Daniel Kimmage writes in Foreign Policy today about the myth of mutual interests between Russia and the United States. We've held some of these arguments in the past, such as the idea that Russia has completely opposite intentions with Iran. Kimmage is also skeptical about those who tip the scale too far, describing the Russian business environment as "selective kleptocracy" - which falls short of the "loony larceny" of Mobutu's Zaire. The fact that Russia has created a strong stabilization fund, successful hard currency, and gold reserves is not consistent with its portrayal of a complete mafia state. Like any good Russophile/Russophobe, Kimmage kicks off the discussion with complaints of frustration over the traditional myopia of Western media on Russia, and all the flawed assumptions it creates. Below he explains how Obama should play hardball when the realist plan falls through.Yes, Obama should present Russia with a good-faith offer of a constructive role in ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, energy security, and common solutions to the global economic crisis. But he needs a Plan B if Russia responds with rhetorical sops while continuing to undermine a rules-based system of international relations.
Plan B will involve measures aimed at dispelling the Kremlin's impression of Western weakness. If Russia sends the message that the road to Kabul runs through Moscow -- as it did when it enticed Kyrgyzstan to shutter a U.S. military base while kindly offering to facilitate a new U.S. supply line through Russia -- send a stronger message by exploring a new base in Georgia. Or Azerbaijan. Or even Turkmenistan. If Russian energy skullduggery leaves European customers out in the cold, go after the ill-gotten assets of the Russian elite, targeting the sleazy offshore networks of individuals in leadership positions.
These are hard-nosed moves that don't need to happen in the full glare of public back and forth. Merely telegraphing a willingness to get tough -- through messages sent behind closed doors -- can create a new, more realistic, context for achievable cooperation on clear terms.
Moscow won't like any of this, but it will understand it perfectly. Hardball is a familiar game to folks who cut their teeth far from the polite confines of Washington's elite foreign policy conclaves.
Back in those hallowed halls, much of the Washington expert community will respond with predictable howls of outrage: "We need Russia!" they will say. Really? What, exactly, has Russia done for the United States on Iran? Afghanistan? Counterterrorism? Energy security?
I notice that he dosen't say how the Georgian/Azeri base would be useful for operations in Afghanistan, nor does he say how targeting Russian elite assets would help Ukrainians pay their gas bill. All this is about is trying to force the Russian leadership to submit to US dictate, like Yeltsin did. The problem with this notion is that none of what Kimmage threatens is remotely as bad as what Russia went through the last time the Russian government tried to appease the US.
Well, luckily for you, the president appears to be going the realism route 100%, so none of this will be an issue.
That said, if Russia exploits the situation as Kimmage is predicting, then the Kremlin will succeed in proving the hardliners right, and will weaken Obama and the friendly inclined liberals.
The Russian government, wisely, do not seem to greatly care who is in power in Washington. Both conservative administrations like the Bushes, and liberal administrations, like the Clinton, will treat Russia like a doormat if given the chance. And the whole source of US-Russia friction is the determination on the part of the Russian government not to provide that chance again.
Well that's entirely the problem, as your comment illustrates. So long as the nationalists in Russia continue to think of everything in terms of "bending over" to some U.S. agenda, or framing the relationship in terms of raw power and humiliation, things are never going to move forward. In this line of thought, working with Washington on anything from Iran to Afghanistan to arms control is seen as "being treated like a doormat." The only good outcome for this crowd is unending confrontation, and the only success is the repeated foiling of any U.S. initiative.
Forget about achieving anything that contributes to Russia's security, economic growth, and health as a nation and society ... its all about arrogance, pride, and a lingering inferiority complex. No matter what happens, Putin is right, and Putin is Russia - the nationalists see no separation between the fate of the country and the fortunes of one man (the Americans did not feel the same away about Mr. Bush).
In in the end, this is quite a damaging approach to diplomacy, and one that has historically prevented Russia from achieving its interests.
What you say is true, and you would have a strong point indeed, if the Russian government hadn't spent the 1990s, and the early 2000's thorougly testing US intentions and achieving few of Russia's interests, not even repeal of a thoroughly symbolic Jackson-Vanik Amendment. I mean, talk about a cost-free US gesture! But no, the USG cannot bring themselves to do even that.
An even more damaging approach to diplomacy is to spend well-nigh twenty years reciprocating little of even symbolic value.