The Politics of Parole

A detailed history of Budanov's violent crimes could fill an encyclopedia, so I'll just cite two paragraphs from Peter Baker and Susan Glasser's book Kremlin Rising, describing the murder of Elza, who was abducted by Budanov for "questioning" after a full day of drinking:

"For two hours, Budanov and Elza were alone in his tent. Budanov later claimed that he was questioning her about her rebel ties and that she insulted him, threatened to kill his family, and lunged for his gun. Yet Elza could hardly speak Russian, relatives said later, and was incapable of such elaborate conversation in what was to her a foreign language.

Sometime after 3 a.m., Budanov emerged from the tent. Inside, Elza was dead. She had been beaten, stripped naked, and strangled. (...)

The examination by a military forensics laboratory found black-and-blue marks all over Elza's face, neck, and body, strangulation marks on her neck, and severe damage to a "plethora of internal organs" that appeared to be the result of repeated blows by a heavy object. The experts reported finding injuries to her hymen and rectum along with bleeding proving "those injuries were inflicted approximately one hour before death."

Yet it is this individual, whose case became an accidental referendum on the war in Chechnya, who was granted parole this week, as the authorities cite the five years of pre-trial detention and good behavior in prison.

The Yukos prisoners however, the best-known being Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, who stand accused of non-violent offenses, imprisoned on convictions that would not stand in any rule of law court (the Swiss Federal Tribunal, for example, has declared their cases politically motivated), are wholly unable to obtain parole or early conditional release. Many of the Yukos prisoners have also spent more than five years in pre-trial detention with exemplary behavior, and Svetlana Bakhmina, who recently gave birth while still serving her sentence, had her appeal hearing for early conditional discharge delayed yet again on the same day the Budanov decision was handed down.

So what is it about the politics of parole that lets a self-confessed murderer walk while innocent people are not given the luxury of even arguing their case for release? Firstly, it is instructive to take a close look at how one parole came about.

It was the one notable development in the Yukos-related cases near the end of 2008, when former general counsel Vasily Alexanyan, who was subjected to medical blackmail after contracting AIDS and tuberculosis while in custody, was granted "parole" on an absurdly high $1.8 million bond. Before we all raise our arms and rejoice that the Russian courts have returned to justice and sanity, we need to understand that this judicial decision was too little too late. Anyone who believes Alexanyan's release had more to do with justice, rather than political expediency, is seriously misled.

First there is the issue of the timing of this judicial decision, one that is inextricably linked to the Bakhmina parole hearing on the same day, which was delayed without justification. This is something that appears to have gotten lost in the press coverage. On Dec. 8, the court ruled to grant Alexanyan parole, whereas only six weeks earlier they had ruled to extend his detention, despite the fact that he was terminally ill with lymphatic cancer due to his untreated immune deficiency. There was a reason for this sudden reversal, and it was not just an inspired moment of altruism.

On Monday, Dec. 22, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled that Russia had violated Alexanyan's constitutional and basic human rights in denying him urgent medical care, and called for his immediate release. According to my sources, Russian authorities allegedly caught wind of the ECHR decision early, and preempted any obligation to observe the ruling by arranging for a release of Alexanyan, and buying them impunity on the Bakhmina case, whose online petition has already garnered more than 90,000 signatures in support of her release. If Russia had not granted the parole and bail decision before the ECHR, they would have been obligated to release him unconditionally with no bail.

Secondly, there is the issue of the bail bond itself. The purpose of a bail bond is to secure an individual's attendance at a set upcoming trial. However the proceedings in Alexanyan's case were stayed, and as such, there was no trial date set for the future. Thus, it is completely illogical to demand a bail, and no one can say for certain exactly what this money is for or what it secures. Alexanyan himself has described the bail as "cynical." Alexander Arkhangelsky of state-run media RIA Novosti wrote that it was set at "an outrageously high sum," while I would go further to describe the bond as what it is: another criminal extortion and a forced bribe by the authorities. It is my suspicion that the bail was set at such a high amount as part of an effort to taint Alexanyan's reputation with the guilt of wealth, and try to make him look like the prototypical white collar criminal that they were never able to prove that he was in court. The fact is, and this was again downplayed in the media coverage, that the family and lawyers for Alexanyan struggled very hard to raise these funds through donations (I personally received numerous emails from readers offering to donate to the cause, despite the fact that I do not represent this party).

Lastly, it is a complete illusion that Alexanyan has been "released" in the same capacity as Budanov. He has been bed-ridden with fatal illness for months now, and all that this $1.8 million paid for was the removal of the guards at the same clinic, and the ability of his family to visit for what may become his final days alive. The parole imposes severe restrictions on him (he is prevented from traveling abroad, and they are attempting to restrict him to residing at just one address - meaning it would be a violation, for example, for him to switch hospitals).

Under Russian law, a prisoner becomes eligible for early conditional release when they have served half of their term and exhibit a record of good behavior in the penal facility. Both of these requirements had been met in surplus by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, yet in August his filing for release was rejected by the authorities after numerous delays, citing that the prisoner had failed to attend a sewing class. In other words, the decision was a complete farce.

In today's court system in Russia, meeting the legal requirements for early release has extremely little to do with whether or not the court grants the decision. This has been demonstrated repeatedly in all the high-profile releases of political prisoners such as Mikhail Trepashkin, and, to a lesser extent, Sergei Storchak (who was better described as a prisoner of the clan wars). These release decisions were the result of complex political negotiating and bargaining, followed by an order handed down from above to the judge to take the appropriate decision. When there is no clear order coming down, such as in the case of Bakhmina, the issue is indefinitely delayed while the judges await instructions - there are few independently-minded judges left that are willing to act on evidence and risk angering the executive.

It is beyond my role to predict whether or not we will see any positive political developments within the Kremlin with regard to the Yukos prisoners and the release of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, but it is clear that the case has become the definitive referendum on the leadership's expressed dedication to eliminating legal nihilism and cracking down on corruption. Like so many other pressing issues in Russia, from the natural gas dispute to the confrontations with bordering nations, all will depend upon what value they assign to the issue of reputation. For as much as we hear Russian officials clamoring for "respect" abroad, we don't see it backed up by much action.

Upper photo: Chechens hold posters reading "Where is a justice?" and "A murderer should be in a prison!" during a rally against former colonel Yuri Budanov discharged in Grozny on December 25, 2008.  (AFP/Getty Images)