Just when I thought I was all done posting video interviews from my last trip to Washington, I saw Bob's post today about the Gary Hart and Dmitri Simes article about realism, interests, and the prospects for cooperation between the Obama Administration and Russia. In response, I have gathered together some of the last scraps of the interview I shot with David Satter from the cutting room floor, as his comments strangely seem to engage almost in a direct dialogue with the Hart and Simes piece, especially in terms of debating realism (though the interview occured a month before this article was published). Some of my questions to Satter stemmed from an article he published in Forbes in November 2008 containing advice for Obama on Russia, including the point to "ignore the realists."
Taken together, the video below and the Hart/Simes piece constitutes a real "throwdown" on the U.S.-Russia relationship in these next critical months. Please leave your weapons at the door.
Taken together, the video below and the Hart/Simes piece constitutes a real "throwdown" on the U.S.-Russia relationship in these next critical months. Please leave your weapons at the door.
At the risk of pointing out the obvious, there are several odd and intriguing convergences of opinion and
wide-open disagreements between these two camps. One starting point is the source of these arguments. Simes, as usual, gets published by the
National Interest, the conservative bi-monthly published by the Nixon
Center, with Henry Kissinger serving as the honorary chairman of the
publication. Satter, who publishes widely, is also no stranger to the
National Review, which was William F. Buckley's gift to the world. In
fact, you're more likely to see convergence between the pages of the
leftist weekly The Nation and some conservative magazines when it comes
to Russia.
So within this strange world of powerful, arch-conservative opinion making, we have two pretty opposing perspectives on handling Russia ... a trend which contributes to our position here that partisan politics are practically useless in discussing such a complicated foreign policy issue as Russia.
That's not to say that there aren't some agreements. Hart, Simes, and Satter all agree on one thing - that the basic geopolitical interests of the United States and Russia are identical. Hart/Simes say that "a sober evaluation of vital U.S. and Russian interests suggests that in no area are they in fundamental conflict" while Satter says that both Moscow and Washington are keen to build a balance of power in Central Asia to put a check on China, and that "ultimately a crisis situation could arise in which the United States and Russia emerge as allies."
.
Whereas Hart and Simes make a convincing case that the most important thing for U.S.-Russia relations to move forward would be for Washington to drop any pretension that they can define Russia's interests for them, Satter appears to argue the diametric opposite. One of the key differences between the two schools of thought we are seeing here is how much responsibility for the deterioration of the relationship rests on Washington's shoulders. Hart and Simes believe that the United States has a lot to atone for: "we did not just lecture Russia, we assumed that Russian policy makers would take our lectures seriously and follow our guidance." Meanwhile Satter appears to believe that the United States is not at all responsible for improper conduct in the relationship, and that the burden should be upon Moscow to take steps toward a consensual center.
Both approaches, in my humble opinion, seem too extremist. Why must responsibility for what has happened and what should happen rest with only one party? Furthermore, taking on the realism approach, Satter argues that "there is nothing realistic about the total absence of moral principles in international affairs" - point I believe is well taken - but then continues to suggest that any policymaker willing to make the trade-off in values for cooperation somehow stands to profit financially from this relationship with Russia. I don't think this claim makes very much sense, and seems like a conclusion driven by conspiracy ideation and paranoia.
There are also talking points from Hart/Simes which seem straight from Russia Today, such as the question "Are we holding the Russians to a higher standard of performance than we do other nations with whom we deal?" It could be argued that Russia receives exceptional status, but in the other direction ... didn't Putin get invited to the Bush family home at Kennebunkport? Didn't the EU go ahead and hold PCA talks with Russia after the violation of ceasefire terms in Georgia? This question will certainly attract some scorn from many parties, but it is precisely in the center of the debate.
So within this strange world of powerful, arch-conservative opinion making, we have two pretty opposing perspectives on handling Russia ... a trend which contributes to our position here that partisan politics are practically useless in discussing such a complicated foreign policy issue as Russia.
