Defining Russia's Interests in Venezuela

Later, at the peak of the rise in prices for energy sources, purely economic benefits from cooperation were added. Besides cooperation in the energy sphere, Caracas, receiving «hydrocarbon» windfall profits, was able to pay with «hard cash», not with promises and for deliveries of Russian weapons, which at least partially compensated the losses (current and potential) on the markets of China and, to a lesser degree, India.

2. In your opinion, how good for Venezuela is cooperation with the faraway RF and confrontation with the nearby USA?

The question sounds too diffuse. On the whole, the Chavez regime, which is getting closer with, among others, Russia, is good for Venezuela (the poor majority). Venezuela's policy in relation to the USA distantly recalls the Russia's policy in relation to Europe, but on a smaller scale. Venezuela, like Russia in the 1990s, was a raw-materials appendage of the USA without any rights (Russia - Europe). When the rise in prices for oil began, political ambitions began to grow as well. Russia, remaining the same raw-materials appendage of Europe, now wants to integrate into European society as an equal. Venezuela, remaining the same raw-materials appendage of the USA, is attempting to appear in the capacity of a regional integrator to spite the USA, but this does not impede the energy cooperation of Caracas and Washington. At the foundation of the foreign policy of the USA lies absolute pragmatism, and if this is necessary, they will buy what they need, even from sworn enemies - if there is no other way. And if this is not beneficial - then the USA will not meet even the very closest allies halfway - this is where they differ, let us say, from the USSR, which often supported allies to its own detriment

3. In your opinion, how realistic is the possibility that the moderate reformers in this region ( the presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay) will swerve to the left?

I would say not "swerve to the left", but "radicalize". South America right now on the whole represents a leftist continent - the USA in this sense has lost it. The only rightist pro-American regime there is in Colombia, and it is in many ways holding on with American bayonets. The rest of the regimes can be divided into moderately leftist (a vivid example - that same socialist de Silva in Brazil, who indeed is the leader of the «moderates» in the region), and leftist radicals («bolivarian hooligans») headed by Chavez (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, in some measure - Cuba and Paraguay).

In consideration of the crisis, a sharp drop in the standard of living of the population is expected, and here totally opposite variants of the development of events are possible. It is possible that this will provoke bolivarian revolutions in countries with a moderate regime, and the entire continent will become «bright red». But, in consideration of the high role of the military in the political life of these countries, overthrows are possible too, based on the results of which the white wealthy minority, relying on the military-and-police repressive apparat, will rule the poor majority, physically annihilating those who think differently.

4. «Russia has every right to declare about her strategic interests in the Western hemisphere against the background of the declarations of the USA about its interests on the post-Soviet space ». But why was Russia not able to declare about its interests on the post-Soviet space?

Russia, in my opinion, was able to declare about its interests on the post-Soviet space quite effectively, moreover not in word, but in deed. Here both the victory in the «five-day war», after which Russia once again began to be regarded as the principal military guarantor of stability in the post-Soviet region, and the dislodging of the Americans from «Manas», and other, less [large-]scale and noticeable events. What is being spoken of here is that in such a manner they're trying to tell the Americans - «look, we can mess around under your belly as well». For countries with an «insular» psychology, like the USA, it is very unpleasant to be realize that they can be «had» at home - let us recall what a shock the terrorist acts of 11 September caused, when the Americans were attacked not somewhere in their embassy in Africa or on a destroyer in the Near East, but right at home. Or, what is more pertinent for the given question - the reaction of the USA to the deployment of missiles on Cuba in 1962, although this, once again, was a symmetrical response to the actions of the USA in the immediate proximity of the USSR - in Turkey. True, what is being spoken of now is not the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in the region, and certainly not the support of anti-American terrorists.

5. Doesn't the ill feeling on the part of Brazil, Guyana and Colombia in connection with the shipments of Russian weapons to Venezuela threaten Russia?

