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Recognition of South Ossetia: A Trump Card Played Too Early

I would count myself as one of those surprised by President Dmitry Medvedev's fast-track decision to endorse the Duma's non-binding resolution to officially recognize the independence of Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. "Recognition" of independence is a rather inflexible political good, one that is difficult to retract or cancel as an incentive for leverage in negotiations with Washington and Europe, and one that gains Russia very little in terms of any geopolitical advantage.

So why would Medvedev recognize these territories now, at the cost of such enormous damage to the country's reputation and crashing the stock market yet again, when such a move gets him nothing? In the interests and defense of those Georgians who were given Russian passports? That argument seems highly unlikely, as does the farcical argument Moscow is trying to position the invasion, ex post facto, in nearly the exact language of the Balkan situation, citing warp-speed humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide and ethnic cleansing (the Serbs, by the way, are going to be pretty upset that they've been abandoned).

What is clear is that the Russians are not playing any kind of international diplomatic game here, but rather making decisions in a concerted effort to change the facts on the ground. The fact that Medvedev's tone has changed so dramatically in recent weeks (the formerly eloquent anti-corruption law professor now calling the Georgian president a "moron" and taunting in the language of a silovik, not a modern politician) would lead one to believe that he is under tremendous pressure from the internal clan struggles to seize as much power and initiative as possible, and spearheading the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia buys him some time and some wiggle room to fend off the hawks.

For some weeks now, Medvedev will be flying high on the winds of Russian nationalism, as the majority of the country (even those who get their news outside of state-controlled TV) believe in the righteousness of the invasion. Liberal columnist Alexei Pankin was even taunted into acquiescence by a friend for his initial even-handed treatment of the cause of war, who wrote to him: "In 1945, those Russian barbarians used unjustified force to savagely violate Germany's territorial integrity, and they pushed its duly elected chancellor to suicide." Yes, many Russian liberals are willing to believe that Saakashvili, of the minuscule Georgia with its extremely small army, actually had the ambitions of Hitler to take over Russia. If you're not buying that one, there are plenty willing to paint the man as WMD-less version of Saddam Hussein. Let's just say that there are so many assumptions on all sides of this conflict that are quite beyond belief.

In my opinion, we are once again seeing Russia's internal politics guide the decision making in its foreign policy, and the results for the country's reputation and future relationships are disastrous. This is not to mention how little thought Moscow has seemed to put into how it will handle this extremely difficult precedent with its own separatist territories. Much much more on this to come later.

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Comments (1)

Sebaneau [TypeKey Profile Page]:

http://www.newkosovareport.com/200808271165/Columns/Analyzing-Moscow-s-recognition-of-South-Ossetia-and-Abkhazia-as-independent-countries.html
From Kosovo to Georgia: Russia against Russia [and Serbia] PDF Print E-mail
Image , 27 August 2008

When Russia joined Serbia in opposing the independence of Kosovo, the West did not like it, but when Moscow said that the recognition could create a precedent, this concern was considered a legitimate one [by those who didn't know the 1974 Constitution]. After all, the world is full of ethnic divisions, although most of them relatively dormant.

Therefore the West promised that this would be a unique case defined by two conditions: the long record of crimes against humanity committed by the Serbs during the last decade and Serbia's inability to integrate Kosovo back. Diplomats and high officials tried to convince Russia that the West was determined to reject any effort to use Kosovo as a precedent. Russia remained unconvinced [they were already intent upon using Kosovo as a bargaining chip or an as excuse for their numerous aggressions against their neighbors].

Of course during those tense months of negotiations with Moscow, no one in the West thought that despite all this talk about international law, Russia would be the first to use Kosovo as a precedent [on the contrary, that possibility was quite obvious].

Why was Russia fighting so hard? If the West joined them and China against any effort to make Kosovo a precedent, who else could have been capable of challenging this decision? Who was Russia afraid of?

Well, apparently, Russia was afraid of itself. This can be the only conclusion given the recent Moscow's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. After lecturing the West and the rest of the world about the danger of Kosovo precedent, Russia became the first in history to use it as one.

Comparison with Kosovo is quite a long stretch
Russia's position is simple: if Kosovo has the right to become a state, why not South Ossetia and Abkhazia? It is a question that some people have been asking in the West too --those who either have little knowledge about either case or have political or economic reasons to go against their current governments.

