FTD: The End of Putin's Legend

Myth No. 1: "Putin brought Russia economic recovery."

Nobody will deny that most Russians are better off today than eight years ago. Real wages have more than doubled, pensions are paid on time, and in the big cities, the temples of consumerism are shooting out of the ground. The basis for this development, however, was laid at a time that is today demonised, namely during the radical reforms of the 1990s, which are loathed in Russia. As Russia expert Anders Aslund proves in his book Russia's Capitalist Revolution, it was the painful measures of price liberalisation, privatisation, and the cutting of subventions that allowed a market economy to take root in the first place. Putin came to office after the bank crisis of 1998 and after the devaluation of the rouble – at a time when the macro-economic imbalances had been eliminated. From then on, things could only improve.

Myth No. 2: "Russia once again enjoys political prestige in the world."

Putin’s fans recall the Russian president’s speech at the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy with a shudder of delight: Putin’s aggressive appearance showed “Russia is back again.” But what kind of country is it that has to insist on being taken seriously at every opportunity? In fact, Putin’s term of office is marked by a series of foreign policy defeats. The attempt to influence the presidential election in Ukraine was a grandiose failure. Despite resistance from Moscow, Kosovo has become independent. And Russia is surrounded by states that desire nothing more than to get out from under the influence of its large neighbour. Out of sheer frustration, Russia again and again turns the valve on energy resources in order to demonstrate its power. As a result, it also damages its credibility as a reliable provider of energy resources.

Myth No. 3: "Political conditions have stabilised."

This is a favourite argument of the Kremlin’s friends. Against the backdrop of the uncivilised political disputes of the 1990s, this appears at first glance convincing enough. Putin reined in power to the centre, placed the previously high-handed governors under his control, and, on top of that, installed seven federal prefects. In addition, he banned every form of real opposition and confined the nation-wide television channels to court reporting. That is to say, all responsibility now lies with the number one person in the state. Such a system functions so long as money in the form of petrodollars continues to fall from the sky and a lot of people go on getting a little bit of it – as is the case at the moment. Things will get dangerous, however, if times get rougher, which can hardly be avoided. That the Kremlin is aware of this is shown by its reaction to the protests from pensioners, who took to the streets at the start of 2005 in opposition to planned social reforms. The plans were immediately withdrawn.

Myth No. 4: "Crime in Russia has been reduced."

Here, too, the 1990s have to be held up as a picture of horror. Extortionists and gang warfare defined everyday life at the time, it is believed. However, nothing has changed here. Enterprises are still being taken over by wilful gangsters – but now they often have good contacts to law enforcement agencies. According to findings from the World Bank, corruption in Russia has even increased. The number of murders has also remained the same, according to official statistics.

Myth No. 5: "Putin took on the oligarchs."

It is dubious praise to credit a state for putting its most capable men in their place. But even if one accepts the argument that the Russian nouveaux riches plundered the country, Putin did nothing to stop them. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the very oligarch who most quickly realised that he had social responsibility, is sitting in prison. Others, however, such as Oleg Deripaska or Roman Abramovich, were able to greatly increase their wealth – with the blessing, with the support, and to the benefit of the Kremlin.

Putin was not a great president. He was lucky and profited from the work of his predecessors. The Russian governments that follow will have to pay for the consequences of his term in office. They are not to be envied.