I can't say anything about Guyana - I simply don't know. As concerns Colombia, it is totally oriented towards the USA, Russia does not cooperate with it closely in practically any sphere at all, so its reaction does not worry Moscow. This is like in the situation with Georgia, although Georgia is closer to Russia territorially and culturally. As for Brazil, it is unlikely that the shipments of Russian weapons to Venezuela are going to seriously harm it. First, the country is a regional and one of the world leaders in the production and sale of weapons, competing with Russia, and the Russian specimens shipped to Venezuela on the whole are not dangerous for the Brazilian armed forces. Second, Chavez himself has not displayed aggression in relation to Brazil and indeed any regimes in South America, besides the pro-American Colombian one. Finally, Brazil is connected with Russia by sufficiently close trade relations (the country is one of the largest suppliers of meat), and it will not likely want to lose such a promising sales market for its ag output, especially in light of the crisis and of the reduction of other markets the world over.

6. How do you assess the state of the opposition in Venezuela?

The opposition in Venezuela is sufficiently strong, and Chavez's power is not as solid as this seems at first glance. This can be seen too by the results of the last referendum, where he won by a not very large margin. The strength of Chavez's regime is in two things. First - his personal charisma. Second - he was able to fix up a sufficiently effective system for the redistribution of «oil» incomes in favor of the minority, but this is specifically a redistribution - there are problems in the country with the creation of an industrial base independent of the export of hydrocarbons. In consideration of the world crisis and the fall in prices for them, this could give the opposition new chances.

7. If «the principal direction of cooperation will lie in the sphere of the production and refining of oil and the help that Russia can render in the construction of the so-called «South American gas ring», then for how long will this be? After all, the reserves of oil and gas in Venezuela and Russia are not going to last forever?

Sufficiently long - what could be spoken of is decades. It is more likely that the Chavez regime will fall than that energy resources will end in Venezuela.

8. Is the «gas ring» realistic there, if there are big problems with gas rings here (the South and North Streams - very expensive and there are opponents of these projects).

More likely this is hyperbole. The USA are diversifying deliveries of hydrocarbons to themselves and will never allow anybody to become a monopolist in this question. Here, Russia in some far-distant future may even compete with South America for the North American market - the opening of a plant for the production of LNG on Sakhalin leads one to such thoughts. Although this is a decidedly distant prospect.

9. Will the "resetting" of relations with the USA after the coming of Obama force Russia to do some "resetting" of its own in relations with Venezuela, for example in the quantity of military contracts, which create fertile soil for tension in that region?

I don't see any real "resetting" of Russian-American relations for now - only words. So that a "resetting would truly appear, the USA are going to have to abandon many of their strategic objectives, which they, judging by the first steps of the Obama administration, do not intend to abandon for now - what is being spoken of is only a change in the methods of achieving them. For example, it has already been repeated many times that Washington will once again reconsider the advisability of building a ballistic missile defense - and what of it? Reconsider and say whether you'll build or not, but there's no sense in repeating yourself. Now, if there are going to be concessions - not imaginary, but real - on the part of Washington (abandonment of ballistic missile defense, abandonment of lobbying for «Nabucco» and so on), then it does make sense to discuss what concessions Russia is ready to go for, including also in the sphere of MTC [military-technical cooperation, Russian for "selling arms"--Trans.] with Venezuela.

10. If the Iranian nuclear program, being implemented not without the help of the RF, rouses such irritation the world over, then will not the Venezuelan one, likewise implemented not without the help of the RF, become such an irritant?

Recently, the chief of the Pentagon Robert Gates himself (who has remained in the Obama administration) declared in relation to South America that he is more concerned about the actions of Iran there than about those of Russia. Unlike Iran, where both nuclear weapons and the means of delivery can be created in the foreseeable future, the situation in Venezuela is completely different. For now, as much as I understand it, the development of the nuclear sphere there is taking place only in words, and there exist serious reasons for this. First, Venezuela is rich in hydrocarbons, and, what is most important, produces them in a sufficient quantity to remove the necessity for the development of the «peaceful atom» (Iran is also rich, but does not produce enough). Second, Venezuela does not have such neighbors-irritants who possess nuclear weapons as Israel is for Iran. Argentina and Brazil did attempt to do something in the given sphere, but they abandoned their attempts back in the 1970s-80s. So Russian-Venezuelan nuclear cooperation (but not the sale of conventional weapons) could very well become the first concession on the part of Moscow in the event that Washington truly demonstrates its readiness for dialogue, and the "resetting" about which was spoken above truly comes.

Photo: Pavel Salin (photo from www.treli.ru)