Georgia treatment of these two provinces is nothing to be proud of. However, this is not even near the mass graves filled with killed civilians that the Serbian army and aramilitary units left behind in Kosovo. It is enough to mention the 800 bodies that the Serbs took with them from Kosovo to Belgrade in a desperate effort to hide their crimes from history [actually, almost 1,000 have already been repatriated]. These bodies were found later buried in three mass graves near the capital of Serbia. They were added to more than 10,000 civilians killed during the war in Kosovo, most of them ethnic Albanians [that's closer to 12,000].

Georgians may have never been serious about improving the life of the Ossetians and Abkhazians but they have never planned a forced mass exodus of their populations as the Serbs did and later executed in Kosovo. [On the contrary, the Georgians have been the victims of massive ethnic cleansing]

The extent to which the Serbs have burned their bridges with the Kosovars is seen in the inability of the most moderate politicians in both sides to sit and agree with each other [That's inaccurate: The LDS leadership is quite willing to sit down with the Kosovars]. Despite all these, the West has insisted, to the strong discontent of the Kosovars, to offer only conditional independence to Kosovo. The new state will be under supervision and its treatment of minorities, its relations with neighbors and its self-ruling efficiency will determine whether this independence will stand the test of time.

This is a far cry from the way the Russians have supported the full and undisputable independence of the two autonomous "republics".

Leaving principles and moral issues aside and putting on the practical lens: an independent Kosovo is the only practical choice in the region. Kosovo is too big for Serbia to handle. Belgrade and the region cannot afford a long-term conflict. Kosovo in Serbia is not like Chechnya in Russia, a rebelling corner in a large federation. A more adequate comparison would be with Russia trying to recover a territory four times the size of Ukraine.

While some can say that Abkhazia is not that small compared to Georgia either, it is worth pointing out that while Serbia has a population of around four times the population of Kosovo, Georgia has a population of 18 times the population of Abkhazia (of which at least 20% are Georgians and less than half ethnic Abkhazians [not to mention the 40 % Georgians who have been victims of ethnic cleansing]). While it is not fair to discriminate on the basis of population size, it is also worth noting that Kosovo with two million people is not identical to South Ossetia of 70 thousand.

Finally, what really matters is that Kosovo with its larger size and blessed with natural resources is a viable state while the two former Georgian provinces will be at the mercy of Russian life support and will practically join the federation de facto if not de jure.

A blow to Russia's image
By opposing the West's recognition of Kosovo's independence Russia somehow became a champion to the countries that fear the creation of new states could one day endanger their own territorial integrity. Many of them care little for Serbia and few of them see a practical connection between Kosovo's case and their own situation, but they considered it prudent to see this project fail.

However, with its decision to "recognize" both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent republics, Russia is bound to become a strong disappointment in the eyes of those who thought that its opposition to Kosovo's independence was based on principles. Furthermore, by keeping unchanged its position on Kosovo, Russia appears as hypocritical by the rest of the countries, which recognized the self-determination right of Kosovo.

After carefully and craftily building a strong image in the world, Russia has rushed to taint it within a few weeks with military and political moves that wwere completely avoidable. For the first time in recent years, Russia has shown little confidence in its political clout in international affairs.

Since the second week of August, many friends of Georgia throughout the world had thought that Georgia fell into Russia's trap by responding with force to "South Ossetians' harassment" [actually they were perfectly aware of the larger invasion, and that's what they responded to]. However, now is the time for the friends of Russia to scratch their heads and try to understand how Russia did this to itself.

Were those two provinces worth Russia's international image, or a possible change in the Western position on Chechnya and other republics in the Daghestan area or elsewhere in the federation? [Don't hold your breath] Until now, Russia was in the comfortable international position of blaming the West for weakening the UN. Russia's yesterday decision reversed the situation.

Furthermore, to Serbia, which has placed much its trust and hope on Russia's support for their fight against Kosovo's independence, the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states is bad news. Now, Belgrade has to find a way to refuse Russia's invitation to join it in its new unreasonable stance, which, as the foreign minister of Sweden said, is not against the West any more, but against the entire international community.

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This page contains a single entry from the blog posted on August 26, 2008 10:02 PM.

The previous post in this blog was Stumping the War at the DNC.

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