsk-tsking it as a stupid child who can't get his stuff in order, shrugging their shoulders and suggesting that Europe should never consider it a serious partner -- a quite paternalistic attitude, especially in view of how much influence Russia still tries to exert inside Ukraine. The hope is, of course, that Ukraine will eventually submit to Russia's bidding. That's already sufficiently bad. Can you imagine if China were doing something like that to India -- let's say, if the economic situation in India were unstable and approaching desperation as in Ukraine?
You ask what country I "belong" to -- I am Brazilian, born and bread in the Northeast area (one of the poorest, call it Brazil's Bangladesh). I like to think I'm quite independent in my political ideas, but I do admit my country (which was a military dictatorship during my childhood) was very much anti-USSR.
Ok , so Russia has to be blamed for its imperial past . But dont you think Russia has more than made up for it by withdrawing from the East ?? Wasn't that the entire motivation behing Gorbachev allowing East Europe "freedom for themselves" ?? Dont you think the Russians deserve some credit for dismantling their own empire ? When the West made promise for not expanding NATO , that WAS IN RETURN FIR RUSSIA NOT HAVING A PRESENCE IN EAST EUROPE & DISMANTLING ITS OWN EMPIRE. The whole idea was having no military lines dividing Europe. I think they deserved more than just lip services frm the West . If the West thought it did not need Russian promises , then it should have made that clear.
The first NATO expansions were made/proposed in the 90s when Russia could hardly feed itself. I was barely 12-15 yrs when I witnessed Russia's collapse by my own eyes [on BBC offcourse] . These expansions were never made against "Russian intervention". Breaking promises during that phase is the worst insult you can offer anyone. Mind you none of the Russians took that lightly. THAT is the source of current "anti-western attitude " in Russia & not its imperial hangovers. Individual govts/ politicians have their own interests , but that time could have been used to build more trust .
You mentioned RUssia meddles in East Europe, well Russia has reasons to be worried about Western meddling in its own affairs too. Constant hectoring on "democracy ", that too mostly supported financially by greedy oligarchs like Berezovsky & Co. who have only looted the country of all its wealth , only makes it obvious that Russians should feel threatened . Why shouldn't they build bases then ?? Look , East Europe including Russia was basically a victim of too many unfortunate events in history [ WW2 , Holocaust Communism etc].Im sure we can take sides & keep bickering for 100 years as to who was wrong. This region needs to be handled more delicately than just building more bases & missile shields which only benefit defence corps on all sides . See "Should We Scared Of Russia - BBC Panorama" on youtube. It will give you a Russian Perspective through BBC eyes.
As far integration in the West is concerned, EU & not NATO is a far better means to acheive that . Bringing Ukraine in NATO would call for West Europe to have bases in Ukraine. & now since Germany is the most powerful country again in the West it implies they may have to contribute . DO you think the Germans would like to face down the Russians again ?? I don't think so !!!!!! Interstingly Germany & Russia have shared the bloodiest history amongst themselves for the past 100 years. They should hate each other more for WW2 & the subsequent division of germany. BUT look at German policy now.They have resisted all US pressure NOT TO do business with Russia. Far from bearing past grudges this is one nation which has been the least enthusiastic about irritating the Russians. Now this does not go well with Poland , but lets not go into that .Not because they are pacifist , but coz they know better that how a humiliated & defeated power must, rather MUST NOT be treated. The French & Italians have been doing good business with Russia too . The NATO policy hence is merely a hallmark of Bush's "go it alone " , " either with us or without us" policy which pisses off even its best allies. Russia is evolving , give it some time.
ABout Putin's comments, too many of his comments have been exxagerated , taken out of context . Its very easy you see. Id like to see the entire conversation before commenting on it.
Anyways the point i'm making is that there are too many big issues to be solved.If you look at the world , you will see we ACTUALLY have a situation like never before in the history of mankind that so many nations have so many common problems which can make or break each of us. India has fought 3 wars with Pakistan , came close to a nuclear conflict , & we have the terrorism problem . WE will bear the biggest shock is the world fails Afghan-Pak. It would be a tragedy if the world loses this chance.So id rather that the West & russia stop having military build ups where they ARE NOT NEEDED & concentrate on whats more important.
Oh btw Brazil & India have many things in common. Huge size, growing economy, huge shanty towns in our biggest cities [ seen Slumdog ?? ] .
Im a certified Russophile ,maybe because India has had good relations with USSR & now with Russia. But i can see you aren't close to a Russophobe , so you can appreciate my view
Lets face it the idea behind NATO is a good one. But for what I have seen so far, it looks to me NATO is a used as a tool by the US to proceed their cold war ideas. Somehow the USA doesn't understand that Russia isn't the Soviet Union anymore. And that Russia today is not the kind of Russia that it was before Putin.
The USA has been pushing the other NATO countries to let Georgia in as fast as possible. I can only reason that their motivation was to tighten the NATO belt around Russia. Good thing some other NATO countries could stop the whole party or else we would have a complete Russophobic maniac in a group of countries that already lost all it's credibility.
@Seraphiel
One more thing to remember about NATO is that it is also a business conglomerate. Specifically, each time another country joins NATO it is required to make all it's weapons systems interoperable with other NATO countries. Therefore, when a former Soviet Bloc country joins it must, over time, scrap its old weapons and purchase new ones from manufacturers "approved" by NATO. This is very big business.
So another way to look at the situation is from the perspective of market share. NATO is trying to increase its market share. To be fair, Russia also wants to maintain its own installed base of customers.
At the end of the day, this issue probably deserves to be in the Business Section of the newspaper versus the International Affairs section.