That's not to say that there aren't some agreements. Hart, Simes, and Satter all agree on one thing - that the basic geopolitical interests of the United States and Russia are identical. Hart/Simes say that "a sober evaluation of vital U.S. and Russian interests suggests that in no area are they in fundamental conflict" while Satter says that both Moscow and Washington are keen to build a balance of power in Central Asia to put a check on China, and that "ultimately a crisis situation could arise in which the United States and Russia emerge as allies."
.
Whereas Hart and Simes make a convincing case that the most important thing for U.S.-Russia relations to move forward would be for Washington to drop any pretension that they can define Russia's interests for them, Satter appears to argue the diametric opposite. One of the key differences between the two schools of thought we are seeing here is how much responsibility for the deterioration of the relationship rests on Washington's shoulders. Hart and Simes believe that the United States has a lot to atone for: "we did not just lecture Russia, we assumed that Russian policy makers would take our lectures seriously and follow our guidance." Meanwhile Satter appears to believe that the United States is not at all responsible for improper conduct in the relationship, and that the burden should be upon Moscow to take steps toward a consensual center.
Both approaches, in my humble opinion, seem too extremist. Why must responsibility for what has happened and what should happen rest with only one party? Furthermore, taking on the realism approach, Satter argues that "there is nothing realistic about the total absence of moral principles in international affairs" - point I believe is well taken - but then continues to suggest that any policymaker willing to make the trade-off in values for cooperation somehow stands to profit financially from this relationship with Russia. I don't think this claim makes very much sense, and seems like a conclusion driven by conspiracy ideation and paranoia.
There are also talking points from Hart/Simes which seem straight from Russia Today, such as the question "Are we holding the Russians to a higher standard of performance than we do other nations with whom we deal?" It could be argued that Russia receives exceptional status, but in the other direction ... didn't Putin get invited to the Bush family home at Kennebunkport? Didn't the EU go ahead and hold PCA talks with Russia after the violation of ceasefire terms in Georgia? This question will certainly attract some scorn from many parties, but it is precisely in the center of the debate.
Back in the 1990s, the US approach to Russia was memorably characterized by President Clinton: "Okay Boris, here's what you have to do next. Here's some more sh*t for your face."
The difference between Satter and the other authors is that Satter still believes this to be an adequate basis for US-Russian relations, while Hart and Simes understand that this approach will no longer do.
This blog seems to share Satter's delusions.
You've been trotting out that quote for quite a few comments now ... never mind that it probably was never said.
Here's the thing - I would argue that anybody who says it's ALL Russia's fault or that its ALL Washington's fault isn't being honest. There are some who would argue that Russia's treatment is often a response to their conduct - just count the number of treaties broken, and then still wonder why there is an air of distrust.
Furthermore, I think that the critique of the realism approach to foreign policy is something worthy of discussion - that Russia's cooperation on issues requiring international leadership (including everything from Iran to piracy to genocide in Africa) shouldn't necessarily always require a quid pro quo.
I stated pretty clearly how I disagree with some of Satter's critique, but the idea about the place of values in foreign policy is one that requires more than this kind of evasive dismissal.
I don't think anybody's delusions of persecution really advance the discussion.
@James
I'm pretty sure that you could care less what I think but I just wanted to commend you for this blog post. Truly fair, balanced, and informative. Thanks for bringing to our attention the Simes/Hart article even though you may have some pretty serious reservations about their positions.
Kudos!!
PS: Yup, I am being serious )))
You can take the issue of the quote up with Strobe Talbott.
As for quid pro quos, there was a time the Russian government didn't seem to need them. That attitude didn't even get them Jackson-Vanik. It did get them lots of sh*t for their faces though. So was this because the Russian government didn't give enough, or what? Whose fault was it that, for instance, Putin's support after 9-11, which by all accounts he gave against the advice of the Russian foreign policy elite, was reciprocated by the abrogation of the ABM Treaty?