Defining Russia's Rational Interests

In other words, Simes and Hart argue that any given country's stated "interests" are not up for debate, and should be accepted as is.  It's the classic assumption which has weakened the realism approach, that the leadership in the Kremlin is defining these interests with unitary rationalism, directed toward the fulfillment of the national interest - nevermind the expediency for domestic politics, clan infighting, or ambitions for personal power and/or wealth, which may sometimes pose conflicts between national and partisan interests. 

For example, we are told that "Moscow wants to prevent the Taliban from returning to power in Afghanistan" while at the same time the Kremlin is rushing to deliver the first tranches of a bribe to Bishkek to close down a critical airbase.  That's completely inconsistent with the rational assumption of national interest.

Despite the predictable points of disagreement for me, the article is well written with some good ideas (such as ditching Jackson-Vanik) and other arguments worthy of debate.

There is nothing unusual about that; throughout history, countries have accommodated one another in some areas to harvest the fruits of a better relationship in others that matter more. And unless the United States can compel Russian action on issues of interest to us, something no one seems to argue is possible, mutual accommodation is the only path available to win Moscow's cooperation. We cannot realistically expect Russia to change its perspectives without getting anything in return.

Let us be clear: this does not mean America should make any unilateral concessions to Russia or any concessions at all that would damage essential U.S. interests or principles. Nor should the United States hesitate to draw clear red lines to defend our key interests, such as protecting Russia's neighbors from unprovoked aggression. Still, to demonstrate America's seriousness about resetting the U.S.-Russia relationship, the administration and Congress should consider some of the problematic but easily fixable issues that we can get off the table quickly as gestures of good faith. An obvious first step is to work together to graduate Russia from that troublesome Jackson-Vanik amendment promptly and unconditionally. Three successive U.S. administrations have promised to free Russia from these restrictions. Delivering at long last would be a cost-free message to the Russian government that Washington is a serious potential partner.

Even the best American strategy is unlikely to produce breakthroughs or the sudden transformation of our current near rivalry into a beautiful friendship. But pretending to cooperate with Russia, as we have done for almost two decades, is not a responsible course in the current troubled world. Especially if the help we need from Moscow on America's national-security priorities is not make-believe, but real.