The Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the European Union and the Russian Federation, which will reopen for talks in early December, sounds and feels very appealing from afar. Like any well marketed piece of diplomacy, it contains all the words that make us feel safe, fair, and respectful, providing for (in theory) a legal framework to guide relations between the EU as a whole and Russia - in such difficult spheres as energy, investment, and security. Recently it was decided to resume the negotiations to prepare a new PCA with Russia following a punitive delay in the wake of the invasion of Georgia, despite Moscow's failure to withdraw troops to positions held on Aug. 7, as agreed in the Sarkozy-brokered plan.But can the PCA really solve so many problems so quickly?
Perhaps some of us could be forgiven for believing that this piece of
Brussels bureaucracy is some sort of panacea for all the problems
Europe has with Russia's policies, or even a panacea for some of the problems within the EU itself, threatening its coherent identity and purpose. Not Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform,
who today warns us that far from settling any of the major EU-Russia
diplomatic puzzles, the debate over the empty PCA represents a
distraction in place of the real discussion that needs to take place.
Barysch, who has written extensively and intelligently on the energy problem,
argues that the EU is sending a message to Moscow and the world by
opening up these discussions so quickly - that a new reality has been
accepted in the Caucasus, and that we have returned to business as
usual. Excerpt below:
EU politicians do have a point when they say that the Europeans need to continue to engage with Russia in areas ranging from energy security to preventing Iran's nuclear bomb. What is troubling, however, is that the decision on the PCA was not accompanied by a more thorough debate on the future of the EU's Russia policy. EU leaders did ask the Commission to conduct an "audit" of the different policy areas that matter for the EU and Russia, such as energy, trade, foreign policy, research and visas. The result is an anodyne, technical document that does little more than illustrate the fact that the EU and Russia depend on each other in many ways. The implicit conclusion is: let's continue working together. But the document does not answer the question why. Is co-operation a means to an end (it was once seen as a way towards a "strategic partnership" and "common values")? Is it meant to further the EU's interests? If so, which ones and how? Or does the EU proceed with the dozens of co-operation and support programmes simply because it cannot agree on an alternative?
The Europeans need a more political, strategic debate about what they want and need from Russia. This will take time. The Georgia war has not narrowed the gap between the different national positions as much as many people had initially predicted. But this gap makes a political debate on Russia all the more urgent. By next year the Europeans will have to forge a coherent response to Medvedev's proposal for a new European security architecture. Sarkozy told Medvedev at the Nice summit that the idea would be discussed within the framework of the OSCE in 2009. But Sarkozy did not necessarily speak on behalf of his EU colleagues, many of whom suspect strongly that Russia simply wants to split the Europeans and drive a wedge between Europe and the US. Nor did all EU governments welcome Sarkozy's idea of a 'deal' on missiles under which the US would suspend the deployment of missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic while Russia would withdraw the threat of putting Iskander missiles into Kaliningrad.
The PCA negotiations - which will be conducted mainly by the European Commission - will not provide the answer to such questions.
